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Bankers and Chancellors 
William W. Bratton* & Michael L. Wachter** 
The Delaware Chancery Court recently squared off against the investment 
banking world with two rulings that tie Revlon violations to banker conflicts of 
interest.  Critics charge the court with slamming down fiduciary principles of 
self-abnegation in a business context where they have no place or, 
contrariwise, letting culpable banks off the hook with ineffectual slaps on the 
wrist.  This Article addresses this controversy, offering a sustained look at the 
banker–client advisory relationship.  We pose a clear answer to the questions 
raised: although this is nominally fiduciary territory, both banker–client 
relationships and the Chancery Court’s recent interventions are contractually 
driven.  At the same time, conflicts of interest are wrought into banker–client 
relationships: the structure of the advisory sector makes them hard to avoid 
and clients, expecting them, make allowances.  Advisor banks emerge in 
practice as arm’s-length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than 
by a market for reputation.  Meanwhile, the boards of directors that engage 
bankers clearly are fiduciaries in law and fact and company sales processes 
implicate enhanced scrutiny of their performance under Revlon.  Revlon 
scrutiny, however, is less about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation than about 
diligence in getting the best deal for the shareholders.  The Chancery Court’s 
banker cases treat conflicts in a contractual rather than fiduciary frame, 
standing for the proposition that a client with a Revlon duty has no business 
consenting to a conflict and then passively trusting that the conflicted fiduciary 
will deal in the best of faith.  The client should instead treat the banker like an 
arm’s-length counterparty, assuming self-interested motivation on the banker’s 
part and using contract to protect itself and its shareholders.  As a doctrinal 
and economic matter, the banker cases are about taking contract seriously and 
getting performance incentives properly aligned and not about traditional 
fiduciary ethics.  They deliver considerably more than a slap on the wrist, 
having already ushered in a demonstrably stricter regime of conflict 
management in sell-side boardrooms.  They also usher in the Delaware 
Chancery Court itself as a focal-point player in the market for banker 
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reputation.  The constraints of the reputational market emerge as more robust 
in consequence. 
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I. Introduction 
On Valentine’s Day 2011, Delaware’s Vice-Chancellor Travis Laster 
enjoined the shareholder vote on a private equity buyout of Del Monte 
Foods Company.  The ground: the company’s board of directors was 
disabled from acting fairly in approving the merger due to the conflicted 
position of its investment banker–advisor, Barclays.1  The injunction lasted 
only twenty days, and the deal eventually closed.2  Even so, the ruling 
rocked the world of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)3 by casting standard 
practices into question, most prominently “stapled” financing—an arrange-
ment in which the selling company’s banker–advisor also finances the 
purchase price for the buyer.  Uncertainty followed for sell-side companies, 
their advisors, and their counsel.4 
 
1. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 839–40 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
2. Id. at 840. 
3. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Him Again? Laster Rips Barclays, Holds up Del Monte Sale to PE 
Group, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/15/him-
again-laster-rips-barclays-holds-up-del-monte-sale-to-pe-group, archived at http://perma.cc/4M9Z 
-AQWL (noting that the decision “casts a harsh light” on typical Wall Street bank M&A advisory 
practices). 
4. See David Marcus, The Case of J. Travis Laster, DEAL PIPELINE (Apr. 1, 2011, 12:51 PM), 
http://pipeline.thedeal.com/tdd/ViewArticle.dl?id=10003542734, archived at http://perma.cc/MY 
Q5-Y3Z8 (discussing Vice-Chancellor Laster’s boldness, the decision in Del Monte, and legal and 
financial professionals’ concerns about the resulting lack of predictability in their work); Vipal 
Monga, Make My Day, DEAL PIPELINE (Feb. 18, 2011, 11:21 AM), 
http://pipeline.thedeal.com/tdd/ViewBlog.dl?id=38439, archived at http://perma.cc/R2YN-H6GZ 
(“Laster’s opinion exposes the taken-for-granted process that occurs in many going-private 
deals.”); Shira Ovide & Gina Chon, Judge Delays KKR’s Del Monte Deal and Slams Barclays, 
WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/02/15/judge-
delays-kkrs-del-monte-deal-and-slams-barclays, archived at http://perma.cc/32SW-39PD 
(reporting on Vice-Chancellor Laster’s criticism of Barclays for providing what many banks 
believe is “bread-and-butter” advisory work).  Commentary continued for some time.  See, e.g., 
Robert Teitelman, Strine, El Paso and the Shaming Thing, DEAL PIPELINE (Mar. 7, 2012, 
1:01 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/strine-el-paso-and-the-shaming-thing.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZC5X-VH72 (describing Vice-Chancellor Laster as suffering 
“considerable blowback”). 
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A second upset followed just over a year later, when then-Chancellor 
Leo Strine ruled on a request to enjoin the shareholder vote on the merger 
of El Paso Corporation into Kinder Morgan, Inc.5  Investment banker con-
flicts had poisoned the sell-side well once again and the court excoriated the 
actors responsible, in particular Goldman Sachs.6  But this time the 
injunction was refused, the chancellor declining to obstruct sell-side 
shareholder access to what might be deemed a good deal.7  Reaction again 
was loud.  Some praised the chancellor’s shaming strategy,8 while others 
accused him of surrendering to the investment banking interest in declining 
to enjoin.9  Still others thought that any surrender was to the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers10: the chancellor had departed from “traditional principles of 
agency law.”11  It was a case of a judge making a mountain out of a Wall 
Street molehill.12  There were even whispers about ulterior motives—many 
 
5. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 433, 452 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
6. Id. at 440–44. 
7. The case was not closed, for the breaches of duty were left over for ex post litigation over 
liability and damages.  Id. at 451–52. 
8. See Reynolds Holding, Judges’ Words Can Speak as Loudly as Actions, REUTERS 
BREAKINGVIEWS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2012/03/20/judges-
words-can-speak-as-loudly-as-actions, archived at http://perma.cc/JU7S-DUEY (describing 
strong, public shaming techniques like Chancellor Strine’s as “useful precedent” in shaping 
behavior); Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Losers in the El Paso Corp. Opinion, DEALBOOK, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/the-losers-in-the-el-
paso-corp-opinion/?, archived at http://perma.cc/U42H-RGAY (identifying seller CEO Douglas 
Foshee and the bank as the losers); Teitelman, supra note 4. 
9. See David Weidner, Is Leo Strine Serious?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203961204577268191951502420.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8WPK-3UR2 (arguing that Chancellor Strine colorfully criticized the 
transaction but ultimately failed to provide a remedy for the shareholders); Stefan Padfield, A Test 
Case for Shaming as Sanction?, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 10, 2012, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/a-test-case-for-shaming-as-sanction.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R63Q-2VCG (expressing skepticism that the bankers from Goldman would face 
any real financial or reputational consequences following Chancellor Strine’s decision to deny an 
injunction in El Paso); Brian J.M. Quinn, Is Corporate Law Serious?  Maybe . . . Maybe Not, 
M&A L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2012/03/is-
corporate-law-serious.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SD7G-EAAN (considering whether 
leaving decisions up to shareholders, as in the El Paso decision, represents a failure of corporate 
law); Jonathan Weil, Goldman Raises Conflicts to a High Art, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 8, 2012, 
7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-09/goldman-sachs-raises-conflicts-to-a-
high-art-jonathan-weil.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TU9N-9JP3 (suggesting that bankers 
emerged as the real winner). 
10. Alison Frankel, How Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Are Winning the Delaware Injunction Game, 
ANALYSIS & OPINION, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/03/ 
07/how-plaintiffs-lawyers-are-winning-the-delaware-injunction-game/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/S3AM-JAGL (noting that filing for preliminary injunctions can help shareholders recover after-
the-fact damages, which helps plaintiffs’ lawyers recover fees). 
11. Robert T. Miller, Journeys in Revlon-Land with a Conflicted Financial Advisor: Del 
Monte and El Paso 18 (Univ. of Iowa, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-24, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abs=2156488, archived at http://perma.cc/QP6T-J3A2. 
12. See Matt Levine, Delaware Judge Driven to Possibly Obscene Energy Industry 
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see today’s Delaware courts in an awkward institutional position, working 
to retain their leading position as corporate law arbiters even as plaintiffs 
increasingly choose other venues for litigation of Delaware corporate law 
claims.13  Recent Chancery Court decisions can be seen as compensating 
tilts in the direction of the plaintiffs’ bar14 and these investment banker 
cases readily take the profile.15 
Blowback continued a year later still.  The Chancery Court’s hard 
looks at Barclays and Goldman had come to be seen as game changers16: 
sell-side boards suddenly had become ultrasensitive to banker conflicts;17 
staples were said to have largely disappeared;18 and big banks like Goldman 
 
Euphemism by Kinder-El Paso Merger, DEALBREAKER (Mar. 1, 2012, 6:47 PM), 
http://dealbreaker.com/2012/03/delaware-judge-driven-to-possibly-obscene-energy-industry-euph 
emism-by-kinder-el-paso-merger/, archived at http://perma.cc/XP2R-NTN6 (“Strine makes much 
of the fact that Morgan Stanley only got paid if the merger happened.  Welcome to all mergers!  
That, by the way, is actually a real conflict.  But it’s hallowed by tradition so whatever.”).  
Inconsistency between the cases’ two results also was a topic of discussion.  See, e.g., Solomon, 
supra note 8 (recognizing that the decision of the chancellor in El Paso was a “different approach 
than the one adopted” in Del Monte). 
13. A stack of scholarly studies confirms this.  See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A 
Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 3, 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JL94-WF78 (studying 1,117 M&A transactions greater than $100 million from 
2005 to 2011 and finding that “Delaware attracts only 44.6% of [state merger] litigation”); 
Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 361, 369 
(2011) (analyzing a dataset of state securities class action filings and finding that “while the 
number of Delaware securities class actions has increased, the relative percentage of Delaware 
cases compared to those in other jurisdictions has fallen”); Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder 
Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 137, 148 (2011) (studying a dataset of 119 mergers and showing that only 7% of mergers 
that involved litigation were filed solely in Delaware and 40% were filed solely outside of 
Delaware); John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 19–20 (Nw. Univ., Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 10-03, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7KFZ-M8R8 (showing that Delaware courts have been receiving a declining share 
of suits relating to M&A, as “suits against Delaware targets have become increasingly common in 
both federal court and in other state courts”). 
14. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1252 (Del. 2012), aff’g In re S. 
Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (affirming a Delaware 
Chancery Court award of over $2 billion in damages and over $304 million in attorneys’ fees); 
Alison Frankel, Record $285 ML Fee Award is Strine’s Message to Plaintiff’s Bar, ANALYSIS & 
OPINION, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/12/21/record-
285-ml-fee-award-is-strines-message-to-plaintiffs-bar/, archived at http://perma.cc/PYE2-RHHA 
(noting that Strine’s opinion in Southern Copper indicated Delaware would continue to reward 
plaintiff’s firms for bringing high-risk suits by ensuring they are “well compensated”). 
15. We note that any compensating tilts are in turn compensated by Chancery Court decisions 
that constrain plaintiffs’ venue choices.  See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron 
Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013) (sustaining forum selection bylaws). 
16. See Liz Hoffman, Boutique Banks Ride Conflict Fears up M&A League Tables, LAW360 
(Apr. 3, 2013, 9:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/429765/boutique-banks-ride-conflict-
fears-up-m-a-league-tables, archived at http://perma.cc/VA6L-77RD (noting that the warnings in 
the Chancery Court’s Del Monte and El Paso opinions had “seeped into deal making”). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
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and Barclays were losing market share while smaller, conflict-free 
“boutique” advisory firms rose to the top ten league rankings.19  The cases 
had so much affected transactional practice as to prompt talk of overkill,20 
with Delaware judges themselves commenting about possible deal maker 
overreaction.21 
But the Chancery Court returned to the fray undaunted in 2014.  In In 
re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation,22 Vice-Chancellor Laster 
ruled against a banker once more, this time after a trial on the merits, 
confirming the vitality of banker liability on an aiding and abetting theory.23  
Some commentators pushed back yet again, this time warning of crushing 
damages.24  Others noted the opinion with approval.25 
It seems the Chancery Court is damned if it doesn’t and damned if it 
does when it comes to conflicted investment bankers.  It is overly lenient 
and ineffectual in the eyes of some, while in other eyes it is too quick to 
condemn, a slight raise of the judicial eyebrow seemingly bringing great 
financial institutions to their knees.  At the same time, both sides seem to 
agree that the hard looks at banker conflicts in Del Monte26 and El Paso27 
herald a break with the past.  
In fact there is no change in the terms of the law.  Del Monte and 
El Paso apply longstanding principles without modifying them in any way.  
The break with the past lies in the very act of application.28  Important 
 
19. Id. 
20. Liz Hoffman, Takeaways from Tulane, Where M&A Elite Rub Elbows, LAW360 (Mar. 25, 
2013, 8:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/426325/takeaways-from-tulane-where-m-a-elite-
rub-elbows, archived at http://perma.cc/J9YL-2FXN. 
21. Id. 
22. 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
23. Id. at 63. 
24. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Ruling Highlights Unequal Treatment in Penalizing 
Corporate Wrongdoers, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://dealbook.nytim 
es.com/2014/03/18/ruling-highlights-unequal-treatment-in-penalizing-corporate-wrongdoers/?_ph 
p=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4B9-KWDR (warning of a potential 
$250 million judgment against an investment bank over a deal for only $5.1 million). 
25. See, e.g., Mark Roe, The Examiners: Mark Roe on the Rural/Metro Ruling, BANKRUPTCY 
BEAT, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 12:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2014/05/02/the-
examiners-mark-roe-on-the-ruralmetro-ruling/, archived at http://perma.cc/NC4L-LS9M (noting 
that the opinion was “a strong one, not to be criticized by anyone other than conflicted bankers”). 
26. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
27. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
28. History holds out only one comparable Revlon case: Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).  The facts were so extreme as to make it distinguishable.  The 
top executives at Macmillan were attempting to execute a management buyout with KKR.  Id. at 
1264.  Since their deal contemplated that they would remain with the company after the merger, 
the transaction was scrutinized under the duty of loyalty as a self-dealing transaction as well as 
under Revlon.  Id. at 1280.  A rival bidder, Maxwell, complicated things for the executives.  As 
the auction proceeded they tipped their own favored bidder, KKR, about Maxwell’s moves.  Id. at 
1275.  Macmillan’s investment banker, Bruce Wasserstein, fell in with the favoritism, funneling 
information to KKR that was not shared with Maxwell, id. at 1276, and later falsely representing 
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questions arise in consequence, questions about the relationship between 
banker–advisors and their corporate clients, questions often asked in the 
past but never satisfactorily answered.  Is this a fiduciary relationship?  If 
the answer is yes, why should banker conflicts be tolerated at all in a world 
where nobody would proceed with a sale process where the same law firm 
represented both sides?  If banker conflicts jeopardize the interests of sell-
side shareholders, it would seem to follow that bankers should be modeled 
like lawyers and accountants—as professionals whose ethical respon-
sibilities include conflict avoidance.  Alternatively, perhaps the relationship 
is not fiduciary, and if it is not, why should investment banker conflicts 
have a disabling effect on the good faith actions of independent sell-side 
directors?  If professionalization is unsuited to the bankers’ role, then 
conflicts should be expected and arguably tolerated.  Which doctrinal 
template comes to bear here, fiduciary or contract? 
This Article answers these questions, offering the first sustained look 
at the banker–client advisory relationship in this country’s legal literature.29  
We take the two basic legal building blocks—the agency law that channels 
the banker’s relationship with its client and the Revlon30 doctrine that 
inspects the client’s diligence in selling the company—and frame the issues 
contextually, looking to M&A practice, the structure of the advisory sector, 
and applicable economic theory, making a further comparative reference to 
the conflict-of-interest rules governing the lawyers and auditors who also 
provide services to large corporate clients. 
A clear answer to the questions emerges: although this is nominally 
fiduciary territory, both banker–client relationships and the Chancery 
 
to the board that the auction had been fairly conducted.  Id. at 1277.  Applying the rule under the 
duty of loyalty, the court required that the process must pass entire fairness review.  Id. at 1280.  
The court found no justification for the misinformation and discrimination against Macmillan.  Id. 
at 1281–82.  The banker’s failure to disclose the KKR tip to the board was also disabling—when a 
board is deceived by self-interested actors, it ruled, board decisions are “voidable at the behest of 
innocent parties to whom a fiduciary duty was owed and breached.”  Id. at 1284. 
29. Professor Tuch offers an extensive review of banker–client relationships in Australian 
law.  See Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 
29 MELB. U. L. REV. 478, 479–80 (2005) [hereinafter Tuch, Investment Banks] (discussing 
whether banker–client relationships give rise to a fiduciary duty under Australian law); Andrew 
Tuch, Obligations of Financial Advisors in Change-of-Control Transactions: Fiduciary and Other 
Questions, 24 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 488, 489 (2006) (considering whether Australian law 
compels bankers to avoid conflicts of interest in change-of-control transactions or if “less 
onerous” conflict-management procedures are sufficient); Andrew Tuch, The Paradox of 
Financial Services Regulation: Preserving Client Expectations of Loyalty in an Industry Rife with 
Conflicts of Interest 2–3, 15 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08/21, 2008) 
[hereinafter Tuch, Paradox], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086480, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4LCH-FEE3 (highlighting the types of conflicts that inherently arise due to the 
organizational structure of modern investment banks and examining statutory obligations to 
manage such conflicts under Australian law).  Tuch answers the question regarding the application 
of fiduciary duty affirmatively, analogizing to a number of other relationships under various 
countries’ laws.  Tuch, Investment Banks, supra, at 490–97. 
30. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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Court’s recent interventions are contractually driven.  Banker–advisors are 
agents and therefore fiduciaries, but they and their clients also make full use 
of agency law’s opt-out permission, opening a wide door to permit 
conflicted representation.  Corporate law lends a hand by cutting off 
shareholder actions in respect of the agency.  Conflicts of interest have 
become wrought into banker–client relationships; as a result, the structure 
of the advisory sector makes them hard to avoid and clients, expecting 
them, make allowances.  Advisor banks emerge in practice as arm’s-length 
counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for 
reputation.  The corporate lawyers who work beside the bankers on the 
same deals make for an interesting contrast: although the legal regime 
governing lawyer conflicts is not fundamentally different, reputational 
constraints loom much larger and conflicts are more likely to be avoided. 
Meanwhile, the boards of directors that engage bankers clearly are 
fiduciaries in law and fact, and company sales processes implicate enhanced 
scrutiny of their performance under Revlon.31  Revlon scrutiny, however, is 
not in the first instance about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation.  It is 
instead about diligence in getting the best deal for the shareholders.  Revlon 
review takes the court through all aspects of the deal, both the contract itself 
and the process that creates it.32  Anything that impairs sell-side incentives 
is a fair topic for questioning, including banker conflicts. 
Del Monte and El Paso stand for the proposition that sell-side boards 
must treat banker contracts in a contractual rather than fiduciary frame.  The 
cases presuppose that bankers and clients have opted to define their 
relationships contractually and proceed to work out this choice’s logical 
implications in the context of review of the selling board’s diligence.  
Contract follows on contract: a client with a Revlon duty has no business 
consenting to a conflict and then passively trusting that the conflicted 
fiduciary will deal in the best of faith.  The client should instead treat the 
banker like an arm’s-length counterparty, assuming self-interested 
motivation on the banker’s part and using contract to protect itself and its 
shareholders.  Although one can draw a clash of fiduciary and contractual 
values out of the cases’ facts, as a structural matter—both economic and 
doctrinal—the cases are about taking contract seriously.  They show us 
fiduciary principles operating at a high stage of evolution tailored to the 
sophisticated context of M&A. 
This contractual perspective further explicates the cases’ impact.  They 
certainly usher in a stricter regime of conflict management in sell-side 
boardrooms.  But they also usher in the Delaware Chancery Court itself as a 
 
31. Id. at 179, 182 (requiring directors to maximize short-term value once they have decided 
to sell a company for cash). 
32. See id. at 176 (holding that Delaware law did not permit lock-up agreements if the 
contracts resulted from a process that was tainted by a breach of fiduciary duty). 
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focal-point player in the market for banker reputation.  The court’s fact-
finding uncovers hidden information about banker conduct, prompting 
reputational reassessment.  An accompanying negative legal judgment 
makes the court’s interventions doubly unwelcome to the bankers.  This is 
unsurprising, for reputational market constraints emerge as more robust. 
Having answered the questions about the cases’ legal and normative 
implications, undercutting the notion that Del Monte and El Paso impose 
traditional fiduciary norms on unwilling, sophisticated parties, we turn to 
the cases’ critics and their claims that they do too little to police banker 
conflicts or, alternatively, too much.  We test the Chancery Court’s 
approach of case-by-case intervention under the open-ended Revlon 
standard to the closest available alternatives.  We play both sides, asking 
whether bankers plausibly can be treated either as professionals owing strict 
fiduciary duties or contract counterparties free to pursue self-interested 
goals.  The inquiry leads to two thought experiments: we consider each of 
per se prohibition of banker conflicts and safe harbors that make them less 
vulnerable to challenge.  Neither of these clearer alternatives proves 
feasible or superior.  Conflicted bankers, if appropriately managed, can add 
value to a deal; conflicted bankers, if not appropriately managed, can be a 
destructive influence even given full disclosure and engagement of a 
second, unconflicted banker. 
We are left launching actors in the M&A world into a rough, litigious 
sea of uncertainty.  But they can navigate it.  The primary decision makers 
here are not courts but independent directors of selling companies, actors 
with recourse to the best available legal counsel.  As such, they are well 
equipped to make adjustments and cope with banker conflicts in the wake 
of these Chancery Court interventions.  The practice has indeed changed.  
Stapled financing persists, but not in acquisitions likely to trigger Revlon 
scrutiny.  Conflicts remain wrought into banker–client relationships even 
so.  And, while relatively less conflicted boutique investment banks have 
gained some market share since 2011,33 they have done so in continuance of 
a trend going back many years.34 
Part II looks at what investment bankers do when companies are sold.  
It first describes the merger-advisory role, in which the banker is the 
channel for the board’s information about both a sale’s desirability and the 
optimal set of terms.  Part II goes on to detail two ancillary services, the 
rendering of fairness opinions and the provision of debt financing.  
 
33. David Gelles, 30% of M.&A. Advisory Fees Went to Smaller Firms in 2013, DEALBOOK, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/a-banner-year-for-
boutique-investment-banks/, archived at http://perma.cc/UM5S-X9TS. 
34. Paul Sharma, Investment Banking Goes Boutique, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2010, http://on 
line.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704657304575539952433801886, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6EQC-JWET (demonstrating that boutique investment firms’ market share gains 
are part of an existing trend). 
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Conflicts prove pervasive.  Bankers often have ties to acquiring companies 
and the parties financing their deals, leading to incentives to cater to the 
other side of the negotiating table.  An all-or-nothing success fee gives the 
banker an incentive to push for any deal at the expense of a good deal.  
And, as commercial banks have acquired investment banks in the wake of 
deregulation, sell-side advisors have started showing up as buy-side lenders, 
importing an added incentive to get the deal closed on the buyer’s terms.  
As the incentive problems are laid out for inspection, it becomes clear that 
compromised advisors can distort sales processes, injuring sell-side 
shareholders. 
Part III takes a closer look at these conflicts of interest, bringing two 
frameworks to bear.  We first apply economic analysis, which looks toward 
contractual solutions to problems created by conflicts, primarily price 
adjustments and reputational constraints on conflicted parties.  It also 
strongly counsels against per se prohibition.  We then look at the legal 
framework, showing that bankers, as agents, owe fiduciary duties to their 
corporate principals, but with an opening for client consent to agent 
conflicts—an opening subject to a process rule of backstop, rule of full 
disclosure, and an overarching requirement of good faith.  The law 
synchronizes neatly with both the relational picture highlighted in the 
economic analysis and the terms of banker–client engagement contracts.  
All frameworks converge on the same conclusion: in this relationship, 
market-based transactions trump traditional fiduciary values and regulatory 
constraints stem from markets for reputation rather than from bright-line 
legal rules. 
Part IV turns to the hard looks in Del Monte and El Paso.  The cases 
situate the conflicts problem at a front-and-center spot on the transactional 
stage, upping the stakes.  This follows not from a change in the law but 
from the facts.  The bankers in these cases play the primary advisory role 
rather than the secondary role of fairness-opinion giver, the role on which 
the case law has focused heretofore.35  When a conflict compromises the 
banker’s performance in the primary role of negotiating the deal, Revlon 
questions follow. 
Del Monte and El Paso raise a difficult law-to-fact issue: whether a 
Revlon violation based on a banker conflict can follow from a showing of 
an incentive impairment—a “taint” taken alone—or requires a stronger 
showing of realized negative consequences for the sale process.  Our 
analysis identifies consequences of a “might have been,” counterfactual 
nature in both cases, but also highlights room for argument.  El Paso is 
 
35. Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560–61 (2006) (noting 
that after a period of criticism in the 1990s, “Delaware courts continued to place persuasive 
reliance on fairness opinions”). 
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particularly susceptible to a reading of per se actionability, even as the 
conflict in question in the case was particularly severe. 
The results can be seen to follow from an application of strong 
fiduciary norms.  But we think such a reading misses the point.  The 
Chancery Court takes a relentlessly contractual approach here.  To make a 
taint actionable under Revlon is not to slam down an ethical rule.  It instead 
embodies a determination that a banker’s incentives undermined a 
contracting process—an economic judgment with legal consequences. 
In Part V we address both those who criticize the Chancery Court for 
lax treatment and those who describe the cases as fiduciary overkill.  At the 
same time, we ask whether it is feasible to substitute a rule-based approach 
to banker conflicts, importing certainty to actors in the marketplace.  We 
experiment with two alternative regimes, one stricter and the other more 
accommodating, both rule based.  The stricter approach is per se prohibition 
of conflicts, posed by analogy to the law governing auditor–client 
relationships.  We show that full prohibition could create as many problems 
as it solves and in any event is institutionally unsuitable as an outgrowth of 
Revlon review.  We then look into an alternative: a narrow prohibition 
directed only to stapled financing.  This proves more robust institutionally 
but still fails the substantive test: staples are not intrinsically inimical to the 
shareholder interest.  We then turn to a more accommodating approach—a 
safe harbor for banker conflicts conditioned on full disclosure and 
engagement of a second, unconflicted banker.  We show that the 
combination has a cleansing effect but not enough of an assurance to 
guarantee the integrity of the Revlon regime. 
A conclusion follows. 
II. The Business Side 
The dispute between investment bankers and Delaware chancellors 
concerns the bankers’ performance as advisors to the boards of selling 
companies.  A cogent evaluation of the dispute’s particulars requires 
contextual grounding.  We accordingly preface our legal analysis with a 
look at the business side.  Subpart A focuses on what bankers do, first 
describing their central advisory function and going on to two ancillary 
services, provision of fairness opinions and financing.  In subpart B we go 
on to look at the incentive structure of the banker–client relationship, 
detailing conflicts of interest that potentially skew the performance of the 
advisory role to the detriment of the interests of target shareholders. 
A.  Services Rendered 
1. Advising on Partner, Price, and Process.—The senior management 
suite of an operating company is unlikely to be populated with M&A 
experts.  The company’s board of directors accordingly needs outside help 
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when another company proposes a merger or the company’s managers 
themselves inquire into sale possibilities.36  Either way, the board calls on 
an investment banker for expert advice about market conditions and 
alternative modes of sale.37  Indeed, sale processes often originate in the 
suggestion of a banker looking to drum up advisory business.38 
Transaction planning has only just begun with an affirmative answer to 
the question as to “whether” to sell.  There follows a series of further 
questions with significant value consequences.  There can be a “what” 
question: if the company has multiple divisions, sale of a piece or pieces 
might yield more than sale of the whole.  Then come “how” and “to 
whom.”  An open auction might or might not yield more than a process 
focused on a bilateral negotiation with a single acquirer.  A transaction with 
an operating company in the same line of business (a strategic merger) 
might or might not yield more than a private equity buyout (a financial 
merger).  Negotiation with a given suitor involves further choices regarding 
sale process, mode of payment, and the merger agreement’s ancillary terms.  
At the bottom line looms an overarching “how much” question. 
The bank helps management answer all the questions, bringing its 
expertise to bear.39  Its participation in the sale process starts with a 
valuation of the selling company, an analysis that provides a basis against 
which to evaluate the attractiveness of subsequent offers.40  The valuation 
also figures into the marketing effort, as the banker works with 
management to project a promising future performance by the company.41  
The bank then searches for potential bidders, drawing on its knowledge of 
the target’s industry to identify companies whose lines of business hold out 
 
36. Cf. Henri Servaes & Marc Zenner, The Role of Investment Banks in Acquisitions, 9 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 787, 806 (1996) (explaining that companies look outside for advisors in more complex 
transactions). 
37. See id. (highlighting the fact that a firm may rely on an investment bank when the firm 
does not have the needed expertise). 
38. J. Peter Williamson, Mergers and Acquisitions, in INVESTMENT BANKING HANDBOOK 
219, 226–27 (J. Peter Williamson ed., 1988). 
39. Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm describe the skills bankers bring to bear as follows: 
[T]he central investment bank activity is the creation of private law in situations 
where the precise quantification of the parameters of trade is impossible, either as a 
consequence of their extreme complexity, or because it would involve the disclosure 
of facts that would undermine the value of the exchange.  The skills needed to fulfill 
this role are hard to pass on at arm’s length: they are best learned through day-to-day 
contact with an expert mentor and once learned, they cannot easily be codified and 
widely disseminated at arm’s length.  This type of skill was characterized by 
Polanyi . . . as tacit. 
ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, 
POLITICS, AND LAW 265 (2007). 
40. See Anup Agrawal et al., Common Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions: Determinants 
and Consequences, 56 J.L. & ECON. 691, 697 (2013) (listing target valuation as a service provided 
by investment banks). 
41. Id. 
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an appropriate fit.  Absent a fit, the banker looks for a buyer to which the 
target makes sense as a diversification play or, alternatively, for a financial 
purchaser.42  The banker compiles a list of potential bidders, dividing them 
into strategic and financial categories.43 
Decisions also need to be made about the sale process.  Alternatives 
fall along a range: at one extreme comes a negotiated transaction on an 
exclusive basis with a single prospect; at the other extreme comes an 
auction open to all potential purchasers; in between come controlled auction 
processes centered on bilateral negotiations with multiple suitors.44  
Whatever the choice, the bank is heavily involved in negotiations with 
potential acquirers.45 
By way of example, consider the sequence of moves in a controlled 
auction.  The banker circulates a description of an unnamed target.46  
Companies interested in bidding sign confidentiality agreements before 
getting access to a detailed offering memorandum prepared by the bank.47  
The bank also will facilitate the due diligence processes of serious 
bidders.48  Subsequent discussions, which can go forward with more than 
one bidder, focus on an emerging merger agreement, drafted by counsel 
with the bank’s assistance.49  The agreement contains terms on price and 
transaction structure along with several other terms with high value 
salience: a material-adverse-change clause setting conditions permitting the 
buyer to exit, a fiduciary out permitting the target to exit in the wake of a 
higher bid, and a breakup fee to be paid by the target in the event of its 
exit.50  Final bids are submitted with the merger agreement on the table.51  
Given a successful bid, the merger agreement is submitted for the approval 
of the constituent boards of directors.52  Given board approval, the last step 
is approval by a majority vote of the target shareholders,53 with the bank 
joining counsel in preparing the proxy statement.54 
The advisory bank is retained and paid pursuant to an engagement 
letter.55  Typical advisory fee arrangements include a retainer and a 
 
42. WILLIAMSON, supra note 38, at 233. 
43. GIULIANO IANNOTTA, INVESTMENT BANKING: A GUIDE TO UNDERWRITING AND 
ADVISORY SERVICES 122 (2010). 
44. Id. at 122–23. 
45. Agrawal et al., supra note 40, at 697–98. 
46. IANNOTTA, supra note 43, at 123. 
47. Id. 
48. Agrawal et al., supra note 40, at 697. 
49. IANNOTTA, supra note 43, at 125; Agrawal, supra note 40, at 697. 
50. IANNOTTA, supra note 43, at 125. 
51. Id. 
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2011). 
53. Id. § 251(c). 
54. Agrawal et al., supra note 40, at 697. 
55. Charles W. Calomiris & Donna M. Hitscherich, Banker Fees and Acquisition Premia for 
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“success fee”56 pegged at a small percentage of the purchase price.57  On 
average, around 80% of fees bankers draw from M&A depend on the deals’ 
successful completion.58 
2. Opining on Price.—In addition to advising on transactional choices, 
investment bankers formally opine on the fairness of the price—
approximately 80% of target boards and 37% of acquirer boards procure 
such an opinion.59  The opinion is addressed to the retaining board, which in 
turn relies on the opinion when approving the merger.  Literally, the 
opinion states that the price is “fair” from a “financial point of view.”60  
These are, however, terms of art with tightly circumscribed meanings: the 
statement confirms only that the price lies within a range of intrinsic values, 
any of which could be fair.61  Accordingly, a fair price is not necessarily a 
best or even a good price.62  Moreover, the opinion does not define what 
makes the numbers on the range of intrinsic values the fair set.63  Nor does 
the opinion make a recommendation regarding acceptance or rejection of 
the merger.64 
Fairness opinions do set out the valuation metrics used in establishing 
the price range.  The bank chooses among a menu of possibilities65—
discounted cash flow, comparable companies, comparable sale premiums, 
 
Targets in Cash Tender Offers: Challenges to the Popular Wisdom on Banker Conflicts 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11333, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/pa 
pers/w11333, archived at http://perma.cc/PTP8-XSD7. 
56. Success fees come in three forms: (1) a constant percentage of the purchase price; (2) a 
constant dollar amount payable only on the contingency’s occurrence; and (3) a rising sliding 
scale based on the amount of the purchase price.  Id. at 6. 
57. The fee is typically 1%, with the percentage declining as transaction size increases.  
Agrawal et al., supra note 40, at 694. 
58. Id. 
59. Darren J. Kisgen et al., Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 179, 179 (2009); cf. Matthew D. Cain & David J. Denis, 
Information Production by Investment Banks: Evidence from Fairness Opinions, 56 J.L. & ECON. 
245, 246–47 (2013) (finding that with a smaller sample, 96% of target boards procure a fairness 
opinion).  Cain and Denis show that these acquiring boards tend to solicit fairness opinions in 
cases where the merger must be submitted for their shareholders’ approval.  In their sample only 
28% of acquirers solicited an opinion, but 83% did so in cases of joint proxy solicitation.  Id. at 
254–55. 
60. Cain & Denis, supra note 59, at 249. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Fair value could mean any one of a number of things—the company’s stand-alone value 
without reference to a sale, the yield expected in an open auction of the company, the yield from 
an arm’s-length sale of the company, or something else.  Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, 
Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 
30–32. 
64. Calomiris & Hitscherich, supra note 55, at 4.  Nor does the opinion purport to verify the 
information base relied on in its analysis, which comes from management.  Id. 
65. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 63, at 36–37. 
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or a weighted average of results from more than one approach.66  The bank 
also is free to project different sale scenarios—a sale of the whole, a sale of 
separate pieces, a liquidation, or a weighted average of more than one.67  
The final document, in sum, results from discretionary choices, its con-
clusion amounting to the banker’s subjective opinion based on market 
parameters. 68 
A fairness opinion may implicate a separate, fixed fee.69  Assuming 
that the board’s banker–advisor renders the opinion, the rule of thumb ratio 
between the amount of the banker’s success fee and the amount paid for the 
opinion is ten-to-one.70  Significantly, nothing requires the selling board to 
rely on its advisor for the opinion, although so doing yields obvious 
economies of scope and is the usual practice.71  The board can engage a 
different bank for the opinion, paying it a fixed fee.72  Alternatively, 
opinions can be solicited from the advisor and one or more other banks, but 
that happens only in a minority of cases.73  In around 80% of the cases in 
which the selling board seeks an opinion, it procures a single opinion from 
its banker–advisor.74 
Such is the practice.75  As we have seen, the banker–advisor’s 
expertise and judgment figure importantly in the sale effort’s success.  
 
66. Davidoff, supra note 35, at 1574–75. 
67. Id. at 1574 & nn.73–77. 
68. Id. at 1573–75. 
69. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 63, at 38; Davidoff, supra note 35, 1586–87. Fixed fees 
come in two forms: (1) a retainer paid upon execution and delivery of the engagement letter or in 
installments during the term of the engagement and (2) a fee paid upon submission of a fairness 
opinion.  Calomiris & Hitscherich, supra note 55, at 5–6. 
70. Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral Analysis of Investment Bankers When 
Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299, 314 (2006); John S. Rubenstein, Note, 
Merger & Acquisition Fairness Opinions: A Critical Look at Judicial Extensions of Liability to 
Investment Banks, 93 GEO. L.J. 1723, 1727 (2005). 
71. Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 183. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 180, 199. 
74. The percentage in the text is an extrapolation from numbers reported in Kisgen et al., 
supra note 59, at 186–87.  Cain & Denis, supra note 59, at 254, report that in their sample 96% of 
targets procured at least one fairness opinion, 8% procured two, and 1% procured three. 
75. We note that the Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for the National Association of 
Realtors does not ask for much more. Under Standard of Practice 11-1, valuation opinions must 
contain ten minimum terms: 
(1) identification of the subject property 
(2) date prepared 
(3) defined value or price 
(4) limiting conditions, including statements of purpose(s) and 
intended user(s) 
(5) any present or contemplated interest, including the possibility 
of representing the seller/landlord or buyers/tenants 
(6) basis for the opinion, including applicable market data 
(7) if the opinion is not an appraisal, a statement to that effect 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
16 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
 
From a business perspective, the fairness opinion contributes little extra.  
Empirical studies search in vain for value added for sell-side shareholders 
stemming from fairness opinions.  The studies find that fairness opinions do 
not significantly affect either the merger premium or returns on the target 
company’s stock upon the merger’s announcement.76  Nor do fairness 
opinions make deal completion more likely,77 although they do add to the 
base of publicly available information about the value of the target.78 
Their primary function is legal defense.  Investment bankers first 
figured into the law of M&A in the wake of the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
1984 decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom,79 the case that famously found a 
sell-side board of directors liable for a breach of the duty of care.80  The 
defendant board’s defalcation lay in an inadequate informational base, and 
the absence of an investment banker fairness opinion on the merger price 
lay at the core of the empty informational set.81  Fairness opinions have ever 
since amounted to a de facto mandate for diligent sell-side boards.82  The 
opinion serves two defensive purposes.  First, it provides evidence that the 
selling board informed itself of the intrinsic value of the company’s equity.  
Second, it lays groundwork for an affirmative defense under Delaware’s 
corporate code, which provides that directors are protected when “relying in 
good faith” on opinions provided by outside experts.83 
 
(8) disclosure of whether and when a physical inspection of the 
property’s exterior was conducted 
(9) disclosure of whether and when a physical inspection of the 
property’s interior was conducted 
(10) disclosure of whether the REALTOR® has any conflicts of 
interest  
CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS 
§ 11-1 (2014), available at http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/publications/2014/Policy/201 
4-Code-of-Ethics.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P64E-3B3B. 
76. Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 180.  But cf. Steven M. Davidoff et al., Fairness Opinions 
in M&As, in THE ART OF CAPITAL RESTRUCTURING: CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
THROUGH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 483, 491 (H. Kent Baker & Halil Kiymaz eds., 2011). 
77. Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 180. 
78. Cain & Denis, supra note 59, at 248.  The authors also find a correlation between stock 
returns around the proxy mailing date and the valuations in the target fairness opinion.  Id. 
79. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
80. Id. at 890–93. 
81. Id. at 881. 
82. See William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do 
Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 527 (1992) (describing the Van Gorkom case as the 
“Investment Bankers’ Civil Relief Act of 1985”); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule 
and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985) (noting that the most immediate 
effect of the Van Gorkam case was that “no firm considering a fundamental corporate change will 
do so without obtaining a fairness letter”). 
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011); cf. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875 (rejecting the 
defense when the directors relied on uninformed and inadequate opinions of the company’s CEO 
and CFO). 
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Fairness opinions serve these defensive objectives well,84 providing 
potent if not complete evidence of the sell-side board’s fulfillment of its 
duty of care.85 
 3. Providing Financing.—Strictly speaking, service as a merger 
advisor and provision of a fairness opinion require appropriate expertise 
and access to information, capabilities within the competence of small, 
boutique investment banks.86  Boutiques with specialties in a given industry 
tend to thrive when the industry undergoes a wave of concentration by 
merger.87  Still, size has advantages and larger banks bring more to the 
table.  A merger advisor from a large bank can look to the bank’s other 
departments for informational assistance.  The bank’s securities analysts 
can suggest potential merger partners.88  The market arbitrage desk can 
assist in accounting for fluctuations in the advisory client’s stock price 
during the sale process.89  Risk arbitrageurs and traders can project the 
market’s reactions to different merger consideration packages.90  Corporate 
finance departments can assist with debt-financing proposals.91 
Now let us switch to the buy side.  Larger banks advising acquirers 
have the wherewithal to assist directly with financing, underwriting new 
issues of securities, or directly lending funds.  Of course, nothing forces an 
acquirer to engage its merger adviser to provide these services.  But the 
coupling is quite common when underwriting is called for—according to 
one study the acquirer’s advisor does the underwriting in 56% of 
acquisitions involving new issues of securities.92  The claimed benefits are 
 
84. Critics charge that the opinions fall short on the question of greatest concern to the selling 
shareholders, providing little assurance on the quality of the deal.  See Dean Roger Dennis & 
Dennis R. Honabach, Corporate Governance Theory in the 1990’s, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 533, 549 
(1992) (“By and large, the [fairness] reports are brief, boilerplated documents . . . .”).  We do not 
find the criticisms well-taken.  See infra note 193. 
85. See, e.g., In re Compucom Sys., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. Civ.A. 499-N, 2005 WL 
2481325, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005) (finding that a board of directors fulfilled their fiduciary 
duty of care, in part, by relying on fairness opinions); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 
846 A.2d 963, 985 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting the argument that approval of a fairness opinion 
potentially tainted by the advisor’s conflict of interest deprived defendant directors of the section 
141(e) defense). 
86. For an account of the evolution of large, complex banks and the consequential appearance 
of small boutiques, see generally MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 39, at 294–305.  They note 
that size has costs as well as advantages, because it debilitates peer-group monitoring and detaches 
the professional’s interest in his or her own human capital from the reputation of the firm, 
enervating incentives.  Id. at 301.  For a discussion of the boutique model and its effect on 
conflicts, see infra notes 147–56 and accompanying text. 
87. Williamson, supra note 38, at 227–28. 
88. Id. at 225. 
89. Id. at 225–26. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 226. 
92. Mine Ertugrul & Karthik Kirshnan, Investment Banks in Dual Roles: Acquirer M&A 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
18 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
 
expedited closing and economies of scope in the form of a reduced advisory 
fee.93  
Traditionally, underwriting is a core line of business of U.S. 
investment banks.94  In contrast, lending was long prohibited by the Glass-
Steagall Act,95 repealed in 1999.96  As regulatory barriers fell, commercial 
banks acquired traditional investment banks, resulting in “universal” banks 
combining commercial banking and lending with functions previously the 
province of investment banks, including underwriting.97  Such a banker–
advisor can facilitate an acquirer’s deal as a lender.  But, for present 
purposes, a different coupling is more salient: as universal banks emerged, 
merger-advisory services on the sell side became coupled with purchase 
money lending to the buy side, so-called stapled financing.98  
Staples first appeared as part of a larger package deal: the selling 
corporation puts itself (or a piece of itself) up for auction and offers debt 
financing to potential purchasers in tandem with the sale—financing to be 
supplied by the seller’s banker–advisor.99  The financing package is thus 
“stapled” to the offering memorandum.100  The impetus for these couplings 
came from the banks themselves, which held out their lending capacity to 
lure potential selling companies into accepting their advisory services.101  
Over time, the term “staple” has come to be used more loosely, applying in 
any case where the seller’s banker–advisor participates in financing the 
buyer’s purchase.102  We will follow the broader usage, noting differences 
of transactional context as we go. 
The best case for stapled financing lies with the original auction 
structure.  To frame the case, assume that a corporation is selling one of a 
number of divisions in a favorable credit market.  Opening the door for bids 
on the division with a financing offer already on the table arguably makes 
 
Advisors as Underwriters, 37 J. FIN. RES. 139, 168 (2014). 
93. Id. at 179. 
94. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 321. 
95. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20–21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184–85, 188–89, 
194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (repealed 1999) (restricting 
commercial banks, from among other things, engaging principally in investment banking 
activities). 
96. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). 
97. Wilmarth, supra note 94, at 319–20. 
98. Davidoff, supra note 35, at 1588. 
99. Id. 
100. Richard Hall, Stapled Finance Packages Under Scrutiny, IFLR (Apr. 1, 2006), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984558/Stapled-finance-packages-under-scrutiny.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TG4E-2PS5. 
101. Id. 
102. For example, the term would be used to describe an investment banking firm’s offer to 
provide buy-side financing, as described in In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 
1005–06 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
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the deal more attractive despite the ready availability of credit—assured 
financing lowers the bidders’ transaction costs so that more bidders show 
up.103  As the stock of the division up for sale is not publicly traded, the 
bank’s financing offer also facilitates establishment of a price floor for 
bidding: the bidders take the amount of financing on offer and work 
backward using projected leverage ratios.104  The bank’s presence could 
also attract private equity bidders to compete with a strategic acquirer and, 
in so doing, push the strategic bidder to a higher price.105  Finally, the 
financing package provides a base point for competing financing offers by 
other banks.106  If the stapled bank emerges in the lead, time to closing is 
reduced because the lender’s diligence process already is underway.107 
The above scenario assumes that credit flows freely, leading to 
competition among financing banks as well as bidders.  The assumption 
does not diminish the case favoring staples, for it shows off the coupling’s 
advantages even though competition among banks removes any doubt about 
the availability of financing.  Presumably, the case for a staple strengthens 
further when credit is scarce; lining up the bank at stage one imports 
beneficial certainty.  Other downside scenarios further expand the case for 
having the bank on both sides of the deal.  For example, if credit tightens 
after the deal is signed but before closing, the sell-side fee yield could 
induce the bank to stay with the deal rather than exploring opportunities for 
exit.108 
Now compare a case where a publicly traded company puts itself up 
for sale, indifferent as between a strategic or financial purchaser.  A 
financial bidder emerges as the sale process unfolds and the seller’s banker–
advisor takes a place among the banks providing debt financing to the 
private equity buyer.  This is also a staple under the broad usage.  But, 
 
103. See Jeffrey E. Ross et al., Del Monte: Staple Remover?, 12 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 
PRIVATE EQUITY REP. 1, 17 (2011) (explaining that stapled financing may attract more buyers by 
reducing the costs associated with securing financing on one’s own).  
104. Id.  Note that the price-floor function matters more when the company being sold is not 
publicly traded, as would be the case when a private equity firm sells one of its portfolio 
companies or a publicly traded operating company sells a division.  Note also that the price-floor 
argument can be turned around.  The amount of financing on offer tips potential bidders to the 
advisor bank’s hidden views on the value of the selling company.  IANNOTTA, supra note 43, at 
124.  The staple’s availability also can give rise to a negative inference: if the advisor bank is not 
participating in financing then the selling company is worth less than advertised.  Id. 
105. See Christopher Foulds, My Banker’s Conflicted and I Couldn’t Be Happier: The 
Curious Durability of Staple Financing, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 519, 528 (2009) (recognizing that 
stapled financing packages encourage competition between strategic buyers and financial buyers). 
106. Ross et al., supra note 103, at 17.  Presumably, if multiple bidders and banks are 
attracted, the staple becomes less and less relevant as the process continues.  Compare a case 
where a seller requires the bidders to accept the staple.  The element of coercion detracts from the 
case.  But even here there is an argument: the staple reduces variability and makes it easier to 
compare the bids.  Foulds, supra note 105, at 528–29. 
107. Ross et al., supra note 103, at 17. 
108. Foulds, supra note 105, at 536–37. 
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because there is no upfront stapled financing offer from the seller’s bank, its 
inclusion in the financing group holds few of the above-described 
advantages. 
The distinction between the original literally stapled deal and other 
transactions in which the seller’s banker–advisor participates in buy-side 
financing will prove crucial as fact patterns unfold. 
B. Banker Conflicts 
This subpart draws out conflicts of interest embedded in the banker 
service practices just described.  We explore the conflicts’ negative 
influences on advisory bank incentives, while for the moment deferring 
legal evaluation.  We divide the conflicts into three categories: (1) conflicts 
arising from past and projected advisory relationships; (2) conflicts created 
by the terms of the contract of engagement entered into between the 
advisory bank and client; and (3) conflicts stemming from the bank’s 
performance of multiple functions in the sale process. 
1. Relational Conflicts.—Hypothesize an M&A market in which all 
relationships between targets and advisors and targets and opinion givers 
are discrete, one-off engagements.  The advisor bank parachutes in to work 
the sale and provides no other services, having no past transactional history 
with the target or the acquirer; strongly held norms bar it from future 
dealings with the surviving company.  The same goes for the bank opining 
on fairness, which is separate from the advisor bank.  Add a reputational 
interest on the bank’s part in being seen to do an excellent job by third 
parties, and this hypothetical world yields banks well incented to procure 
the best deal for the seller and its shareholders. 
The hypothetical does not describe the real world of advisory services, 
which are grounded in relationships rather than discrete engagements.109  
This is only to be expected.  For example, the long-term banker–advisor of 
a selling company has a built-in informational advantage, making it an 
obvious choice to serve as advisor in a merger.  Yet the relationship that 
creates the advantage can also import conflicts in the form of exterior 
influences that can negatively affect the judgments and discretionary 
choices made by banker–advisors and opinion givers.  For example, a 
merger advisor or opinion giver with a preexisting personal relationship 
with key actors at the seller could cater to their interests.110  Such catering 
might privilege the insiders’ preferred deal over a more lucrative alternative 
that makes the shareholders better off.  Alternatively, an advising bank 
 
109. See Charles D. Ellis, Attracting Corporate Clients, in INVESTMENT BANKING HAND-
BOOK 55, 57 (J. Peter Williamson ed., 1988) (stating that CFOs still place considerable 
importance on established relationships with investment banks). 
110. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 63, at 43. 
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could act with a view to obtaining or maintaining a lucrative advisory 
relationship with the managers of the merger’s surviving company.111  Or, 
in a financial merger, the banker could have a preexisting business 
relationship with the private equity buyer, along with expectations of 
participation in future deals.  Such influences again threaten to skew the 
process toward a suboptimal deal pitched to interests other than the selling 
shareholders’.112 
The incentive skews having been noted, it also should be noted that the 
alternative of a discrete advisory engagement does not necessarily eliminate 
relational conflicts.  A seller certainly can jettison a large, full-service 
advisor with which it has a long relationship and substitute a smaller, more 
focused boutique bank.  But the replacement bank still comes burdened 
with relational baggage in the form of contacts and past dealings with firms 
and actors within the industry and in the financing sector.  Importantly, the 
advisor’s value stems in part from these very contacts, for the contacts are 
the sources of the information the advisor brings to the seller’s table. 
2. Contractually Created Conflicts.—We have seen that on average 
80% of the banker–advisor’s remuneration is conditioned on successful 
completion of the deal and pegged to the consideration paid.113  We also 
have seen that a second bank brought in only for the purpose of rendering a 
fairness opinion receives a fixed fee.114  The contrast is notable: where the 
opinion giver gets paid even if it renders an unfavorable judgment on the 
deal, the advisor’s payoff lies more in making sure the deal closes than in 
raising a critical objection to an inadequate price.  The performance-based 
fee gives the advisor an all-or-nothing interest in closing any deal. 
To get a sense of the negative possibilities, consider the following 
hypothetical.  Target, Inc. is a company in an industry undergoing 
consolidation.  Its market capitalization is $750 million; a $1 billion sale 
price would mean a 33 1/3% premium for its shareholders.  The company’s 
board of directors feels selling pressure and contacts Unibank to inquire 
into the desirability of a sale.  Under the terms of the engagement, Unibank 
will receive a flat 0.5% of the purchase price115 if a sale closes.  A $1 billion 
deal thus nets Unibank $5 million. 
As we have seen, Unibank’s first job is to the compare the prospective 
value of an independent Target with the expected yield on a potential 
 
111. Id. at 41–42; Calomiris & Hitscherich, supra note 55, at 8. 
112. See Davidoff, supra note 35, at 1587 (stating that ongoing relationships and expectations 
between a bank and corporate management can influence the bank’s decision to find that a 
transaction is fair in order to protect future business). 
113. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
115. See Foulds, supra note 105, at 525 (noting that the typical fee for advising on a corporate 
sale is 0.5% of the transaction’s value). 
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merger.116  The conflict created by the fee becomes operative immediately; 
any deal looks better than no deal because the former advice yields the bank 
nothing and the latter advice yields millions.117  Let us assume that Unibank 
advises the Target board that a deal makes sense and conducts a search.  
Two bidders emerge.  Bidder 1 offers $1 billion in the form of its own 
common stock.  There is a 100% chance that the deal will close.  Bidder 2 
offers $1.2 billion in cash, but it will have some problems swinging debt 
financing.  There is only an 80% chance that a deal with Bidder 2 will 
close.  Moreover, if Target enters into serious discussions with Bidder 2, 
Bidder 1 will walk away. 
From the point of view of Target’s shareholders, proceeding with 
Bidder 2 makes sense despite the risk because an 80% chance at $1.2 
billion tied to a 20% chance of being left at the current $750 million market 
cap is worth $1.11 billion, greater than Bidder 1’s offer of $1 billion ([$1.2 
billion × .80 = $960 million] + [$750 million × .20 = $150 million] = $1.11 
billion).118  Unibank’s expectations work differently.  Bidder 1 is a 
$5 million bird in the hand under the performance fee arrangement.  
Bidder 2 is worth a lesser $4.8 million ([$6 million × .80 = $4.8 million] + 
[$0 × .20 = $0] = $4.8 million). 
The incentive problem would be ameliorated given a fee based on 
efforts expended rather than a fee contingent on a deal closing.  A variable-
contingent percentage fee also could improve things.  If Unibank were paid 
0.5% up to $1 billion and 0.075% for any consideration over $1 billion, 
pursuit of a risky $1.2 billion deal with Bidder 2 would be worth $6 million 
to Unibank compared to a $5 million payoff with Bidder 1.  But such 
alternative arrangements are seen only rarely.119 
Generally, the conflict created by the performance fee skews the 
advisor bank’s incentives in the wrong direction whenever a risky but more 
valuable alternative crops up, whether in the form of an alternative bidder 
or a choice over deal terms.120 
Here again we need to enter a caveat.  Advisory fee arrangements have 
been stable across time.121  Presumably, the bankers would be just as happy 
with a different, less conflicted approach, so long as their bottom lines 
 
116. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
117. We note that the conflict is much ameliorated if Unibank has an existing relationship 
with Target, for a deal can mean loss of the client to the buyer’s investment bank. 
118. We are assuming that the sale process is confidential.  Given a public announcement, the 
seller’s market capitalization can be expected to be lower than $750 million if no deal is 
completed. 
119. Variable percentage fees are seen with small companies and private companies.  
Calomiris & Hitscherich, supra note 56, at 6. 
120. See Foulds, supra note 105, at 524 (explaining that a bank may skew an auction in favor 
of obtaining a higher fee, regardless of whether its actions negatively affect shareholders). 
121. See generally Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 63, at 38–41 (discussing the most common 
fee structures for banker–advisors). 
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remained unaffected.  The preference for performance fees accordingly lies 
with the selling companies, which, once having publicly set a sale process 
into motion, have a manifest interest in assuring that the deal closes.  Failed 
deals implicate disappointed markets and internal costs manifested in 
significant stock price declines: Target’s market cap falls below the $750 
million start point when it announces that its sale process has failed.122 
3. Conflicts Arising from Multiple Functions.—Conflicts can arise 
when a financial institution performs multiple functions.  Hypothesize a 
bank engaged to advise X Corp. in connection with a projected hostile 
tender offer for the stock of T Corp., an advisory relationship that generates 
confidential information with manifest value in the trading markets for the 
shares of both X and T.  The bank has an asset management division and a 
proprietary trading operation.  An informational tip from the bank’s merger 
advisor to its investment advisors and stock traders violates its 
confidentiality agreement with X, not to mention the federal securities 
laws.123  Thus do confidential advisory services present an obvious 
compliance problem when provided by a bank with trading and investment 
departments.  Banks address the problem by constructing internal 
informational barriers.124 
We turn now to a more complicated case.  A bank sells multiple 
services, and profit maximization through the sale of service A implicates 
subpar performance of service B.  To take a famous example, in the post-
Enron era regulatory intervention occurred against investment banks 
charged with having produced in their research departments (service B) 
overly optimistic analyses of companies whose good will they wished to 
cultivate toward the end of securing underwriting business (service A).125 
 
122. A recent study of terminated mergers finds a significantly negative (–4.16%) abnormal 
return for private targets over a three day event window.  See Tilan Tang, Bidder Gains in 
Terminated Deals 10 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2503023, archived at http://perma.cc/3BG7-PYKC. 
123. Cf. Tuch, Investment Banks, supra note 29, at 487 (describing a conflict of interest that 
arises in the securities trading industry when investment banks draft research reports on public 
companies they hold or desire to hold as financial advisory clients). 
124. Id. at 511–12. 
125. There resulted the Global Settlement of Conflicts of Interest Between Research and 
Investment Banking, dated April 28, 2003, between ten large banks and regulators at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Association of Security Dealers, the New 
York State Attorney General, the North American Securities Administrators Association, the New 
York Stock Exchange, and state securities regulators.  Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory 
Auth., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of 
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.finra.org/Newsro 
om/NewsReleases/2003/p002909, archived at http://perma.cc/9GCU-4V7H.  The banks agreed to 
pay $1.4 billion and reform their conduct of business.  Id. 
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With M&A, buy-side lending has emerged as the service A that 
compromises the delivery of sell-side advisory service B.126  A stapled 
financing package puts the bank on both sides of the negotiating table.  In 
its advisory role it wants a higher price while as a lender to the surviving 
company it favors a lower price.  It simultaneously looks to collect fees in 
both capacities. 
The list of negative possibilities is lengthy.  To get a sense of them, 
return to Target, Inc. and hypothesize that its board of directors is feeling 
merger pressure but has taken no steps to inquire into sale possibilities.  
Unibank, a universal bank with both a large lending division and a stable of 
traditional investment banker–advisors, shows up at Target’s door 
uninvited.  Unibank suggests a sale process with its advisory fee at a 
contingent 0.5%.  It also offers to procure financing for up to 90% of the 
purchase price.  Unibank can finance the acquisition either by underwriting 
bonds or syndicating a loan package (acting as lead lender), collecting fees 
either way at 1.5% of the loan amount.127  If Unibank engineers a $1 billion 
deal and lends 90% of the purchase price, it makes $5 million on its 
advisory side and $12.15 million on its lending side.128 
Now assume there are two types of potential acquirers for Target—
strategic purchasers and private equity firms.  The strategic purchasers are 
operating companies in the same or related lines of business.  They buy 
using their own stock as consideration or using a mix of own stock and 
cash.  The cash sometimes comes from their own balance sheets and at 
other times from lenders.  The buyout firms, in contrast, finance 90% of the 
purchase price with borrowed money and have repeat-play relationships 
with the big banks, including Unibank. 
A strategic bidder shows up with a knockout “bear hug” proposal at 
the start of the process: $1.2 billion in bidder stock for a 60% premium over 
market but with give ups in the form of negotiation exclusivity and deal 
protection provisions.  This deal nets Unibank $6 million on the advisory 
 
126. The description in the text does not exhaust the universe of potential conflicts from 
multiple representations.  A bank also could (1) advise two sellers in the same industry; (2) advise 
both the seller and the buyer; (3) advise two or more buyers of a single company or asset; and 
(4) provide financing to multiple buyers.  See David B. Miller et al., M&A Engagement Letters: 
Protecting Sellers and Buyers, STRAFFORD 71 (Nov. 21, 2013), http://media.straffordpub.com/pro 
ducts/m-and-a-engagement-letters-protecting-sellers-and-buyers-2013-11-21/presentation.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/QT2P-C48G. 
127. See Christine Harper & Julia Werdigier, ‘Stapled’ Loans Create Potential Conflicts for 
Merger Advisers, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2005, 7:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=10000006&sid=aNS.Y5u9qCb8&refer=home, archived at http://perma.cc/ETF3-5QVV 
(“The lead arranger of loans for a leveraged buyout can make 1.3 percent to 1.5 percent of a loan’s 
value . . . .”). 
128. This was more or less the situation in In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 
A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), where a bank whose financing fees were ten times its advisory fees had a 
strong incentive to promote its financing role at the expense of its advising.  Id. at 70. 
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side and $0 on the loan side.  Unibank thus has every incentive to advise 
Target to resist the squeeze and pursue alternatives that implicate cash 
consideration financed with loans, particularly with private equity buyers.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but Unibank makes more on 
the private equity alternative whether or not private equity bidders are likely 
to make lower offers. 
The problem is salient even in the absence of the bear hug offer: 
whatever the value question on the table, the bank will feel pressure from 
its corporate loan department to answer in favor of a private equity sale.  
Moreover, as between two private equity bidders, one of which is open to 
the staple and the other of which will be finding financing elsewhere, the 
advisor has a clear preference. 
Note that a staple can negatively skew banker incentives even when 
attaching to all bidders.  Let us go back to the staple’s original version: the 
bank’s advisory department urges a prospective client to sell all or a part of 
itself, holding out an assured financing package as a sweetener.129  The 
prospective client signs on and the bank conducts an open auction in which 
all bidders plan to make use of the staple.  Although the auction is a win-
win for the bank, a perverse incentive creeps in nonetheless.  As the bidding 
goes higher the amount to be loaned under the bank’s commitment 
increases as well; as the principal amount increases the loan becomes riskier 
and its value to the bank goes down accordingly. 
Summing up, a staple aggravates the conflict springing from the 
performance fee by creating a banker preference for a subset of bidders.  It 
further aggravates the conflict by giving the banker a toehold interest on the 
opposite side of the negotiating table.  And, just as the performance fee 
builds in a bias towards a conservative posture respecting strategic choices, 
so does a staple reinforce the conservatism—the easier the buyer’s deal 
terms, in particular the lower the price, the less risky the bank’s loan and 
the more valuable to the bank.  But a caveat once again must be entered.  As 
noted above, staples can import advantages to sellers, reducing transaction 
costs, establishing a price floor, and conceivably importing financing other-
wise unavailable.130 
C. Summary 
A number of points emerge from this Part’s look at investment banker 
M&A services.  First, banker–advisors play a critical role in realizing the 
best price for target shareholders.  To the extent a conflict impairs their 
service provision, injury is threatened.  Second, relational conflicts are 
inevitable.  Third, while some bankers eschew conflicts of interest, many do 
 
129. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
130. See supra text accompanying notes 103–107. 
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not, in some cases seeking them out.  Fourth, the bigger the bank the more 
prone toward conflicts of interest.  Fifth, incentive impairments stemming 
from conflicts are by no means deadweight negatives from the point of 
view of selling shareholders: some conflicts stem from relationships that 
generate information of value to selling companies; stapled financing holds 
out benefits as well as costs.  Sixth, bankers and their clients do not use 
their contracts to minimize conflicts and improve incentives; otherwise the 
fee would not be performance based. 
III. Banker–Client Relationships: Economics and Law 
Our review of banker M&A services and industry structure depicts a 
practice that tolerates banker conflicts, treating them as a piece of a 
complicated picture of choices and trade-offs.  Banks purvey information 
gleaned relationally, and the source relationships can hold out conflicts.  
Meanwhile, a sell-side board chooses among a range of vigorously 
competing banks, some more conflicted than others.  A big bank holds out 
more conflicts but also offers a deeper informational base and a wider range 
of services including, potentially, financing.  Conflicted representation can 
make cost–benefit sense. 
Business people thus see conflicts as problems to be managed.  With 
lawyers, in contrast, conflicts are “red flags” that trigger alarms.  When a 
conflict crops up in a fiduciary relationship, a lawyer’s first instinct is to 
evaluate by reference to “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”131 
and counsel avoidance rather than cost–benefit calculation.  Corporate law’s 
fiduciary regime protecting the interests of target shareholders triggers a 
second round of lawyerly concern regarding the conflicts tolerated on the 
business side. 
It looks as if we have set a stage for a classic policy confrontation 
between economic expediency and fiduciary values embedded in legal 
mandates.  This Part shows that the appearance is deceptive.  We begin by 
examining the banker–client relationship through an economic lens.  
Unsurprisingly, economic analysis remits the conflicts problem to 
contractual solution.  We then turn to the legal side where the relationship is 
situated in an agency framework, again unsurprisingly.  Bankers, as agents, 
owe fiduciary duties to their corporate principals, but the law leaves ample 
room for contractual adjustment accommodating agent conflicts.  Now 
comes the surprise: the accompanying legal process rules synchronize 
neatly with the features of the relational picture highlighted in the economic 
analysis. 
 
131. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); cf. Tuch, Investment Banks, supra 
note 29, at 481 (identifying fiduciary duty as requiring complete and unerring loyalty to another’s 
interests). 
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A. The Economics of Banker Conflicts 
Economists define a conflict of interest as a situation in which a party 
to a transaction can gain by taking actions adversely affecting the 
counterparty.132  The definition is capacious, sweeping in actions that 
lawyers classify as hard bargaining, overreaching, contractual bad faith, and 
contractual nonperformance, without any need to refer over to fiduciary 
duty.133  Where a lawyer inspects the relationship for a duty and proceeds 
from there, problematizing the conflict if the relationship is fiduciary,134 an 
economist views all fact patterns as contractual.135  Given a conflict, an 
economist asks how it impacts the parties’ incentives and projects their 
rational, contractual responses.136 
Here is the basic economic analysis.137  A rational counterparty, in this 
case the sell-side board, anticipates the conflict’s negative impact and 
adjusts for it.138  In the simplest scenario it simply discounts the price until 
the engagement becomes attractive net of the conflict’s costs.139  The 
conflicted seller of services will want to forestall discounting and so needs 
to mitigate the conflict’s effect.  For an advisory bank, the straightforward 
way to do this is to build a reputation for adding value to client 
transactions.140  Once the bank’s future income is staked on the reputation’s 
maintenance,141 the bank has a strong incentive to make sure that a conflict 
 
132. Hamid Mehran & René M. Stulz, The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial 
Institutions, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 268 (2007). 
133. Cf. id. at 268 & n.4 (describing the legal conception of conflict of interest as conditioned 
on the existence of a fiduciary duty). 
134. Tuch, Investment Banks, supra note 29, at 481–82. 
135. See Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
393, 402 (2007) (observing that an economist’s primary interest is in analyzing contractual 
mechanisms that may alleviate agency problems and other opportunism concerns, such as 
fiduciary breaches). 
136. See Mehran & Stulz, supra note 132, at 278 (demonstrating how financial institutions 
will consider whether a conflict of interest actually threatens business performance prior to acting 
on it). 
137. More sophisticated formal analyses incorporate factors such as information asymmetries, 
signaling, banker capability, and market position, showing how banker reputations evolve across 
time under dynamic conditions.  See, e.g., Zhaohui Chen et al., Traders vs. Relationship 
Managers: Reputational Conflicts in Full-Service Investment Banks 1–2 (Oct. 20, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21920 
98, archived at http://perma.cc/54Y5-66JN (modeling banker reputations by type of work 
performed and their use as a governance mechanism to manage conflicts of interest). 
138. Mehran & Stulz, supra note 132, at 269. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 277; see also Jonathan Macey, The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and 
Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency), J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN., Fall 2010, at 18, 19 (“[D]eveloping and maintaining a reputation for integrity is costly.  
At the very least, companies must resist the temptation to pursue opportunities for profit that come 
at the expense of their customers.  Encouraging, or even just condoning, the pursuit of such 
opportunities represents a breach of trust with the customer . . . .”). 
141. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System defines reputational risk as “the 
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does not impair its performance.142  Competition within the advisory sector 
further sharpens the bank’s incentives: a bank giving into conflicts and 
providing bad service loses market share.143  Banks thus monitor conflicts, 
promulgating internal policies and enforcing them with control systems.144 
Two things follow: first, client injury should not be assumed by virtue 
of a conflict’s existence, and second, even given a negative impact, the 
conflict may have been taken into account in advance and so would imply 
no relational breach.145  Restating these points: conflicts should not be 
barred by per se rules; indeed, given sophisticated parties, we should 
presume that conflicts have been recognized ex ante and adequately dealt 
with contractually. 
Significantly, this analysis does not predict that the services-seller’s 
interest in minimizing the adverse impact of conflicts reduces their 
incidence to zero.  A bank selling advisory services can be expected to 
invest in containing its incentive to self-serve only so long as so doing is 
cost beneficial.146  And, with investment banking services, minimization of 
conflicts could be quite expensive since it presupposes that the bank divest 
all lines of business that create them.  Such has not been the case, even as 
minimalist boutique banks do exist. 
To get a better sense of differentiation with the sector, we took the 
advisors listed in Mergerstat’s annual merger advisory top fifty from 1996 
to 2013147 and divided the advisors into four categories: (1) investment bank 
 
potential that negative publicity regarding an institution’s business practices, whether true or not, 
will cause a decline in the customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.”  Letter from 
Richard Spillenkothen, Dir., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Div. of Banking 
Supervision and Regulation, to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve 
Bank (May 24, 1996), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/ 
sr9614.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5BWW-7J8S. 
142. Mehran & Stulz, supra note 132, at 278. 
143. The collapse of Bankers Trust following the disclosure of customer abuse at its swap 
desk provides a telling example of “the workings of the reputation market.”  Macey, supra note 
140, at 27. 
144. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS, REPORT OF THE BUSINESS STANDARDS COMMITTEE 17–18 
(2011) (describing various groups within the firm that work to resolve conflicts of interest and 
listing guiding principles underlying the firm’s conflict of interest policies), available at 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/committee-report/business-standar 
ds-committee-report-pdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4NHB-GJTX. 
145. See Mehran & Stulz, supra note 132, at 279 (clarifying that conflicts of interest do not 
necessarily have adverse impact on services provided by a financial institution if capital markets 
discount analyst recommendations to adjust for bias). 
146. Id. at 273. 
147. Mergerstat publishes an annual list of the top fifty financial advisors by total deal value.  
See FACTSET MERGERSTAT, 2014 MERGERSTAT REVIEW, at i, x (2014), available at 
http://www.bvresources.com/freedownloads/mergerstatreviewexcerpt2014.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/WY8N-ABPL (stating that Mergerstat has tracked statistics on mergers, acquisitions, 
and divestitures for over forty-five years, and annually publishes a hardcover report that includes a 
ranking for financial advisors). 
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subsidiaries of commercial banks and other large financial companies;148 
(2) large independent investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley (irrespective of their categorization as bank holding 
companies in 2008); (3) boutique investment banks; and (4) advisors not 
falling into the foregoing three categories (principally private equity and 
auditing firms).  The line between large investment banks and boutique 
investment banks is drawn by reference to numbers of employees and 
bankers, underwriting capacity, and the bank’s range of activities and 
breadth of industry coverage.149  Figure 1 breaks out annual market shares 






148. The “commercial banks” category includes universal banks, institutional lenders, 
insurance companies, and their subsidiaries.  This category does not include investment banks that 
are only nominally commercial, such as Goldman Sachs & Co. 
149. We admit that the line drawing entails judgment calls about quantity and that our 
approach departs from the practice of financial economists, who divide banks into size categories 
based solely on market share.  See, e.g., Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 188 tbl.2 (using a three-
tier ranking system for advisors based on number of acquisitions and market share); 
P. Raghavendra Rau, Investment Bank Market Share, Contingent Fee Payments, and Performance 
of Acquiring Firms, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (2000) (categorizing banks based on market share). 













Other Boutique Investment Banks
Large Investment Banks Commercial Banks
Merger Advisory Market Share, 1996–2013 
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 The figure tells a two-part story.  On the one hand, large independent 
investment banks lose market share as large commercial banks acquire them 
over time.  This enhances the potential for conflicts, for commercial bank 
entry facilitates, inter alia, stapled financing.  On the other hand, boutiques 
steadily gain at the expense of big banks, commercial and independent, 
taken as a whole.151  The boutiques’ market share increased from 3% in 
1996 to 12% in 2013.  Boutiques, as monoline shops, are less prone to 
conflict.  They aggressively promote themselves as such.152 
 The Figure also depicts an industry that changes constantly.  Boutiques 
are often founded by bankers who leave big banks to start their own 
shops.153  Big banks in turn historically have hired rising stars away from 
boutiques, maintaining their dominance in the process.154  That movement 
was reversed in 2008, when constraints on pay packages made regulated 
banks vulnerable to poaching by young boutiques holding out bigger 
bonuses.155  The back and forth of personnel, taken together with the 
continued appearance of new boutiques and the volatility of the boutiques’ 
market share, lends the sector a dynamic aspect. 
 
151. The figures should not be taken to imply that a particular bank, whether in the 
commercial or large investment bank category, gained or lost market share during the period in 
question. 
152. Scott Bok, CEO of Greenhill & Co., has described the boutique appeal in the following 
way: 
I think we’re kind of a throwback, really.  We’re a bunch of senior partners who just 
like advising companies.  We don’t have any other products to sell you; we don’t 
want to do your financing, we don’t want to do your bond underwriting, we don’t 
write research on you, we don’t want to sell you foreign currency, we don’t want to 
sell you our wealth management product.  All we want to do is give you the best 
possible advice. 
Jonathan Marino, Rising Sun, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Jan. 2009, at 52, 53; 
see also MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 39, at 303 & n.18 (suggesting that the focused nature 
of boutique firms immunizes them from conflicts of interest that may affect larger banks, allowing 
them to give more impartial advice); Joshua Hamerman, Greenhill’s Export: Pure Advice, 
INVESTMENT DEALER’S DIG., May 7, 2010, at 1, 18 (quoting Robert Greenhill, boutique advisory 
firm Greenhill & Co.’s Chairman, who attributes Greenhill’s success to its nonconflicted 
advisory-only model—a feature that separates it from large banks); Joshua Hamerman, Tech 
Qonversation, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Aug. 2009, at 44, 44 (quoting Ian 
MacLeod of investment boutique Qatalyst Partners, who stresses that the Qatalyst model allows 
advisors “to focus exclusively on providing independent advice to great technology companies”); 
Sagent Advisors Formed to Offer Financial Direction, Guidance on Mergers and Acquisitions, 
INS. ADVOC., June 21–28, 2004, at 40, 40 (quoting advisor Herald L. Ritch, who remarks that his 
boutique advisory firm Sagent can offer pure advice, free of trading, investing, or structural 
conflicts, which meets a “‘growing demand’” in America). 
153. For example, one of the earliest and best known boutiques, Wasserstein Perella, was 
founded by two former employees of Credit Suisse First Boston.  MORRISON & WILHELM, supra 
note 39, at 302. 
154. See Stephen J. Morgan, The Battle of the Bulge Bracket, WHARTON MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 
2001, http://magazine.whartontest.com/issues/362.php, archived at http://perma.cc/GLW7-YEQW 
(reporting on a large bulge-bracket bank’s purchase of a boutique in order to acquire its talent). 
155. Christopher Alessi, Banking on Boutiques, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 2011, at 62, 
64. 
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 To summarize, where lawyers look for taints arising from conflicts, 
counseling prohibition, economic analysis counsels that taints by 
themselves are not enough to justify prohibitive intervention because the 
parties already may have adjusted for the underlying conflict in their 
contract.  The economic question is whether a potential for harm survives 
the contracting process for later realization at the performance stage.  The 
banking sector is well suited to the economic case, for it sees active 
competition among a range of service providers with conflicts figuring into 
product differentiation. 
B. Legal Treatment: Agency and Contract 
 We now compare the legal treatment of banker–client relationships. 
 This might have been a federal law discussion.  Banker–advisor firms 
are broker–dealers within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934156 and their 
advisor–employees must register with the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA).157  Numerous FINRA rules apply to investment 
bankers,158 but the rules do not touch specifically on advisor conflicts and 
client duties.159  State law regimes of contract, agency, and corporation law 
govern accordingly.  The fit with the economic analysis turns out to be 
surprisingly good. 
 1. Fiduciary Characterization: Agency and Advisory Functions.—
Viewed through a legal lens, banker–client relationships entail the 
performance of two functions—representation and advice giving.  The legal 
framework differs with the function. 
 When the banker represents the client at the negotiating table, it acts as 
an agent: at common law an agency obtains whenever a party acts for 
another subject to the other’s control.160  A leading Delaware case on 
banker liability, In re Shoe-Town,161 tersely confirms the characterization: 
“[The banker] served as an agent of management.”162  Fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care follow from the characterization. 
 
156. See Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers 16–19 (Wash. Univ. 
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-04-04, 2014), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2432601, archived at http://perma.cc/FD6T-FW9E (arguing that “investment 
bankers are properly designated as broker-dealers”). 
157. Id. at 16–17. 
158. Id. at 20. 
159. See id. at 20–23 (generally describing the subject matter covered by FINRA’s rules and 
explaining that such rules are “piecemeal” and mainly directed at regulating firms, as opposed to 
individual conduct). 
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 & cmt. b (2006). 
161. In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 
1990). 
162. Id. at *7. 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
32 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
 
 An agent’s duty of loyalty includes a duty not to act as an adverse 
party to the principal.163  Conflicts of interest can implicate breaches of duty 
accordingly.  But the prohibition is conditional: the bar lifts if the principal 
consents to a conflict after full disclosure by the agent.164  This opening for 
contracting out from fiduciary responsibility is in turn subject to a proviso: 
the agent’s overall conduct is subject to ex post review for good faith and 
fair dealing.165  The common law thus withholds from the conflicted agent 
an assurance of absolute immunity from attack even given consent and 
disclosure.  The practical question is how close the agent can get to 
immunity. 
 We turn now to service in an advisory capacity.  Here the banker and 
the client interact one-on-one and the banker does not act for the client in 
dealing with a third party.  Strictly speaking, no agency obtains.166  This 
matters, because absent an agency there is no ready-made common law 
template that comes to bear to impose a fiduciary characterization. 
 It would seem sensible to extend the fiduciary characterization coupled 
with the agency to the relationship as a whole, tailoring the duty’s 
particulars for the advisory role.  An analogy to legal representation 
provides a template.  Ethical principles applicable to lawyers distinguish 
between representation and advice giving, termed “counseling.”167  The 
fiduciary prescription against adverse dealing applies to representation,168 
while the lawyer acting in an advisory capacity is required to “exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”169  Conflicts 
of interest can impair independence just as they can impair representation 
and so remain problematic.170  At the same time, the client remains in the 
same posture of exposure and reliance that supports imposition of fiduciary 
duty respecting the agency. 
 We have found no cases that take up the question whether the 
fiduciary characterization extends to the banker’s actions as an advisor, at 
least so far as concerns the primary clients—the sell-side corporation and its 
 
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006). 
164. Id. § 8.06.   
165. Id. § 8.06 cmt. d(1).  The ethical regime governing lawyers operates similarly.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 214–217. 
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (commenting that a service 
provider who “simply furnishes advice and does not interact with third parties as the 
representative of the recipient of the advice” is “not acting as an agent”). 
167. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2014) (describing the scope of 
legal representation), with id. R. 2.1 (describing an attorney’s advisory role as an aspect of 
representation). 
168. Id. R. 1.7. 
169. Id. R. 2.1. 
170. Indeed, we think that the duty to render advice independently is susceptible to a fiduciary 
characterization, although we are not sure that any outcome determinative consequences would 
follow therefrom. 
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board of directors.  Such cases as there are concern a secondary issue: 
whether the selling company’s shareholders enjoy the status of fiduciary 
beneficiaries. 
 
 2. Scope: The Status of Shareholders.—Many banker cases turn on the 
question whether the client’s shareholders are direct beneficiaries of its 
banker’s duties.  This is unsurprising in view of the prevalence of 
representative litigation in the wake of merger announcements. 
 Under Delaware’s default rule, bankers owe no duties to shareholders 
and shareholders accordingly have no direct action against a banker.171  
Significantly, this is not because the banker is classified as a classic arm’s-
length contract counterparty with the client board.  We have already quoted 
the leading opinion on shareholder duties, In re Shoe-Town, for the 
proposition that the banker is the board’s agent.172  But, in the Delaware 
court’s view, the client board of directors is the only principal in the fact 
pattern: the banker is not deemed to stand in a relationship of trust with its 
client’s shareholders and thus is not subject to a representative lawsuit for 
breach of fiduciary duty.  We will expand our quotation of Shoe-Town to 
show how this needle is threaded: 
[The banker] served as an agent of management. Its authority was 
derived by delegation from management.  Directors and other 
governing members of a corporation who are imbued with fiduciary 
responsibility can be characterized as agents and quasi trustees.  It is 
equally true, however, that those serving as mere agents are 
generally not characterized as trustees and therefore do not stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with the shareholders.  Indeed, it escapes 
reason to say that an investment bank hired by a management group 
taking a company private, such as in the present situation, would 
stand in a relationship with a given corporation and its stockholders 
similar to the relationship of a trustee to his cestui que trust.  In 
addition, because a fairness opinion or an outside valuation is not an 
absolute requirement under Delaware law, it makes little sense to 
strap those investment banks, who are retained, with the duties of a 
fiduciary.173 
 
171. See In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 12, 1990) (explaining that bankers serving only as agents are typically not deemed 
trustees and thus owe no fiduciary duty to shareholders). 
172. See supra notes 161–62. 
173. Shoe-Town, 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (citations omitted); see also HA2003 Liquidating 
Trust v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 517 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to find that a 
banker–advisor owed a duty to shareholders outside of its contractual duties and noting that “[the 
plaintiff] wants us to throw out the detailed contract . . . and to make up a set of duties as if this 
were tort litigation”). 
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 Another leading case on banker duties, the New York Appellate 
Division’s opinion in Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co.,174 goes the other 
way.175  Like Shoe-Town, Schneider is a 1990 decision in a case involving 
an allegation of banker negligence in connection with the preparation of a 
fairness opinion.  The court used an agency theory to link the shareholders 
to the banker: the board’s special merger negotiating committee was formed 
to protect the shareholders and engaged the banker toward that end; the 
committee acted as the shareholders’ agent; the banker accordingly acted as 
the shareholder agent’s agent and so stood sufficiently in privity with them 
to support a direct action.176 
 The two approaches can be distinguished on a theory of the firm 
grounds.177  Delaware hews to the traditional model under which the board 
owes duties to the corporate entity and does not directly serve the 
 
174. 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1990). 
175. Id. at 574–75. 
176. Id.; see also Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 
1987), rev’d on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988) (engaging in a similar analysis). 
177. Predictably, the Delaware approach has been criticized.  The critics would upgrade 
investment bankers to full fiduciary status with the shareholders as direct beneficiaries.  
“Gatekeeper” liability would follow along the lines imposed on auditors—applying ex post 
scrutiny for lapses of due care and diligence.  See Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment 
Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 513–16, 519–20 (1992) (advocating for such an 
approach); cf. Cameron Cushman, Note, Liability for Fairness Opinions Under Delaware Law, 36 
J. CORP. L. 635, 649 (2011) (recommending a shareholder cause of action for negligent fairness 
opinions); Rubenstein, supra note 70, at 1724 (same).  Contrast those who would prefer to roll 
back Smith v. Van Gorkom and denude the fairness opinion of a central place in the board’s 
demonstration of diligence.  See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or 
Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951, 970 (1992) (noting that, because of the variety of 
valuation approaches used and the influence of interested parties, objective and independent 
fairness advice is difficult to achieve).  Under this line of thinking, valuation opinions should be 
dismissed completely as intrinsically subjective, id. at 970, and useless in most scenarios, id. at 
1000–03.  It follows that a gatekeeper liability regime will never work and the law should not 
encourage boards to hold out fairness opinions as a basis for shareholder reliance.  See Carney, 
supra note 82, at 535–36 (rejecting the argument that gatekeeper liability for investment bankers 
is good public policy).  If you need a gatekeeper, free the field of regulatory barriers and let the 
market for corporate control solve problems through competitive bidding.  See id. at 538 
(suggesting that “[m]arkets may provide the strongest form of protection for minority and public 
shareholders in takeouts and management buyouts”).  But others advocate a more moderate 
liability-based approach.  See Dale A. Oesterle, Fairness Opinions as Magic Pieces of Paper, 70 
WASH. U. L.Q. 541, 557–58 (1992) (recommending that boards of directors should be held liable 
in shareholders’ derivative actions for relying on substandard opinions and that the showing 
required for proving an aiding and abetting cause of action against an investment banker should be 
reevaluated). 
 We reject the analogy to auditors as gatekeepers.  Accountants work ex post with verifiable 
numbers.  Appraisers of value sometimes do too, but just as often they work with soft future 
projections.  Auditors apply a well articulated body of rules and principles to client accounting 
treatments and operate under a thick book of best practices.  This regulatory encasement provides 
yardsticks for ex post evaluation of auditor performance.  There is no comparable body of 
principles governing the professional activities of bankers, and, failing bankers’ formal organi-
zation as a profession, none can be expected.  The Shoe-Town barrier to banker gatekeeper 
liability makes good sense. 
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shareholders as an agent.178  The indirect relationship between the board 
and the shareholders takes the framework of the common law of trust rather 
than of agency,179 with the shareholders emerging as beneficiaries of 
director trustees rather than as principals.  The framing cuts off banker 
liability—the banker, whatever its tie to the board, certainly has not signed 
on as anybody’s trustee.  The New York court, in contrast, is unconcerned 
about the corporate entity, ignoring it so as to construct a direct agency 
relationship between the board committee and the shareholders.180  This 
facilitates a link over to the banker, who owes the same duties to both 
principals.  The impetus for the treatment lies less in corporate than in tort 
law.181 
 The Schneider approach has not had much traction.  In recent cases 
concerning the characterization and scope of the advisory function, the 
Schneider agency analysis determines no results, to the extent it is 
mentioned at all.182  Instead, the cases start where Shoe-Town leaves off: 
 
178. See Shoe-Town, 1990 WL 13475, at *6–7 (refusing to find a fiduciary duty between an 
investment bank hired by a corporation’s management and that corporation’s shareholders). 
179. This follows from the statutory scheme.  Consider the basic allocation of power.  The 
relevant Delaware statute provides that the shareholders elect a board of directors in which 
management power is vested.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)–(b) (2011).  If one takes a 
contextual look at this dispensation against the general legal background, it might appear that the 
shareholders possess the ordinary rights of owners of property, with the elected directors serving 
as their agents under a delegation of authority.  But such is not the case.  In the corporate law 
model the shareholders do not delegate authority to the board.  The board’s powers, in the classic 
expression, are “‘original and undelegated,’” springing from the law’s provision of the organi-
zational form and its vesting of authority in the board.  People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 
634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (quoting Hoyt v. Thompson’s Ex’rs, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (N.Y. 1859)).  Even 
as the shareholders elect the board, they have no right to tell it what to do.  They can only proceed 
indirectly by removing it or replacing it at the next annual meeting. tit. 8, § 141(k).  Agency 
relationships work differently.  Actual authority must be based on the principal’s actual 
manifestation of assent, and the terms of the delegation can be changed at will.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY  §§ 3.01 & cmt. b, 3.06 & cmt. b (2006).  Indeed, the delegation can be 
revoked at will.  Id. § 3.06 & cmt. c. Neither are the shareholders the legal corporation’s owners.  
They own shares of stock, and, as shareholders, have the rights specified therein or pursuant to 
corporate law.  If one adds up the foregoing incidents of the legal corporation and then looks for 
an analog in the common law form file, the affinity lies with the trust.  Like a trust, the corporate 
entity takes title to property.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS  § 40 & cmt. b (2007) (“[I]t 
is generally stated and usually true that the trustee has legal title . . . .”).  Like a trustee, the board 
of directors has comprehensive power to manage the property and owes fiduciary duties.  See id. 
§ 70 (stating that a trustee has the power to manage a trust and in acting on this power stands in a 
fiduciary relationship with the trust’s beneficiaries). 
180. Schneider, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574–75. 
181. The absence of a corporate law duty does not foreclose the possibility of a shareholder 
suit on the ground that the shareholders are third-party beneficiaries of the advisory contract.  
Compare Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 235–36 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding 
a controlling shareholder to be an intended beneficiary of an advisory contract), with Joyce v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that a banker–advisor did 
not undertake any contractual duties to shareholders). 
182. See, e.g., Young v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 08CH28542, 2009 WL 247626 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. Jan. 13, 2009) (rejecting a Schneider claim on the ground that the engagement letter and 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
36 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
 
there is no presumption, based on agency law or otherwise, that the banker 
owes fiduciary duties to the shareholders.183  Rather, it is up to the 
shareholders to persuade the court that a relation of trust and confidence 
arose in the circumstances of the particular engagement.184  It is an uphill 
fight, given standard-form engagement letters that negate the trust asser-
tion.185  But shareholder plaintiffs have been known to reach the summit, 
given the right relational facts.186 
 
 3. Contracting Out.—Recall that agency law opens a door for 
contracting out of fiduciary duty: an agent can deal adversely with its 
principal by procuring advance consent based on full disclosure subject to 
an overall limitation of good faith and fair dealing.187  Banker–client 
engagement letters seek to take full advantage of the opening.  This section 
surveys the result, first taking up disclosure questions and then turning to 
provisions that limit banker liability and attempt to negate fiduciary status 
altogether. 
 
 a. Disclosure.—The basic requirements of disclosure and consent 
make eminent sense in the banker–client context.  The conflicted banker has 
an informational advantage.  Contracting between the bank and the client 
respecting the bank’s conflict cannot be expected to succeed until the 
informational asymmetry has been ameliorated.  Disclosure evens the field: 
the client board has choices in the matter (for example, substituting another 
banker) and needs to make a considered decision regarding the seriousness 
of the conflict. 
 Banker–client engagement letters customarily contain boilerplate 
disclosures of banker conflicts, with the client’s execution and delivery of 
 
fairness opinion made it clear that the banker’s duty did not extend to shareholders). 
183. See, e.g., Joyce, 538 F.3d at 802 (finding that no fiduciary duty existed between a 
banker–advisor and shareholders stemming from a fairness opinion given by the bank to the 
company’s board of directors). 
184. See Baker, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 236 & n.5 (applying New York and Massachusetts law, 
which requires that the plaintiff demonstrate a fiduciary relationship was created based on 
circumstances beyond the terms of the contract); Joyce, 538 F.3d at 802 (applying Illinois law and 
requiring the shareholders to show special circumstances that give rise to an extra contractual 
duty); Brooks v. Key Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, 809 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272–73 (App. Div. 2006) 
(requiring allegations that, apart from the terms of the contract, the parties created a relationship of 
higher trust). 
185. See Joyce, 538 F.3d at 802 (dismissing a fiduciary claim in reliance on an engagement 
letter defining the corporation as the client only); CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Credit 
Lyonnais, 704 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (App. Div. 2000) (dismissing a fiduciary claim that was 
contradicted by contractual language).  For a case in which the standard restriction to the board of 
directors blocked a claim related to a fairness opinion, see Young, 2009 WL 247626, at *6. 
186. See Baker, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 236–37 (refusing to dismiss a plaintiff shareholder claim 
alleging special circumstances where the relationship was “muddy”). 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 164–66. 
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the letter manifesting consent.188  But the standard provisions are generic, in 
effect notifying the client that the bank is a big, multifunctional place that 
holds out potential conflicts.189 
 Disclosure of conflicts specific to a particular transaction must be 
tailored with a view to later judicial scrutiny.  Delaware has an extensive 
case law on banker-conflict disclosure occasioned by shareholder litigation 
over the completeness and accuracy of proxy statements distributed in 
connection with the merger approval process.  Fairness opinions must be 
described in the proxy statement, and, at the plaintiffs’ behest, the Delaware 
courts conduct searching reviews of disclosures of the opinions’ contents.190  
 
188. Here is a sample: 
[Client] acknowledges that [investment bank] is a global, full service securities firm 
engaged in securities trading and brokerage activities, and providing investment 
banking, investment management and financial advisory services.  In the ordinary 
course of its trading, brokerage, investment and asset management and financial 
activities, [investment bank] and its affiliates may hold long or short positions, and 
may trade or otherwise effect or recommend transactions, for its own account or the 
accounts of its customers, in debt or equity securities or loans of [client] or any other 
company that may be involved in the Transaction contemplated by this Engagement 
Letter.  Further, in connection with its merchant banking activities, [investment bank] 
may have made private investments in [client] or any other company that may be 
involved in the Transaction contemplated by this Engagement Letter.  As a global, 
full service financial organization, [investment bank] and its affiliates may also 
provide a broad range of normal course financial products and services to its 
customers (including, but not limited to investment banking, commercial banking, 
credit derivative, hedging and foreign exchange products and services), including 
companies that may be involved in the Transaction contemplated by this Engagement 
Letter.  Furthermore, [client] acknowledges [investment bank] may have fiduciary or 
other relationships whereby [investment bank] or its affiliates may exercise voting 
power over securities of various persons, which securities may from time to time 
include securities of [client] or of potential purchasers or others with interests in 
respect of the Transaction.  [Client] acknowledges that [investment bank] or such 
affiliates may exercise such powers and otherwise perform its functions in connection 
with such fiduciary or other relationships without regard to [investment bank’s] 
relationship to [client] hereunder. 
Miller et al., supra note 126, at 74–75. 
189. For an unsuccessful attempt to use a generic disclosure statement to shield a failure to 
disclose particular facts respecting a conflict, see In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 105–06 
(Del. Ch. 2014). 
190. The shareholders must get a fair summary of the work done, including detailed 
information about key inputs, multiples, discount rates, dates, and the range of values generated.  
In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 511 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203–04 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Ehrlich v. Phase Forward Inc., 
955 N.E.2d 912, 923 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (recognizing the “fair summary” standard).  Either a 
discrepancy between the numbers reported in the proxy statement and those reported to the board, 
or the failure to report relevant value data supplied to the analyst can result in an injunction 
against the shareholder vote on the merger.  See, e.g., Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato 
Learning, Inc., 11 A.3d 1175, 1177–79 (Del. Ch. 2010) (enjoining a vote where the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) used in an opinion had a broader upward range than WACC 
figures in the boardroom and no disclosure was made regarding internal cash flow projections 
supplied to the banker).  The courts also want the shareholders positioned to understand all factors 
that might influence the banker’s analysis.  David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, No. 
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 An opining banker’s conflicts must be disclosed as well.  The 
disclosure requirement is applied against the banker both as regards the 
board of directors to which the fairness opinion is addressed and as regards 
the shareholders voting on the merger.191  Litigation follows over the 
quality of the proxy statement’s disclosures.  Scrutiny is strict—failure to 
disclose and quantify the success contingency in the banker fee arrangement 
leads to an injunction against the shareholder vote.192  Any other financial 
outcomes for the banker following from consummation of the deal also 
must be disclosed.193 
 
3694-VCN, 2008 WL 5048692, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008).  Class action plaintiffs ask for 
more disclosure still, including “discussions” of valuation methodologies.  Here the courts 
sensibly balk, asking only for an accurate but literal report.  See In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 
5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) (noting that disclosures do not have 
to discuss all potential alternatives and recognizing that only accuracy is required); Netsmart, 924 
A.2d at 204 (same). 
191. See Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair Summary II: An Update on 
Delaware’s Disclosure Regime Regarding Fairness Opinions, 66 BUS. LAW. 943, 954 (2011) 
(“Because stockholders need to be aware of a banker’s potential conflicts in determining how 
much weight to place on the fairness opinion, the court has required disclosures in several areas 
relating to bankers’ engagement and their potential interest in the transaction on which they are 
opining.”). 
192. See In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at 
*8–9, *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (enjoining the vote, in part, because the specifics of the 
contingency fee were not disclosed, including the percentage of the fee that was contingent on the 
success of the deal); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1190–92 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining the vote for failing to disclose the fact that a significant portion of the 
bankers’ fees rested upon initial approval of a particular transaction).  But see Cnty. of York 
Emps. Ret. Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-VCN, 2008 WL 4824053, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2008) (finding that the specifics about a contingency need not be disclosed and “that 
simply stating that an advisor’s fees are partially contingent on the consummation of a transaction 
is appropriate”). 
193. See, e.g., David P. Simonetti, 2008 WL 5048692, at *8–9, *14 (enjoining the vote, in 
part, for failure to disclose and quantify outcomes relating to warrants and convertible notes from 
prior transactions). 
 Strict though the scrutiny may be, critics of the use of contingency fees in fairness-opinion 
practice remain unsatisfied.  They would like to see these conflicts barred.  See Bebchuk & Kahan, 
supra note 63, at 49–51 (suggesting that fairness opinions written under contingent-fee 
arrangements should be discounted or a second opinion from a flat-fee banker should be required); 
Carney, supra note 82, at 536–37 (recognizing the existence of proposals to ban success fees).  
They also note the charge that the opinions are accepted at face value without further scrutiny of 
their methodologies or assumptions and suggest that opinion practice be revamped so as to afford 
selling shareholders a stronger, more reliable basis for voting yes.  E.g., Davidoff, supra note 35, 
at 1600–01, 1625.  “Fairness” remains undefined under Delaware law, id. at 1605, making it hard 
to subject the opinion to collateral attack.  The commentators blame the Delaware courts for 
settling for less.  They suggest that the Delaware courts should get their hands dirty at a technical 
level: the fairness standard should be articulated explicitly, Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 63, at 
46–47, and courts should subject fairness opinions to closer evaluation, checking into the 
relationship between the banker’s assumptions and conclusions and demanding more factual 
detail, id. at 47–48.  At the same time, the courts should accord fairness opinions less weight in 
the balance when evaluating board diligence.  Id. at 52. 
 We find the criticism unpersuasive.  The softness of valuation opinions follows from the 
softness of valuation as a discipline.  Valuation practice could be regularized and hardened, 
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 The disclosure requirement, in short, is not a formality. 
 b. Liability and Scope Limitations.—Engagement letters contain 
standard provisions designed to insulate the bank from the duties of care 
and loyalty.  On the care side, the provision limits the bank’s liability for 
actions related to the engagement except in cases of gross negligence or 
willful misconduct.194  A parallel provision requires the client to indemnify 
the bank for liability stemming from the engagement other than any liability 
resulting from its own willful misconduct, gross negligence,195 or bad 
 
provided an authority emerged to articulate and impose best practices.  Perhaps, as Professor 
Davidoff has suggested, bankers should organize as a profession and discipline themselves, 
articulating their own valuation and conflict of interest standards under the gaze of market 
regulators.  Davidoff, supra note 35, at 1615–16 (recommending the formation of a public–private 
Investment Banking Authority that would promulgate standards for valuation practice and 
supervise internal procedures, requirements, and conflicts at the banks). 
 Some self-regulation does exist in the sector: the banks have internal review committees that 
supervise the rendering of fairness opinions and the committees in turn operate under procedural 
requirements imposed by the FINRA.  See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. MANUAL § 5150 
(2008), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6832, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6QBN-9PG4 (establishing rules requiring specific disclosures and 
procedures addressing conflicts in fairness opinions).  But cf. Michael B. Rizik, Jr. & Matthew M. 
Wirgau, Fairness Opinions: No Longer a Laughing Matter, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 233, 261 
(2008) (noting that the FINRA rules only apply to certain National Association of Securities 
Dealers “member[s]”).  This is minimal compared with requirements imposed on other advisory 
financial institutions. 
 But even if fundamental regulatory change is in order, it is unreasonable to look to Delaware 
courts to affect it.  They are institutionally ill-positioned to do so.  The missing function is 
legislative and administrative rather than adjudicative, and the standard-setting process should be 
informed by insider expertise. 
 Nor is there any emergency.  The main body of criticism of fairness opinions dates from two 
decades ago, when shareholders were viewed as hapless consumers who innocently relied on 
whatever a name-brand banker engaged by an entrenched CEO happened to say.  That view has 
changed.  The same climate that prompted the criticisms has prompted heightened scrutiny of 
boardroom processes and decisions both in Delaware courts and in the outside marketplace.  
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 653, 677–78 (2010).  The board of directors has since evolved as a more robust 
monitoring institution, populated by increasingly independent directors working together to 
enhance shareholder value with managers incented by equity compensation plans.  Id. at 678.  
Merger volume has reached new records again and again, id. at 678–79, and everybody takes a 
hard look at the deals.  Fairness opinions certainly could be more informative.  But hapless 
reliance on them is no longer a piece of the fact pattern, if indeed it ever was. 
194. Here is a sample: 
You also agree that no Indemnified Person shall have any liability to you or your 
affiliates, directors, officers, employees, agents, creditors or stockholders, directly or 
indirectly, related to or arising out of the agreement or the services performed 
thereunder, except losses, claims, damages, liabilities and expenses you incur which 
have been finally judicially determined to have resulted proximately and directly 
from actions taken or omitted to be taken by such Indemnified Person due to such 
person’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
Miller et al., supra note 126, at 99. 
195. See Marshall P. Horowitz & Joshua Schneiderman, Negotiating Investment Banking 
M&A Engagement Letters: Keeping the Investment Bank Incentivized While Protecting Your 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
40 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
 
faith.196  On the loyalty side, the letter states that services are rendered 
solely for the use of the client’s board of directors197 and that the bank, as 
an independent contractor, owes duties arising from the engagement only to 
the company and to no other person; duties are limited to those expressly 
created under the engagement and fiduciary duties are disclaimed.198 
 Questions arise respecting these provisions’ validity and enforceability 
The trend lies in favor of the provisions. 
 The liability limitation language is supported by case law.199  This is 
unsurprising, for the language tracks the agency law template for opting 
 
Interests, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=84675f88e 
4c0-492e-8535-954518c0c7f5, archived at http://perma.cc/RE8D-RSGD (noting that an 
investment banker will generally insist on this provision). 
196. Here is a sample: 
You are not responsible for any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses to the 
extent that such loss, claim, damage, liability or expense has been finally judicially 
determined to have resulted primarily and directly from actions taken or omitted to 
be taken by such Indemnified Person due to such person’s gross negligence, willful 
misconduct or bad faith . . . . 
Miller et al., supra note 126, at 93; see also Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: Why It’s Hard to 
Successfully Sue Your Banker, DEAL J., WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:22 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/01/25/dealpolitik-why-its-hard-to-successfully-sue-your-banker/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V7H6-DLY5 (describing an indemnity clause used by Goldman Sachs 
that included an exception for bad faith). 
197. Here is a sample: 
[Client] acknowledges and agrees that all advice and opinions (written and oral) 
rendered by [investment bank] are intended solely for the use of the Board of 
Directors in (and only in) their capacity as such, and may not be used or relied upon 
by any other person, nor may such advice or opinions be reproduced, summarized, 
excerpted from or referred to in any public document or given to any other person 
without the prior written consent of [investment bank]. 
Miller et al., supra note 126, at 16. 
198. Here is a sample: 
[Client] acknowledges that it has retained [investment bank] solely to provide the 
services set forth in this Engagement Letter.  In rendering such services, [investment 
bank] will act as an independent contractor, and [investment bank] owes its duties 
arising out of this engagement solely to the [client] and to no other person.  The 
[client] acknowledges that nothing in this Engagement Letter is intended to create 
duties to the [client] beyond those expressly provided for in this Engagement Letter, 
and [investment bank] and the [client] specifically disclaim the creation of any 
fiduciary relationship between, or the imposition of any fiduciary duties on, either 
party. 
Miller et al., supra note 126, at 18.  For an alternative drafting strategy, consider the following 
clause contained in the engagement letter in a case where the banker had been advising the 
acquirer in a merger, only later to disengage and represent the target: “[Target] agrees that it will 
not assert any damage, conflict of interest, or other claim against [the bank], [its] affiliates or such 
other party arising out of [the bank’s] relationship with [the acquirer] on the basis of a conflict of 
interest or otherwise.”  Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2008).  The 
drafter makes no attempt to deny the existence of a duty of loyalty or to contract out from under it.  
It simply gets the beneficiary to waive any claim arising therefrom. 
199. See, e.g., HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC., 517 F.3d 454, 
457–59 (7th Cir. 2008) (validating liability limitation language in an engagement letter by 
refusing to find liability on the part of a bank because its lack of prescience did not constitute 
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out, including the same exclusion of bad faith conduct.200  A question does 
arise concerning the more particular meaning of the good faith concept in 
the banker–client context.  The contractual concept of good faith201 can be 
expansive or narrow, implying substantive fairness norms where the 
relationship entails vulnerability and dependence but limiting the parties to 
rights expressly set out in the contract given arm’s-length dealing among 
sophisticated parties.202  There also is a parallel, culpability-based good 
faith concept developed by the Delaware courts in cases where a corporate 
charter opts out of the duty of care.203  Choice of law issues could arise as 
between the two concepts.204 
 How the variant notions of good faith might synchronize in the 
banker–client context is anybody’s guess, for there are no cases.  Our sense 
is that the culpability-based good faith notion would come to bear as a 
universal backstop, with courts avoiding resort to either expansive or 
narrow contract law concepts.  This approach neatly echoes the engagement 
letters’ exception for acts of “gross negligence, willful misconduct or bad 
faith.”205 
 We now turn to scope limitations and fiduciary disclaimers.  Scope 
limitations that exclude shareholders from beneficiary status are 
uncontroversial.206  They take a cue from Shoe-Town and confirm that the 




200. Compare Miller et al., supra note 126, at 93 (providing a bad faith exclusion), with 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006) (setting forth a good faith standard). 
201. See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) 
(observing that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract). 
202. The leading case is Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. Apr. 
1981) (en banc). 
203. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 47 n.37, 66–67 (Del. 2006) 
(defining bad faith as an “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities,” falling between “(1) conduct motivated by subjective bad intent and (2) conduct 
resulting from gross negligence”). 
204. In a Delaware litigation, the issue could arise under the law of another state, with New 
York as a likely candidate, depending on the engagement letter’s choice of law clause.  See 
Louis R. Dienes & Alison M. Pear, An Annotated Form of Investment Banking Engagement 
Letter, 25 CAL. BUS. L. PRAC. 107, 120 (2010) (providing a model engagement letter prepared by 
California lawyers with an alternative of California or New York law).  By hypothesis, since the 
engagement contract creates the agency, the agency law applied to the engagement should be the 
law chosen by the contract.  But the matter is not free from doubt.  See Shandler v. DLJ Merch. 
Banking, Inc., No. 4797-VCS, 2010 WL 2929654, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2010) (refusing to 
apply the Ohio choice of law provision in an engagement letter to a claim alleging that a bank 
aided and abetted the selling board’s breach of fiduciary duty on the theory that Delaware has the 
stronger interest in the matter). 
205. See supra note 196. 
206. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
207. See Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that, 
absent special circumstances giving rise to an extra-contractual fiduciary duty, investment bank 
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 Across-the-board provisions that disclaim a fiduciary duty to the client 
corporation and its board of directors present more of a problem, for they 
raise a theoretical question as to whether or not the common law of agency 
imports a mandatory fiduciary duty.  Corporate law precedents suggest that 
such disclaimers are ineffective.208  Contrariwise, a disclaimer of fiduciary 
duty has been given effect in a banker–client case decided abroad.209  
Meanwhile, the limitations and disclaimers in engagement letters follow the 
pattern for opting out that now prevails in documentation governing limited 
partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs).210  But the 
comparison to LPs and LLPs also sounds a note of caution.  LP and LLC 
disclaimers have explicit statutory backing,211 statutes in turn prompted by 
judicial expressions of doubt concerning the limits of the opting-out 
envelope.212  In any event, the LP and LLC opt-out envelope remains 
subject to a contractual good faith limitation.213 
 Engagement letters, in sum, get the bankers comfortably close to 
immunity respecting conflicts—given disclosure and consent and subject to 
 
owed no such duty to shareholders); Brooks v. Key Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, 809 N.Y.S.2d 270, 
27273 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (requiring investor to allege that the parties created a relationship 
of higher trust than would arise from their contracts alone to sustain a cause of action to lie for 
breach of a fiduciary duty independent of contractual duties).  But see Baker v. Goldman Sachs & 
Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 23637 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss with respect to 
fiduciary duty claim, because a shareholder made sufficient allegations that special circumstances 
existed to create an extra-contractual fiduciary relationship when an investment bank allegedly 
knew about and actively solicited plaintiff’s faith and trust). 
208. See Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that express 
waivers did not preclude claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against an entity 
claiming to be a third-party beneficiary to the contract); Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
218, 22325 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a waiver of fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in a 
close corporation “is against public policy and a contract provision in a buy-sell agreement 
purporting to effect such a waiver is void”); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of 
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 250 (1995) (“The core duty-of-
loyalty rules governing corporate fiduciaries cannot be waived, but courts may give effect to 
highly specific agreements that do not present the dangers of systematic unforeseeability and 
potential for exploitation.” (footnote omitted)). 
209. See Australian Sec. and Invs. Comm’n v Citigroup Global Markets Austl. Pty Ltd (No. 4) 
[2007] FCR 963 (“[T]he exclusion of the fiduciary relationship was effective, notwithstanding the 
fact that Citigroup undertook to provide financial advisory services . . . .”).  For discussion of this 
case, see generally Tuch, Paradox, supra note 29. 
210. See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: 
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 557, 57677 (2012) (surveying 
similar provisions in the operating agreements of LPs and LLCs). 
211. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013) (covering LLCs); id. § 17-1101(d) 
(covering LPs). 
212. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 16768 
(Del. 2002) (recognizing that the then-current form of § 17.001(d) merely stated that liability 
could be expanded or restricted by provisions in the partnership agreement but made no mention 
of the ability to eliminate such liability); Manesh, supra note 210, at 561 (noting that the statutes 
were amended in response to the Gotham Partners case). 
213. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (2013). 
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exposure for their own willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith.  
Significantly, the good faith limitation is repeated in every source of law we 
have traversed—common law, statute, and negotiated contract. 
  
 c. Lawyers Compared.—At this point we make reference to the ethical 
principles governing lawyers as an indirect source of support for our 
reading of the law of banker–client relationships.  One tends to think of 
lawyer conflicts as prohibited, but the actual rules follow the template of the 
common law of agency rather closely.  As with agency law, the rules start 
with a prohibition against conflicted representation214 but then open a 
loophole—the representation may proceed provided that the lawyer 
reasonably believes that competent and diligent representation can be 
provided and the client’s informed consent is procured in writing.215  The 
loophole’s proviso may be restated as a conditional but irreducible 
prohibition—if the lawyer cannot reasonably believe that competent and 
diligent representation can be provided, the client’s consent is not operative; 
the conflict is “nonconsentable.”216  Unsurprisingly, the more sophisticated 
the client the better the case for consentability, with in-house counsel at a 
large corporation as the archetypical example of a consentable client.217 
 
214. DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2010) (“Except as 
provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest.”). 
215. Id. R. 1.7(b) (“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client; . . . and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”). 
216. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 14 (“[S]ome conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer 
involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the 
client’s consent.”); see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 11.20 (3rd ed. 2014) (recognizing that similar language under the Model Rules makes certain 
conflicts nonconsentable).  The basic sequence of inquiry in the attorney conflict rules roughly 
tracks that of corporate law’s duty of loyalty—self-dealing transactions between directors and 
their companies are voidable provided the director discloses fully and gets the consent of the 
disinterested directors, so long as an unfair transaction still can be voided.  In other words: 
prohibition, followed by permission conditioned on disclosure and consent, followed by a 
reservation of a core of irreducibly unacceptable situations.  The focus of ex post review differs, 
however.  With corporate conflicts, the court reviews the decision-making context of the 
approving board, insisting on consenting independent directors.  See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. 
Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 173–74 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006) (requiring 
an examination of “the interestedness of each of the Voting Directors, as well as the information 
available to them”).  With attorneys the court reviews the attorney’s determination to request the 
client’s consent.  See HAZARD, ET AL., supra, § 10.5 (“[T]he lawyer must honestly assess the 
situation and make a reasonable judgment that he or she can still provide competent and diligent 
representation.”).  The lawyers’ context also holds out some per se rules; for example, 
representation of both sides in litigation is prohibited without exception.  DELAWARE LAWYERS’ 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122(2)(b) (2000). 
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(iv) (2000) 
(“Decisions involving clients sophisticated in the use of lawyers, particularly when advised by 
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 Lawyers and bankers thus operate under roughly similar conflicts 
rules.  Yet, in practice, they have very different profiles.  Bankers, even as 
they guard their reputations and monitor client conflicts,218 take advantage 
of the law’s opt-out envelope and in some cases embrace conflicts.219  
Lawyers who represent large corporations could do the same thing, but in 
fact do not.220  They tend to be more risk averse than the bankers,221 
particularly as regards their reputations.  They avoid conflicts accordingly, 
making considerable investments in information flow within their firms to 
assure that no conflicts occur.222  The practice of conflict avoidance in turn 
spawns a set of self-enforcing practitioner norms, norms much more potent 
in deterring conflicted representation than are the formal rules.223 
 As the economic analysis predicts, what matters here is less the basic 
legal framework than the actors’ particular reputational concerns, concerns 
that manifest themselves by degree.  Even as both bankers and lawyers have 
a keen interest in protecting their reputations and both invest in conflict 
avoidance, the respective cost–benefit calculations work differently, with 
some bankers piling on the conflicts in pursuit of immediate bottom line 
enhancement.  Apparently, in the market for banker services, the conflicts 
by themselves result in minimal long-term costs in the form of reputational 
 
independent counsel, such as by inside legal counsel, rarely hold that a conflict is non-
consentable.”). 
218. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 826 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(concerning a bank involved on the buy and sell side of each stage of the sales process for self-
interested reasons). 
220. Thomas B. Mason, Ethics: Conflicts of Interests for Transactional Attorneys, 
ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, http://www.zuckerman.com/media/site_files/165_ABA%20Business 
%20Law_EthicsConflicts%20of%20Interest%20for%20Transactional%20Attorneys_Mason.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7TNA-7G2L. 
221. See, e.g., C. Evan Stewart, New York’s New Ethics Rules: What You Don’t Know Can 
Hurt You!, N.Y. BUS. L.J., Fall 2009, at 80, 81 (describing attorneys as risk averse). 
222. See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the 
Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 135–39, 157–59 (2003) (describing 
the use of electronic databases and screening methods to share information within a firm to avoid 
potential conflicts). 
223. See id. at 125–29 (describing five incentives for self-regulation: (1) disqualification from 
litigation and its related reputational and financial costs; (2) the loss of fees and future 
relationships through voluntary withdrawal; (3) intrafirm discord arising from conflicts with other 
attorneys’ clients; (4) losing client trust; and (5) expensive or unobtainable malpractice insurance); 
see also W. Terence Jones, Ethical Issues for Business Lawyers, in ETHICAL LAWYERING IN 
MASSACHUSETTS § 12.2 (James S. Bolan & Kenneth Lawrence eds., 3rd ed. 2009) (advising that 
because “the ‘fullness’ of full disclosure is always a fact question, it is often advisable to decline 
representation, regardless of the waiver by the clients”). 
 It thus comes as no surprise that there are no cases about merger proxy-statement disclosures 
concerning conflicted lawyers.  See Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Conflict Scenarios in the M&A 
Setting, 33 SEC. REG. L.J. 310, 311 (2005) (describing a “dearth of judicial case law” on ethical 
M&A practices and responsibilities). 
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punishment.  Meanwhile, the common law of agency throws up no serious 
obstacles. 
C. Commentary 
 We emerge with the economists and lawyers in apparent harmony in 
their treatment of banker–client relationships.  The economists remit 
conflicts to the contracting parties, and the law facilitates the process, 
asking only for disclosure as the means to the end.  The law accepts this 
subject to a series of overlapping good faith limitations—the agency duty of 
loyalty’s reservation regarding “good faith and fair dealing,” the reservation 
regarding “gross negligence, willful misconduct or bad faith” in the 
standard banker engagement letter, and the good faith constraint on 
statutory opting out.224  There is a notable harmony of approaches across the 
disparate sources.  There is also a residuum of uncertainty arising from 
distinctions between the agency and advisory functions and contract and 
corporate law concepts of good faith.  Our sense is that the ambiguities 
matter little, with the answers to all questions lying in the culpability-based 
notion of good faith developed in corporate law. 
 The economists assure us that reputational markets contain any 
conflict of interest problems left over in the wake of contracting.225  Our 
comparative reference to legal practice backs up the assurance, showing us 
that where a market for services places a high value on undivided loyalty, 
agents avoid conflicts without any need for legal compulsion. 
 But the body of cases on which this depiction draws is thin.  The 
Delaware opinions referenced in this Part concern fairness opinions rather 
than the advisory function.  Since no one takes fairness opinions especially 
seriously,226 it is easy to conclude that disclosure renders a conflict 
harmless.  The same conflict may loom larger if it impairs the banker’s 
performance of an advisory role with inputs on deal structure and 
bargaining strategy, raising questions about the adequacy of the disclosure 
palliative. 
 The next Part shows the Delaware courts taking a harder look at 
advisory bank conflicts when the conflicts bear on the question whether a 
sell-side board has performed its Revlon duty to make a reasonable deal.  
Although the possibility of this connection long has inhered in the structure 
of Delaware fiduciary law, its recent realization in decided cases alters the 
calculus of M&A practice and brings banker conflicts to the policy front 
line for the first time.  A theoretical question arises: whether the 
confrontation implies open conflict between economic analysis and 
fiduciary norms.  We will see in Part IV that the answer is no.  Revlon 
 
224. See supra notes 165, 194–96, 213 and accompanying text. 
225. See discussion supra subpart III(A). 
226. See supra note 193. 
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scrutiny of banker conflicts accepts the contractual zone opened up by the 
parties, carrying their choice of contract treatment to its logical conclusion. 
IV. Hard Looks in Chancery 
 We have seen that as between fairness opinions and advisory services, 
the real stakes for all parties in M&A lie in the latter, where the banker’s 
inputs directly impact the transaction’s terms.  The banker–advisor is there 
to help the board get the best deal.  Revlon, in turn, reviews the board’s 
reasonableness in that pursuit.  Put the two together and banker conflicts 
become a problem.  The same conflicts that generate minor questions 
regarding a fairness opinion can create major problems when they 
compromise the inputs of an actor at the cutting edge of the sale process. 
 Two recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions, In re Del Monte 
Foods Co.,227 and In re El Paso Corp.,228 take hard looks at banker conflicts 
under Revlon.  A succeeding case, In re Rural Metro Corp.,229 signals that 
we should expect no letup in the scrutiny’s intensity.  The upshot is a 
radical change in the legal posture of banker–client relationships.  But, in 
effecting this change, Del Monte and El Paso herald no return to old time 
fiduciary values.  They are not motivated by a norm of self-abnegation that 
runs against the banker, nor do they purport to eliminate contracting out 
from the banker–client relationship.  The Revlon overlay has a 
transformative effect even so, for the question now is whether banker–client 
contracting inhibits realization of the best deal.  The reframing forces the 
client, the sell-side board, to go into arm’s-length mode in dealing with its 
banker, no longer acting like a passive, consenting beneficiary preserving a 
valued relationship.  The board should be ready to deal with a banker 
conflict the same way it deals with every other aspect of the merger, with 
two-fisted bargaining.  Del Monte and El Paso, far from obliterating 
contract with fiduciary values, take contract seriously.  If a banker conflict 
undermines the reviewing court’s confidence in the contracting process, the 
barrier to invalidation by taint that follows from economic analysis falls 
away. 
A. Change of Context: Bankers under Revlon 
 Conflicted bankers do become embroiled in shareholder litigation over 
breached fiduciary duties in merger sale processes, despite the Shoe-Town 
barrier and their full use of the opt-out privilege.  Revlon plaintiffs sue sell-
side boards of directors, seeking to establish unreasonable sale processes.230  
Any mishandling of the board’s relationship with its banker can figure into 
 
227. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
228. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
229. In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
230. E.g., Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817. 
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such a showing.231  Importantly, in the Revlon context the banker is a piece 
of the fact pattern, not a defendant.  At the same time, however, a banker 
conflict can be more problematic than in a fairness opinion case like Shoe-
Town.  Fairness opinion cases look only at the banker and the board inter 
se, with the shareholders figuring in only as proxy statement recipients.232  
That limited view makes it easy for a contract and disclosure to deflect 
attention from the conflicts and their potential impact.  Revlon shifts the 
focus to the shareholders as beneficiaries of the board’s trustee duty, 
potentially denuding disclosure and consent of curative power. 
 Indeed, it can be noted that Revlon inquiries into banker conflicts bear 
a familial relationship to ethical inquiries respecting lawyer conflicts.  The 
lawyer’s inquiry has two prongs: (1) the conflict must be fully disclosed to 
the client, and (2) the disclosing lawyer must reasonably conclude that he or 
she can still provide competent and diligent representation.233  The ex post 
decision maker confirms the client’s consent and reviews the quality of the 
disclosure and the reasonableness of the lawyer’s determination, weighing 
the gravity of the conflict.234  But for one important distinction, Revlon 
scrutiny of banker conflicts is quite similar.  As with the lawyers’ rules, 
agency law requires that the conflict must be fully disclosed to the 
consenting client, here the board.235  Under Revlon, the client comes in as a 
second fiduciary owing a separate duty.  Where in legal ethics the fiduciary 
must reasonably determine that the representation is unimpaired, in a 
banker case the client board of directors must reasonably determine that the 
conflict does not impair the sale process.236  The lawyer’s term 
“consentability” is apt.  In addition, Revlon scrutiny of bankers reverses 
Shoe-Town in part, for under Revlon the shareholders get a cause of 
action.237  Although the action goes against the board rather than the banker, 
the relational effect is similar. 
 At the bottom line, a banker conflict that puts the sell-side board and 
its deal into Revlon jeopardy is effectively prohibited.  This destabilizes the 
 
231. See, e.g., id. at 818 (finding the board responsible for its banker’s actions that led to an 
unreasonable sale process because the board failed to provide oversight that would have checked 
their banker’s misconduct). 
232. See In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475, at *6–7 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 12, 1990) (refusing to find a fiduciary relationship between a fairness-opinion giver and 
shareholders). 
233. See supra notes 214–222 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra note 216. 
235. Miller, supra note 11, at 10–11 & n.89 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 8.06 (2006)). 
236. See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817 (recognizing the issue as whether the client board 
breached its fiduciary duty). 
237. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 
1986) (holding that a board of directors has a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to its shareholders 
when approving a corporate merger), with In re Shoe-Town, 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (explaining 
that bankers serving only as agents owe no fiduciary duty to shareholders). 
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picture of banker–client relations drawn in Part III without directly altering 
anything therein.  Thus did Del Monte and El Paso create an appearance of 
sudden change, for before them there had been only one case in which a 
banker conflict triggered a Revlon violation and then on a fact pattern 
cluttered with other self-standing violations.238 
B. An Early Warning 
 The Chancery Court’s hard looks began with a staple.  Back in 2005 in 
a case called Toys “R” Us,239 the Court noted in passing that stapled 
financing could present a Revlon problem.240 
 Toys “R” Us was a straightforward Revlon case.  The selling board 
had entered into a merger agreement with a private equity buyer, Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts (KKR), concluding a long auction process.241  The plaintiffs 
made cookie-cutter allegations: the board had failed to pursue alternative 
strategies to maximize value242 and had accepted prohibitive deal-protection 
provisions in the merger agreement.243  Under Revlon, the question was 
whether the asserted defalcations violated the board’s fiduciary duty to 
pursue the highest reasonable value for the shareholders.244  The court 
found the board to have acted reasonably.245 
 Review of the board’s reasonableness included a look at the actions of 
its advisor, Credit Suisse First Boston (First Boston).  First Boston passed 
inspection, but the Chancery Court per (then) Vice-Chancellor Strine, 
entered a note of disquiet about a staple.  First Boston twice asked the board 
for permission to provide buy-side financing to the bidders, first during the 
bidding process and second after the signing of the merger agreement—the 
board denied the first request but granted the second.246  This displeased the 
judge: 
 That decision was unfortunate, in that it tends to raise eyebrows by 
creating the appearance of impropriety . . . .  Far better . . . if First 
Boston had never asked for permission, and had taken the position 
 
238. The case was Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).  For 
discussion of this case, see supra note 28. 
239. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
240. See id. at 1005–06 (acknowledging that stapled financing could create “the appearance 
of impropriety”). 
241. Id. at 987–95. 
242. More particularly, a search for a buyer of a division of the company evolved into a 
process to sell the entire company.  The plaintiffs claimed that instead of expediting that process, 
the board should have restarted the search.  Id. at 1001. 
243. In particular, the board agreed to a 3.75% termination fee in the merger agreement.  Id. at 
1016.  The court ruled that the fee was reasonable on the ground that the winning bid was $1.50 
per share higher than the next highest bid.  Id. at 1017–18. 
244. Id. at 980, 999. 
245. Id. at 1007. 
246. Id. at 1005–06. 
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that its credibility as a sell-side advisor was too important in this 
case, and in general, for it to simultaneously play on the buy-side in a 
deal when it was the seller’s financial advisor. . . .  [I]t might have 
been better, in view of First Boston’s refusal to refrain, for the board 
of the Company to have declined the request . . . .247 
Nonetheless, the court determined that the financing arrangement did not 
have a causal effect on the board’s sale decision and thus did not justify 
judicial interference.248 
 The appearance of impropriety stemmed from the staple’s effect on 
First Boston’s incentives.  Without the staple, the banker stood only on the 
seller’s side of the deal, its fee a function of the sale price and successful 
closing.  As we have seen,249 the staple put the bank, through its corporate 
lending department, on the buy side of the deal as well.  To the extent the 
terms of the deal went the buyer’s way, the value of First Boston’s loan 
would increase.  Fortunately, the staple attached only at a late stage, after 
the terms had been set.250  The vice-chancellor also explained that it was not 
his job to “police the appearances of conflict that, upon close scrutiny, do 
not have a causal influence on a board’s process.”251 
 Vice-Chancellor Strine thus left a double gestured signal for the 
market’s interpretation.  To express concern about an appearance of impro-
priety is to talk taint, referencing scrupulous legal practice norms and best 
practices in venues like government employment rather than the law and 
practice of bankers and clients.252  Yet the deal passed inspection.  We are 
reminded of Professor Rock’s observation that Delaware courts sermonize 
without imposing liability as a way of encouraging the development of best 
practices.253  The sermon implies a threat that the less-than-best practice 
that passes inspection today will not be accorded future immunity.  But the 
vice-chancellor also held out comfort when distinguishing between 
appearances and causal influences, implying that a taint does not imply per 
se invalidity and that an adverse consequence must be shown.254 
 The Vice-Chancellor’s signal was duly noted in the M&A world.  
Some read it to herald the demise of staples.255  But, according to Richard 
 
247. Id. at 1006. 
248. Id. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 125–28. 
250. Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1006. 
251. Id. 
252. The legal profession’s actual ethical rules do not make appearances actionable and 
accommodate conflicts between sophisticated parties.  See supra notes 214–217 and 
accompanying text. 
253. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
254. Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1006. 
255. Hall, supra note 100. 
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Hall of Cravath, Swain & Moore, “cooler heads” prevailed256 and staples 
continued to be used freely in their territory of origin auctions of small units 
of larger companies.257  Boards of directors in charge of leveraged buyouts 
of public companies viewed staples with more suspicion.258  The practice 
adjusted accordingly and a staple came to mean the added expense of a 
second banker–advisor, brought in to ameliorate the effects of the 
conflict.259  The conservative advice was that avoiding the added expense 
meant refusing the staple.260 
 Unfortunately, the practice path charted in the wake of Toys “R” Us 
proved unsafe.261 
C. Del Monte 
 In Del Monte, a more severe banker conflict triggered a Revlon 
violation.  In fact, the bank behaved improperly, deceiving its client board 
and thereby tainting the sale process, but not so noxiously to violate Revlon 
standing alone.  There also was an adverse consequence, albeit one in the 
subtle form of an opportunity cost: the board passively accepted the banker 
conflict where it should have gone into arm’s-length mode and extracted a 
giveback. 
 1. The Case.—The banker, Barclays, involved itself on both sell and 
buy sides at every stage of a lengthy sale process.  Del Monte put itself up 
for sale only after Barclays, with which it had a long advisory relationship, 
put it into play.262  Barclays took the first step on its own motion by 
shopping the company to private equity firms.263  Indications of interest 
came in as a result, and the Del Monte board engaged Barclays as its 
advisor.264  At that point Barclays disclosed neither its action in stirring up 







261. Banker conflicts showed up tangentially in three additional cases prior to Del Monte.  
See Ortsman v. Green, No. 2670-N, 2007 WL 702475, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2007) (ordering 
expedited discovery in a case involving a sell-side banker–advisor participating in buy-side 
financing); Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2006 WL 1388744, at *25 (Del. Ch. May 9, 
2006) (upholding a complaint that alleged, in part, that a board of directors violated its fiduciary 
duty by relying on a fairness opinion given by a banker–advisor that had a financial interest in the 
success of the transaction); In re Prime Hospitality, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 652-N, 2005 WL 
1138738, at *1–2, *13 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (rejecting settlement of a Revlon claim in a case 
involving a “clearly conflicted” banker–advisor). 
262. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 819–20 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
263. Id. at 820. 
264. Id. 
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emerged.265  Bidding ensued, with each bidder signing a two-year 
confidentiality agreement that included a “no teaming” provision designed 
to keep the sale process competitive by prohibiting bidders from sharing 
information with other bidders or financers.266  As it happened, Del Monte’s 
board rejected the offers that came in.267 
 Barclays kept at it, encouraging two of the bidders, KKR and Vestar, 
to team up on a second-round bid.268  There followed a three-way 
conversation in violation of the confidentiality agreement,269 a conversation 
never disclosed to the Del Monte board.  KKR submitted a new, nominally 
higher bid but said nothing about Vestar’s involvement.270  The board 
agreed to pursue a deal with KKR and re-engaged Barclays.271  KKR then 
asked the board to permit Vestar to join in its bid, and the board, still in the 
dark about earlier goings-on, consented.272  Around the same time, Barclays 
and KKR agreed that Barclays’s lending side would provide one-third of 
the financing for the deal, an arrangement to which the Del Monte board 
subsequently acceded.273  The board, seeking to ameliorate the negative 
inference arising from Barclays’s conflict, engaged a second financial 
advisor.274 
 Del Monte and KKR–Vestar finally came to terms in a merger 
agreement providing for $19 per share cash and a forty-five day “go shop” 
period during which Del Monte would be free to entertain higher bids.275  
The Del Monte board, ignoring the fact that Barclays had a buy-side interest 
in the success of the KKR–Vestar bid, engaged Barclays to administer the 
go-shop process.276  Goldman Sachs attempted to horn its way in at that 
point, offering to take over the go shop.277  But KKR, after being tipped by 
Barclays, induced Goldman to back off in exchange for 5% of the 
financing.278 
 Vice-Chancellor Laster added all of this up to find a Revlon violation.  
He enjoined the shareholder vote for twenty days, which he deemed a 
length of time sufficient to permit a serious topping bidder to come out of 
 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 821. 
267. Id. at 822. 
268. Id. at 823. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 824. 
272. Id. at 825. 
273. Id. at 825–26. 
274. Id. at 826. 
275. Id. at 826–27. 
276. Id. at 828. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
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the woodwork.279  Revlon reasonableness presupposed process integrity 
and, under Toys “R” Us, an investment banker conflict could taint the 
process so much that even later full disclosure of all the facts would provide 
no cure;280 decisions of a deceived board are voidable, and Barclay’s had 
deceived the Del Monte board.281  In addition, KKR was potentially liable 
as an aider and abettor of the board’s breach, having knowingly broken its 
confidentiality agreement, concealed its dealings with Vestar, created a 
conflict in permitting the staple, and skewed the go shop by drawing off 
Goldman.282 
 If we stop at this point, it looks like the deception by itself undermines 
the process, triggering the Revlon violation.  But the Court went further, 
noting that the problem lay not just in the board’s misapprehension of the 
facts: The facts misapprehended implicated opportunity costs; the board 
needed sound advice regarding the costs’ minimization but never received it 
because its advisor had disabled itself from so doing in the course of 
spinning its deception.283  Barclays crossed the line by failing to come clean 
when KKR asked for permission to bring in Vestar, silently watching the 
board accede without advising the board to extract a giveback that increased 
value to the shareholders.284  The same failure occurred when Barclays 
asked for the board’s permission to do the staple.285  Del Monte and KKR–
Vestar had not yet agreed on a price at that point; thus did the staple conflict 
ripen at an earlier, more vulnerable stage of the process than had been the 
case in Toys “R” Us.286  The board, said the court, should have gotten 
something in trade for conceding the staple, but instead addressed the 
problem by engaging another banker at an additional cost to the 
shareholders of $3 million.287  The board went on to abdicate its oversight 
responsibility when it permitted Barclays, by then tainted by the staple, to 
run the go-shop process.288 
 The merger eventually closed at the agreed $19 per share with the 
shareholders’ approval and despite the injunction.289  The litigation later 
was settled for $89.4 million290: Barclays contributing $23.7 million and 
 
279. Id. at 840. 
280. Id. at 832–33. 
281. Id. at 836. 
282. Id. at 836–37. 
283. Id. at 836. 
284. Id. at 833–34. 
285. Id. at 834–35. 
286. Id. at 833, 835. 
287. Id. at 834–35. 
288. Id. at 835. 
289. KKR Completes Del Monte Deal, ZACKS INVESTMENT RES. (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/48858/kkr-complets-del-monte-deal, archived at http://perma 
.cc/VN3W-3JLM. 
290. Tom Hals, Del Monte’s $89 Million Shareholder Settlement Approved, REUTERS, Dec. 1, 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
2014] Bankers and Chancellors 53 
 
Del Monte paying $65.7 million.291  Around $21 million of Del Monte’s 
payment was in lieu of payment to Barclays of its fee.292  So, roughly 
speaking, each party contributed fifty-fifty and Barclays walked away from 
the deal without a fee.293  Counsel for the plaintiffs picked up $2.75 
million.294 
2. Taking Contract Seriously 
a. Relational Characterization.—The key to understanding the Del 
Monte court’s analysis lies in distinguishing taint from consequences.  The 
taint was multisided.  Barclays worked the deal from three sides, engaging 
with the buyer and the financiers as well as the selling board, compounding 
the problem by concealing its relations with the buyer from the board.295  
The Revlon violation follows from the court’s identification of negative 
consequences, albeit all of the “might have been” variety.  Barclays’s con-
cealment of buy-side arrangements disabled the board from negotiating past 
the buy-team’s interest in a low price to get to the upset prices that might 
have emerged in a competitive bidding.  The board then compounded the 
problem by choosing Barclays to run the go shop over a willing competitor.  
Barclays had no interest in finding a higher bidder where another bank 
would have.  Finally, the board should have extracted givebacks in 
exchange for its consent to Barclays’s adverse representation. 
 The court’s identification of an opportunity cost in the form of a 
missed giveback has doctrinal and policy significance.  It builds a bridge 
between the legal framework encasing banker–client relationships and 
Revlon scrutiny on the shareholders’ behalf.  If the banker, despite a close 
relationship to the board, plausibly is to be treated in law as a potential 
arm’s-length counterparty privileged to self deal, then in a Revlon context 
focused on short-term shareholder gain, the board–client should be prepared 
to go into arm’s-length mode when the banker asks for concessions, 
proactively extracting a quo for every quid.  The bank is still contracting 
out under agency law, but now the contracting out process is scrutinized 
 
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/01/us-delmonte-kkr-settlement-idUST 
RE7B02JZ20111201, archived at http://perma.cc/HB7P-9VJD. 
291. Update 2-Del Monte, Barclays to Pay $89.4 Mln in Settlement, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/delmonte-barclays-settlement-idUSN1E7951XK20111 
006, archived at http://perma.cc/8WP4-Z4HG. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. 
294. Divided as follows: $1.6 million for uncovering Barclays “surreptitious activities”; 
$950,000 for procuring later disclosures to the shareholders regarding the banker’s fees, opinions, 
and relationships; and $200,000 for procuring disclosures about executive compensation tied to 
the deal.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 2535256, at *14 
(Del. Ch. June 27, 2011). 
295. Id. at *5. 
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under Revlon.  At the same time, by encouraging the board to deal 
proactively with the banker, the court shows the M&A world how to make 
itself safe for future banker conflicts; second bankers at the shareholders’ 
expense will not necessarily do. 
 A stark takeaway message for selling boards is implied: banker 
conflicts imply an added layer of responsibility.  The selling board must, at 
a minimum, diligently oversee the banker’s work and negotiations on a 
continuous basis.296  Restating, since bankers can’t be trusted to avoid 
conflicts and keep their incentives properly aligned, their clients have no 
business relying on them.  If it is arm’s length the bankers want, treat them 
accordingly and protect your own beneficiaries.  Such an instruction would 
not be necessary in traditional fiduciary territory. 
 Once banker and board find themselves in arm’s-length territory, a 
proactive stance regarding conflict identification makes sense.  In the 
fiduciary context the beneficiary sits back and waits for the fiduciary to 
disclose the conflict, for only disclosed conflicts are permitted and 
undisclosed conflicts lead to breaches of duty.297  At arm’s length, one puts 
the question directly and upfront, getting affirmative representations. 
 b. Dealing with Deception Under Revlon.—Del Monte raises a more 
particular question for selling boards: what practical steps can be taken to 
avoid being faulted as a deception victim?  Given information asymmetries, 
deception is always a possibility.  The answer once again lies in using 
contractual devices employed in arm’s-length relationships, which can 
make deception harder and more costly to perpetrate.  The board should 
have required the advisor to represent at the time of engagement that it had 
not dealt in advance with potential bidders or otherwise violated the terms 
of its previous engagement—that is, the board should have treated the 
advisor as a party without a duty to disclose.  The board could in addition 
have extracted a promise of continued absolute fidelity to the sell-side 
interest for the duration of the deal,298 something that should not be 
necessary given a fiduciary relationship.  The board then actively could 
have monitored the bankers’ performance of the promise.  Either a 
subsequent finding of misrepresentation or a failure to perform the promise 
of fidelity would result in default under the terms of engagement, and a 
failure of a condition attached to the duty to pay the fee. 
 Utmost diligence makes deception less likely without importing an 
absolute guarantee.  It would seem to follow that even a highly diligent, 
 
296. See In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 
2028076, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (rejecting a Revlon challenge because the board 
“maintained continuous and diligent oversight” of its financial advisor). 
297. See supra section III(B)(1). 
298. The representation of no violations of the terms of the existing contract should also be 
procured from a bidder subject to a confidentiality agreement. 
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disinterested board can walk into a deal that violates Revlon.  The result 
seems surprising, for Revlon is seen as a rule of heightened diligence.299  
But the result is wrought into the inquiry’s structure, which demands a 
process reasonably calculated to result in best price.300  A deal founded on 
deception regarding material facts cannot be deemed to result from such a 
process as an objective proposition, however diligent the approving board.  
Under Revlon, diligence is not a key that automatically unlocks the door to 
a business-judgment safe harbor; process and transactional substance can 
collapse into one another.301  Significantly, the diligent sell-side board is not 
thereby left in an untenable position as regards liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  As to personal liability, a safe harbor obtains—the statutory 
shield for good faith reliance on an agent’s inputs.302  Moreover, the 
litigation’s outcome is as a practical matter determined at the injunction 
stage. 
 c. Staples.—We finally turn to buy-side financing. Toys “R” Us and 
Del Monte ascribe staples with a taint.  The taint does not result in per se 
invalidity, but it does trigger searching scrutiny.  More particularly, the 
selling board now bears a burden to contain and counteract the adverse 
consequences on the banker’s incentives.303  Short of refusing the staple, the 
selling board must justify it, getting a buyer concession in return or 
otherwise identifying a shareholder benefit flowing therefrom.304  Diligence 
and reasonableness combine to mandate bargaining backbone. 
 Uncertainty will persist even with a giveback.  Assume a concession in 
the form of a more liberal go-shop term including a right to solicit higher 
bids.  It still will be hard for the board to see its way 100% clear of the taint: 
what is the value of a larger go-shop envelope when your advisor has zero 
interest in scaring up a higher bid?  To dispel doubts, the board probably 
must resort to the expedient of engaging a second advisor and putting it in 
the driver’s seat.  Once the second advisor displaces the conflicted advisor 
 
299. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding 
that under Revlon, “once directors decide to sell the corporation, they should do what any 
fiduciary (such as a trustee) should do when selling an asset: maximize the sales price for the 
benefit of those to whom their allegiance is pledged”); cf. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 
818 A.2d 914, 929 (Del. 2003) (describing the Revlon standard as “enhanced judicial scrutiny”). 
300. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009). 
301. We commend Professor Miller’s nuanced discussion of the doctrinal strands that 
combine to produce this result.  Miller, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
302. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011). 
303. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 833 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
304. For a case in which the court sustains such a justification, see In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., 
Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 673 (Del. Ch. 2013).  The banker emerged as a potential lender 
after the bidder reported difficulties in procuring financing.  Id.  The selling board permitted its 
banker to proceed as lender on the condition that it recused itself from further negotiations, 
reduced its fee, and still opined on fairness.  Id.  The reduced fee funded engagement of a second 
banker.  Id. 
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from the deal’s front line the taint arguably is removed.  Significantly, as 
negative consequences stemming from the sell-side board’s allowance of 
the staple pile up, just saying no at the get-go begins to look like the 
preferred alternative. 
D. El Paso 
 El Paso turns up the heat several notches.  Here the board and the 
banker made the moves indicated in the conflict-management playbook—
the conflict was fully disclosed and the board displaced the compromised 
banker at the front end of the deal.  The court’s negative findings cast doubt 
on the efficacy of standard palliatives and ominously imply that taints from 
banker conflicts can be disabling per se under Revlon. 
 1. The Case.—El Paso Corp. had two lines of business, an oil 
exploration and production concern and a pipeline; most of its value 
stemmed from the latter.305  Its board, advised by Goldman Sachs, decided 
to enhance value by spinning off the production business, announcing its 
decision publicly.306  At that point Kinder Morgan, Inc. approached El Paso 
with a bear hug: it proposed to buy the whole company for $25.50 per share 
and threatened a hostile acquisition if El Paso refused to cut a deal.307  The 
board sent the El Paso CEO, Doug Foshee, to negotiate with Kinder 
Morgan.308  The board also brought in Morgan Stanley to advise it on the 
Kinder Morgan negotiation.309  The reason there was a conflict: Goldman 
owned 19% of Kinder Morgan (a stake worth $4 billion) and had two 
representatives on its board;310 it accordingly had a pointed interest in 
maximizing the value of Kinder Morgan.  But Goldman continued to advise 
the El Paso board on the possible spin-off.311  Unsurprisingly, Goldman 
erected an internal information barrier between the bankers working the 
spin-off and the bankers in charge of its Kinder Morgan investment.312  It 
did not, however, disclose that the lead banker remaining on the spin-off 
owned $340,000 of Kinder Morgan stock.313 
 
305. El Paso’s consolidated assets were approximately $24 billion, with the exploration and 
production business contributing approximately $4.7 billion.  In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 
41 A.3d 432, 437 n.12 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
306. Id. at 434–35. 
307. Id. at 435. 
308. Id. at 436. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 434. 
311. Id. at 435–36. 
312. Id. at 440. 
313. Id. at 442. 
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 Foshee and Kinder Morgan soon agreed on a price of $27.55.314  But 
Kinder Morgan pulled that offer from the table within a week and 
substituted a lower one.315  Foshee caved and agreed to $26.87.316  A merger 
agreement was signed within a month.317  It contained, inter alia, a no-shop 
provision, a superior proposal exception set at 50% of El Paso’s assets,318 
matching rights for Kinder Morgan, and a $650 million termination fee 
representing 3.1% of El Paso’s equity value.319  It also required El Paso to 
assist Kinder Morgan in concluding a preclosing sale of the exploration 
division.320  The premium over El Paso’s preannouncement stock price was 
47.8%.321  At no point did the board seek competing bidders or look into 
possibilities for separate sales of the company’s two pieces.322 
 The foregoing, taken alone, might not have gotten the El Paso board 
into Revlon trouble, even as it certainly would have occasioned a close look.  
But there was more.  The board let Foshee do the negotiating and set the 
merger’s terms.323  It was clear to Foshee that Kinder Morgan would be 
divesting El Paso’s exploration division in order to finance the purchase of 
the pipeline.324  Foshee, while negotiating the merger, formulated a plan to 
put together a management buyout (MBO) of the exploration business from 
Kinder Morgan after the merger’s consummation.325  He put the proposition 
to the Kinder Morgan CEO as soon as the ink was dry on the merger agree-
ment.326  At no point, however, did Foshee reveal the plan to his own 
board.327  This deception was bad enough, but Foshee also had misdirected 
his own incentives: the easier the time he gave Kinder Morgan in the 
negotiation and the more favorable the deal for Kinder Morgan, the better 
the prospects for a later Foshee-led MBO of the exploration unit.  Arguably, 
El Paso’s own CEO was striving to structure the deal for personal benefit. 
 There also were problems with Goldman.  Before being shunted over to 
the spin-off, it actively encouraged the El Paso board to placate Kinder 
Morgan in order to avert a public hostile offer.328  Nor was it irrelevant on 
 




318. That is, El Paso could accept a better deal for the pipeline separately but not a separate 
deal on the exploration division. 
319. Id. at 436–37. 
320. Id. at 436. 
321. Id. at 435. 
322. Id. at 437. 
323. Id. at 438. 
324. Id. at 443. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 443–44. 
328. Id. at 440. 
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the merger front after Morgan Stanley’s appearance.  The overall outcome 
depended on a choice between the spin-off and the Kinder Morgan merger.  
Goldman fed the board its information about the value of the spin-off, all 
without having disclosed that the banker in charge held Kinder Morgan 
stock in his personal account.329  It also successfully insisted on adherence 
to the terms of its original engagement, so that it had an exclusive right to 
advise the board on the spin-off’s value, thereby foreclosing the possibility 
of second-guessing on the spin-off by Morgan Stanley.330  There was also a 
spat about fees.  Goldman’s engagement gave it $25 million if the board 
went for the spin-off.331  But, with the spin-off apparently a receding 
possibility, it demanded, again successfully, a $20 million fee if the board 
opted for the merger.332  Meanwhile, Morgan Stanley, at Goldman’s 
insistence, got $35 million if the merger closed but nothing if the board 
rejected the merger and went for the spin-off.333  Add this up and 
Goldman’s incentive to push hard for the spin-off was deeply compromised 
while Morgan Stanley, having been shut out of the spin-off, had every 
reason to persuade the board to resolve doubts in the merger’s favor. 
 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of 
success on a claim against the board.334  But the plaintiffs asked the court 
for an aggressive injunction that avoided the deal protection provisions and 
allowed El Paso to shop itself further while simultaneously binding Kinder 
Morgan to complete the merger if no topping bid emerged.335  That, said the 
court, was not the deal Kinder Morgan had made.336  The injunction was 
refused accordingly.337 
 The merger eventually closed at the agreed price.338  An unofficial 
tally indicated that 70% of the El Paso shareholders voted, of whom 98.5% 
approved.339  Kinder Morgan and Goldman later settled the litigation.  
Kinder Morgan paid a $110 million settlement and Goldman waived its 
fee.340  Counsel for the plaintiffs walked away with $26 million.341 
 
329. Id. at 441–42. 
330. Id. at 442. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 442–43. 
333. Id. at 442. 
334. Id. at 444. 
335. Id. at 449. 
336. Id. at 449–50. 
337. Id. at 452. 
338. El Paso (EP) Stockholders Approve Kinder Morgan (KMI) Merger, ISTOCKANALYST 
(Mar. 9, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/5719134/el-paso-ep-stock 
holders-approve-kinder-morgan-kmi-merger, archived at http://perma.cc/57V3-7N4P. 
339. Matt Levine, Shareholders Seem Unfazed by Evildoing in Kinder Morgan–El Paso Deal, 
DEALBREAKER (Mar. 5, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/03/shareholders-seem-
unfazed-by-evildoing-in-kinder-morgan-el-paso-deal/, archived at http://perma.cc/3SX8-99S5. 
340. Jef Feeley, Kinder Morgan’s $110 Million El Paso Settlement Approved, BLOOMBERG 
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2. Taints and Consequences.—El Paso’s result rests on two conflicts: 
Foshee’s as well as Goldman’s.  Foshee’s conflict, taken alone, might or 
might not have triggered a raised eyebrow without a Revlon violation 
following.342  Similarly, the Goldman conflict, taken in isolation and absent 
Foshee’s deception, might not have sufficed to tip the Revlon scale against 
the merger.  Alternatively, had the board reined in Foshee and taken control 
of the negotiation process, maybe none of the conflicts would have 
mattered.  There are no answers, given the fact sensitivity of Revlon cases. 
 That said, El Paso leaves open questions concerning the banker’s 
conflict, its gravity, and its stand-alone impact.  The Goldman taint was 
clear enough, but what were the negative consequences?  Absent 
consequences, El Paso can be read to invalidate the merger based solely on 
the existence of the conflict, arguably a radical departure in the direction of 
per se prohibition.  The opinion coaxes out the conflict’s persistence after 
the engagement of the second banker and then takes care to highlight 
negative implications.  The facts can be read more benignly.  Goldman was 
shunted to one side at an early stage.  It did recommend that El Paso come 
to the table to deal with Kinder Morgan, but Morgan Stanley replicated that 
advice.  Nobody needed to pay Goldman the slightest attention when it 
officiously raised its voice about Morgan Stanley’s fee, which at all events 
came in the usual form.  The valuation numbers Goldman produced 
regarding the spin-off were indeed suspect, but they hit the table at a stage 
at which nobody appears to have been suggesting that the spin-off was a 
viable alternative. 
 But nothing compels a benign reading.  Indeed, as compared to the 
other conflicts of interest described in this Article, those of Goldman in 
El Paso were the most serious.  We have seen banker incentives to get the 
best deal impaired for a variety of reasons—the banker might be cultivating 
future business with the target’s own managers, the acquiring company, or 
the bank financing the deal, or the banker might be promoting a substandard 
deal in order to assure a success fee or a loan origination fee.  The stakes in 
El Paso were larger and more immediate because Goldman owned a chunk 
of the acquirer. 
 Let us consult the dollar figures.  Goldman’s 19.1% of Kinder Morgan 
was worth $3,625,474,851 the day before the public announcement of the 
merger.343  Goldman’s stakes in the merger negotiation stood at 
 
(Dec. 4, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/kinder-morgan-s-110-
million-el-paso-settlement-approved.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7PSW-NJ9P. 
341. Id. 
342. We put off to one side the question whether Foshee breached his own duty to El Paso. 
343. According to Kinder Morgan’s 2012 proxy statement, Goldman owns 134,826,138 
shares. Kinder Morgan, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) (March 30, 2012).  The stock closed at $26.89 on Octo-
ber 14, 2011.  Kinder Morgan, Inc. Historical Stock Prices, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo 
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$147,193,376 per dollar paid in or out in greater or lesser consideration paid 
for El Paso.344  Of course, a dollar in or out tells one only so much, for 
profit is not safely assumed for merger acquirers—many mergers are priced 
so generously for the seller as to result in a loss or a wash for the 
acquirer.345  But that result seems unlikely here, and not only because 
Goldman held two Kinder Morgan board seats and was highly incented to 
choke off any overpriced deal.  The stock market liked the merger.  Kinder 
Morgan stock rose from $26.89 at the preannouncement close to $28.19 on 
the next trading day, an announcement day gain for Goldman of 
$175,273,979.346  The stock hit $30.11 a week and a half later and went on 
to a peak of $39.85 in April 2012 before settling back down to $32.42 by 
the time the merger closed on May 25, 2012.347  Plainly, Goldman’s buy-
side interest in a $200 million-plus gain on its $4 billion investment in 
Kinder Morgan dwarfed the $25 million held out by its advisory 
engagement with El Paso, a figure that arguably should be reduced to 
$5 million due to the $20 million paid to Goldman in the event the merger 
closed.  This was enough money to turn the head of any member of the 
firm, an incentive skew impervious to the presence of internal barriers 
blocking day-to-day information regarding transactional progress. 
 A “might have been” consequence follows.  The El Paso board faced a 
choice between sale and spin-off, with Goldman working the spin-off.  How 
could any Goldman banker reasonably be expected to offer uninfluenced 
advice?  Once Kinder Morgan showed up, any input from Goldman on any 
aspect of El Paso’s strategic choices was highly suspect.  It follows that the 
fact that the Goldman banker left on the deal, as a Kinder Morgan stock-
holder, stood to gain or lose $13,656 for every dollar more or less paid by 
Kinder Morgan for El Paso,348 is not the critical fact.  While this is real 
money for many, it could not be expected to turn the head of a Goldman 
 
.com/q/hp?s=KMI&a=09&b=15&c=2011&d=09&e=17&f=2011&g=d, archived at http://perma 
.cc/4GYD-T3Y7. 
344. Per Professor Miller’s figures, Miller, supra note 11, at 15, El Paso had 771,852,913 
shares outstanding and Kinder Morgan had 707,001,570.  The cost factor is thus 1.0917273 per 
Kinder Morgan share, multiplied by 134,826,138 shares held by Goldman. 
345. See infra notes 429–432 and accompanying text. 
346. According to Yahoo! Finance, Kinder Morgan common shares closed at $26.89 on 
October 14, 2011 and $28.19 on October 17, 2011—the next, post-announcement trading day.  
Since Goldman owned 134,826,138 shares of Kinder Morgan, this $1.30 post-announcement rise 
in stock price resulted in a $175,273,979 gain for Goldman.  See supra note 342. 
347. Kinder Morgan, Inc. Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/ 
symbol/kmi/historical, archived at http://perma.cc/KG6Q-HZ68 (selecting “4 years” from the 
“Select Timeframe” dropdown menu; then see stock prices for October 25, 2011, April 5, 2012, 
and May 25, 2012, respectively). 
348. Miller, supra note 11, at 15 (“[E]ach additional $0.25 that Kinder Morgan paid per 
El Paso share cost . . . [the banker] about $3,414, or . . . for each $0.25 per El Paso share 
that . . . [the banker] might . . . depress the deal price, he would personally profit by about 
$3,414.”). 
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banker.  Contrariwise, a $200 million-plus gain for the firm certainly would 
have mattered.  Forceful advocacy of a spin-off would have amounted to 
disloyalty to the banker’s employer. 
 Ideally, Goldman should have been shut out entirely.  Had Goldman 
seen itself as a fiduciary to El Paso, that result presumably would have 
followed: a conscientious fiduciary can be expected to withdraw voluntarily 
and immediately when put in this position.349  Chancellor Strine, in short, 
was not exaggerating. 
 So which is it, taint or consequence?  The answer depends on one’s 
reading of the facts.  If the spin-off was history—a dead-end valuation 
exercise conducted for compliance purposes—then the Goldman taint 
triggers the Revlon violation on a stand-alone basis (or, at least when taken 
in tandem with Foshee’s deception).  On this reading, El Paso starts to look 
like best practices rule making: appearances of conflict by themselves can 
be disabling.  If the spin-off analysis is seen as central to the sale process, 
then a serious question arises regarding Goldman’s incentives: had an un-
conflicted banker been working the spin-off maybe it would have emerged 
as the more attractive outcome, killing the merger.  While a “might have 
been,” this is enough to count as a consequence.  And the conflict was very 
severe: had the El Paso board been completely asleep at the switch and 
permitted Goldman to continue as sole merger advisor, an open and shut 
Revlon violation would have followed without a showing of particular 
negative consequences.  We doubt that anyone would disagree with that. 
 On balance, El Paso does not embrace a rule of per se invalidation.  It 
instead stands for the proposition that consequences can be counterfactual, 
sensitive to the gravity of the conflict, and tied to the reviewing court’s 
confidence in the overall sale process.  When the court concludes that the 
banker’s incentives undermined the contracting process, it makes an 
economic judgment with legal consequences.  This approach was always 
implicit in the Revlon framework. 
 3. Still Taking Contract Seriously.—As with Del Monte, one takeaway 
for a conscientious board is that consenting to a conflict means going into 
arm’s-length mode and overseeing proactively, monitoring the advisor’s 
activities and using contract to facilitate oversight and position the board to 
take appropriate action.  Del Monte and El Paso, read together, teach an 
additional lesson: multiple conflicts have negative synergies under Revlon.  
Del Monte combined a staple with surreptitious bid partnering, arguably in 
 
349. See Oldham v. Dendrite Int’l, Inc., No. SOM-C-12017-07, 2007 WL 1453482 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 1, 2007) (acknowledging that defendant’s former counsel had 
“commendably resigned” due to the potential for a conflict in the merger process).  Law firms 
have been known to resign peremptorily due to investment banker conflicts.  See supra notes 220–
23 and accompanying text. 
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bad faith on the banker’s part.350  El Paso combined a keen but mar-
ginalized buy-side conflict with the standard performance fee impairment 
and then threw in a lead negotiator with a private agenda.351  What might 
pass in isolation becomes more and more of a problem as the number of 
agents with adverse interests multiplies. 
 El Paso adds a kicker.  Consent combined with proactivity is not 
necessarily enough; extreme steps may be necessary.  The El Paso board 
did keep Goldman off the merger and bring in a second banker.352  It turned 
out that it should have done more, whether tailoring Morgan Stanley’s fee 
to the occasion or, better, promptly escorting Goldman out of the building.  
This can be viewed as a consequence of an application of strong fiduciary 
norms—the taint proves disabling per se.  But we think a contractual 
characterization is more cogent.  When you take contract seriously, there 
comes a point at which you should stop trusting people, cut off the 
relationship, and walk away. 
E. Aiding and Abetting 
 Bankers can be brought into Revlon cases on a derivative liability basis 
on the theory that they aided and abetted the board’s breach in chief.  The 
theory is doctrinally sound,353 and also holds as regards an acquiring 
company.354  The plaintiff must meet a scienter requirement, proving not 
only the existence and breach of a fiduciary relationship but the defendant’s 
 
350. See supra text accompanying notes 262–77. 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 305–32. 
352. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 440 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
353. The substance, that the defendant aided and abetted negligence, finds support in tort law 
precedent. See Anderson v. Airco, Inc., No. 02C-12-091HDR, 2004 WL 2827887, at *5 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004) (“[A]iding-abetting liability is elastic enough to admit a common, 
negligent course of action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (establishing 
liability for a tortious act in concert given (a) a common design; (b) knowledge and substantial 
assistance; or (c) substantial assistance and a self-standing breach of duty); Nathan Isaac Combs, 
Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 258–59 (2005) (analyzing the 
difference between civil conspiracy and the tort of aiding and abetting).  Some courts have found 
liability for aiding and abetting criminal negligence, but the doctrine is not settled.  The operative 
concept, complicity, is open-ended.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962) (providing for 
accomplice liability if a person promotes or facilitates an offense by (i) soliciting its commission; 
(ii) aiding or attempting to aid in its planning or commission; or (iii) failing to perform a legal 
duty to prevent commission); Daniel G. Moriarty, Dumb and Dumber: Reckless Encouragement 
to Reckless Wrongdoers, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 647, 659–62 (2010) (explaining the various ways 
courts have expanded accomplice liability to extend to reckless and negligent crimes and torts). 
354. See In re Ness Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6569-VCN, 2011 WL 3444573, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2011) (involving a claim that a board of directors breached its fiduciary duty to 
shareholders with the aid of the acquiring company); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. 
S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (same); In re 
Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 496 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 
14 A.3d 573, 594–95 (Del. Ch. 2010) (same); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 
A.2d 1172, 1184 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same). 
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knowing participation in the breach.355  These claims accordingly are 
thought to be hard to prove.356  They have been pursued only rarely: prior to 
2014, bankers have shown up as Revlon defendants in an aiding and 
abetting capacity in only a handful of reported cases, Shoe-Town and 
El Paso among them.357 
 Vice-Chancellor Laster’s recent opinion in In re Rural Metro 
Corporation358 highlights the theory’s potential to generate big-ticket 
liability in the right case.  And Rural Metro was the right case, with facts 
contrasting notably with those of Del Monte and El Paso.  Here a banker 
searching for a buy-side financing score effected a textbook skew of a sale 
process.  The banker, RBC Capital Markets, had its eye on financing 
opportunities in two deals, both its client Rural Metro’s and that of a same-
industry player’s sale process already underway.359  RBC figured that 
pushing Rural Metro’s sale at the same time as the competitor’s could lead 
to its inclusion in both financing groups.360  Unfortunately, it did not 
disclose the play to the client, even as it eschewed any search for strategic 
buyers.361  The strategy promptly blew up when confidentiality agreements 
in the other deal caused its bidders to refrain from bidding for Rural 
Metro.362  Rural Metro’s sale process went forward even so, with few 
bidders participating.363  A disappointing bid finally was approved by the 
Rural Metro board.364  RBC all the while was secretly communicating with 
the bidder, tipping it to goings-on in the Rural Metro boardroom as RBC 
tried to secure a place in the financing group.365  RBC also was adjusting 
the numbers in its valuation of Rural Metro downward for the purpose of 
making the low-ball bid look attractive in its fairness opinion.366  The 
 
355. Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1039 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
356. See Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., No. 2823-VCN, 2010 WL 1713629, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 29, 2010) (“The standard for an aiding and abetting claim is a stringent one, one that turns on 
proof of scienter of the alleged abettor.”); Allied Capital, 910 A.2d at 1039 (“[T]he test for stating 
an aiding and abetting claim is a stringent one  . . . .”). 
357. See In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP., 2012 WL 1020471, at *28 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 59 A.3d 418 (Del. 2012) (raising an aiding and 
abetting claim against Credit Suisse); In re El Paso Corp., 41 A.3d at 432, 448 (Goldman Sachs); 
In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 
1990) (Shearson Lehman). 
358. In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
359. Id. at 91–92. 
360. Id. at 91. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 70. 
363. Id. at 71. 
364. Id. at 78–79. 
365. Id. at 95. 
366. Id. at 95–96. 
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successful bidder, licking its lips, never did include RBC in the financing 
group.367 
 This case, unlike Del Monte and El Paso, raises no issue as between 
taint and consequence.  On these facts the court did not need to hypothesize 
“might have been” counterfactual scenarios to show the negative dollars 
and cents implications for the sale process of the banker’s conflict.  Nor 
was scienter on the banker’s part a problem, so purposive had been its 
course of conduct. 
 The case still got a lot of publicity as a clear-cut demonstration of 
aiding and abetting’s liability potential.368  The banker, which walked away 
with only a $5 million fee, now is potentially on the hook for damages 
based on the value of the company as a whole.369  The case also highlights a 
plaintiff-friendly quirk in Delaware law.  The directors whose breach was 
being aided had already settled.370  They would, had the matter been 
litigated, have enjoyed the protection of a § 102(b)(7) liability shield371 so 
that money damages required a showing not just of an unreasonable sale 
process but of bad faith.  The court, following the logic of existing 
applications of § 102(b)(7), declined to extend the protection of the board’s 
shield to RBC.372  The bank was thus liable for damages based on a 
showing of an unreasonable sale process, a showing that would have been 
inadequate to support liability against the directors whose breach it aided 
and abetted. 
 There is something unsporting about the treatment differential.  
Indeed, one gets the sense that the shareholder plaintiffs have finally found 
a way around Shoe-Town, nailing the banker directly and emerging as de 
facto fiduciary beneficiaries of a deep-pocket defendant.  The court adds to 
this sense when it describes the treatment as a species of gatekeeper 
liability, justified for its deterrent rather than compensatory properties373—
much like the fraud-on-the-market litigation mill operated by the federal 
courts under SEC Rule 10b-5.374 
 
367. Id. at 78–79. 
368. See E-mail from Eric Klinger-Wilensky, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, to 
authors (June 25, 2014) (on file with authors) (explaining that, from a practitioner’s perspective, 
banker engagement letters have evolved in the post-Rural Metro world). 
369. Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 69, 107–09. RBC may be able to reduce its liability on a 
contribution theory.  Id. at 109. 
370. Id. at 79. 
371. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 85–86. 
372. Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 86. 
373. Id. at 88. 
374. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 100–18 (2011) (showing that fraud-on-the-market cannot be 
justified as a compensatory tort and that its proponents fall back on a deterrent justification, 
undermining their own case). 
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 These implications, while unfortunate, are only just that.  Rural Metro 
holds out no structural change in the law of banker–client relations.  The 
facts are egregious and the derivative liability theory is well-established.  
The takeaway for sell-side boards is unchanged from Del Monte and 
El Paso—the board should treat a conflicted banker at arm’s length and 
monitor closely.  The banker–client contracting pattern remains un-
disturbed, even impliedly.  As we have seen, exculpatory provisions 
exclude bad faith actions,375 and knowing participation in a breach of a 
client’s fiduciary breach surely falls within anyone’s concept of bad faith. 
F. Law, Economics, and Consequences 
 Part III’s economic analysis of banker–client relationships376 held out 
two strong warnings.  First, the existence of a conflict that negatively 
affects incentives does not by itself impair a transaction because the bank, 
constrained by reputational concerns, does not necessarily act on the 
conflict.  Second, even if the conflict negatively impacts the bank’s 
performance, the possibility may have been priced in ex ante.  Del Monte 
and El Paso traverse neither warning.  The first warning amounts to a plea 
for fact sensitivity and avoidance of per se barriers.  Revlon inquiry is all 
about fact sensitivity; it imports no general interdiction against conflicted 
bankers.377  Questions can be asked about the gravity of the negative 
consequences on which the cases rely.  But we think counterfactual 
possibilities should count as consequences, particularly given the 
preliminary, preclosing process context of Revlon litigation.  As to the 
second warning, ex ante pricing only solves all problems given complete 
information.  Once the complete information assumption is relaxed, 
opportunism becomes a distinct possibility, and information asymmetries 
are wrought into advisory relationships.  In any event, there is no evidence 
of fee discounting in trade for conflicts on the facts of these cases—in fact, 
that is what Vice-Chancellor Laster was asking for in Del Monte.378 
 The only residual economic objection would lie in market disruption: 
the parties contracted and the court pulverized the contracts.  Moreover, a 
market for reputation shapes banker–client relationships;379 judicial inter-
vention pretermits the market’s operation.  Both points are accurate, but 
unpersuasive when mooted as objections.  To make the contracts inviolate 
is to shut down Revlon scrutiny altogether: this is judicial review of a 
contracting process, justified due to the possibility of skews due to agency 
 
375. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra text accompanying notes 132–146. 
377. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 
1986) (emphasizing the particular factual circumstances giving rise to director breach of fiduciary 
duties). 
378. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 844 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
379. See supra subsection III(B)(3)(c). 
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costs.  There is no way to cabin off the banker–client contract from the 
others in the cluster.  It also bears noting that in both cases the court 
intervened with minimal damage to the contract in chief, the merger 
agreement.380 
 Indeed, the Chancery Court here acts less as a disrupter of the 
reputation market than as an important participant therein.  Conflicted 
actors suffer negative reputational consequences only to the extent that facts 
probative of opportunistic conduct become public.  Private litigation opens 
up otherwise black boxes, with the Chancery Court taking the lead role in 
highlighting hidden facts. 
 The blowback in the wake of the Del Monte and El Paso decisions 
makes sense accordingly.  The opinions register as strong negatives in the 
market for banker reputation, not only as regards their bottom line 
judgments but as regards facts revealed.  And, as we have seen, reputation 
matters critically in the economics of financial service provision.381  
Protests are only to be expected.  One can ascribe the protests’ motivation 
to honor impugned.  But we prefer to look to threats to future cash flows. 
 An interesting question arises as to whether these threats actually 
flowed through to the banks’ bottom lines.  Observers have noted that 
unconflicted boutique banks have been showing up high in the league 
rankings in recent quarters, attributing market-shifting impact to the 
Chancery Court.382  We ran a check on this, drawing on the Thomsen One 
quarterly top 25 league ranking for U.S. deals, and separating the banks on 




380. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 452 (Del. Ch. 2012) (denying a motion 
for a preliminary injunction and leaving the merger decision to the shareholders); Del Monte, 25 
A.3d at 844–45 (enjoining vote on the merger for only twenty days). 
381. See supra notes 132–44 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
383. See supra text accompanying notes 148–150 and Figure 1. 
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 Figure 2 depicts the results.  Clearly, the boutique sector has been 
doing well since Del Monte was decided in the first quarter of 2011.  No 
doubt many factors have contributed to this, most importantly secular trends 
in the merger market and movement of key personnel away from big 
banks.384  Seller aversion to conflicts also should be cited—one study offers 
suggestive evidence of increasing client sensitivity to conflicts going back 
decades.385  At the same time, the market share pattern remains volatile, and 
the recent figures show no clear-cut trend in the boutiques’ favor.386  So 
 
384. Alessi, supra note 155,at 64. 
385. See Agrawal et al., supra note 40, at 692–94 (studying mergers in which seller and buyer 
share a common advisor and showing growing evidence that companies have avoided sharing 
advisors since the 1990s). 
386. The first quarter 2014 numbers in Figure 2 reflect the attribution of boutique status to 
Paul J. Taubman, a retired Morgan Stanley banker who was the sole advisor in the Comcast 
acquisition of Time Warner Cable. See generally Marcus Baram, Paul J. Taubman, The Merger 
King Behind the Massive Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014, 
1:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/paul-j-taubman-merger-king-behind-massive-comcast-time-
warner-cable-deal-1555284, archived at http://perma.cc/EX98-75X3 (reporting that Taubman has 
served as an independent advisor in “some of the biggest deals in recent years” since being pushed 
out of Morgan Stanley in 2012).  Had Taubman been classified as “other,” the boutiques’ market 
share trend would be pointing downward.  See Mergers & Acquisitions Review: Financial 
Advisors, First Quarter 2014, THOMSON REUTERS 8 (2014), http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com/ 
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while it is not unreasonable to put the Chancery Court’s reputational inputs 
on the list of influences, the market share figures provide no basis for 
attributing Del Monte and El Paso with game-changing structural impact. 
 It also has been commented that stapled financing disappeared after 
Del Monte.387  We checked on this point too.  A study of mergers closed 
between 1998 and 2005 provides a base point, identifying either a seller–
advisor staple or past financing relationship in 13% of the deals.388  To see 
whether anything has changed, we compared private equity buyouts with a 
consideration over $100 million that closed in 2006 (at the height of the 
buyout frenzy), with those that closed in 2012 (the year beginning ten 
months after the Del Monte decision).  We found staples for 7% of the 2006 
deals and 12.5% of the 2012 deals.389 
 While the raw numbers signal no departure from the past pattern, 
closer inspection reveals a significant narrowing of usage.  Of the twelve 
staples we identified in 2012, only one involved the sale of a publicly 
traded company.390  The rest remained in the territory of the original staple, 
attached to sales of portfolio companies by private equity firms or of 
subsidiaries by operating companies.  There arises a strong implication of 
judicial impact: Revlon creates a litigation threat only when public 
companies are bought out and as to these deals staples have almost 
disappeared.391 
 It seems that actors in M&A continue to find staples advantageous, but 
only in their original, narrow usage where the justifications are strongest.  
Outside that territory, significant legal risks now attend their use.  So, even 
as Del Monte and El Paso have triggered no radical restructuring of the 
banking sector, they have changed the practice, reducing the salience of 
conflicts stemming from multiple service provision. 
 Does this amount to overkill?  Significantly, the one public company 
staple showing up in the class of 2012 was tested in the Delaware 
Chancery.392  It passed because the selling board qualified it within the 
parameters outlined in Del Monte: the purchaser really did need financing 
from its advisor, which withdrew from an advisory role and took a pay cut 
that funded the engagement of a second bank.393  To us this amounts to 
 
.cc/V923-FXW2 (showing that Taubman is individually ranked in eighth place in Thomson 
Reuters’ Top 25 league ranking for U.S. deals for the first quarter of 2014). 
387. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
388. Cain & Denis, supra note 59, at 15.  
389. We used the S&P Capital IQ database.  More particularly, in 2006, 12 out of 172 
transactions had the seller’s advisor in the buyer’s finance group; in 2012 it was 13 out of 104. 
390. This was the sale of Morton’s Restaurant Group, Inc. to Landry’s, Inc.  In re Morton’s 
Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 660, 673 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
391. At the same time, the staple’s price-floor function imports more of a benefit when the 
target is not publicly traded.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
392. Morton’s, 74 A.3d at 660, 673. 
393. Id. at 673.  We note that the standard of review in Morton’s was bad faith.  Id. 
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ordinary course adjustment rebounding to the selling shareholders’ benefit, 
not overkill.  It also contravenes the charges of the critics on the opposite 
side: these cases are anything but toothless. 
V. Regulatory Alternatives: Per Se Prohibition and Safe Harbors 
 Del Monte and El Paso amount to an external shock to actors in the 
M&A world.  The cases trigger reconsideration of standard practices.  
Solutions must be decided upon under uncertainty.  When conservative 
advice follows, expectations are disrupted.  But failure to follow incon-
venient conservative advice creates risks.  At the same time, the cases leave 
a lot of observers unsatisfied: some want more in the way of policing from 
the Chancery, while others think Revlon jurisprudence has gotten out of 
hand.394 
 In this Part we ask whether there might be a better way—a regulatory 
course imparting greater certainty while simultaneously leaving shareholder 
interests unimpaired.  We experiment with two alternative paths, one 
stricter and the other more accommodating, both rule based. 
 The stricter path, charted in subpart A, is per se prohibition of 
conflicts, posed by analogy to the law governing auditor–client relation-
ships.  We start by considering a broad-brush ban.  This proves neither 
feasible nor desirable.  We accordingly narrow the scope and consider a 
prohibition applied only to stapled financing.  This proves feasible without 
being clearly superior to case-by-case review under the open-ended Revlon 
standard. 
 The more accommodating path, charted in subpart B, narrows the 
range of Revlon exposure by dredging a safe harbor for conflicted banker 
engagements.  We draw on the case law respecting fairness opinions and 
the practice response to Toys “R” Us to propose a two-step qualification for 
safety: full disclosure by the conflicted banker to the board and the 
shareholders coupled with engagement of a second, unconflicted banker.  In 
most cases this combination should assure a reasonable sale process, but not 
in all.  The matter accordingly comes down to a trade-off: enhanced 
relational clarity for selling boards and their bankers versus Revlon scrutiny 
covering the entire range of process impairments.  Many would choose the 
former, particularly in light of the perception of a litigation explosion in the 
M&A field.  We choose the latter, pointing out that the zone of safety 
would turn out to be surprisingly small.  We also find ourselves untroubled 
by uncertainty in this context.  In our view, counsel can handle these 
problems. 
 
394. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
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A. Per Se Prohibition 
 Unlike bankers, auditors are organized as a profession and owe well-
articulated duties to their clients.395  But very much like bankers, profit-
seeking auditors have in the past embraced conflicted representation.396  
Eventually, however, Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) intervened to forbid the conflicts, articulating a list of 
per se prohibitions.397  This subpart takes a look at the evolution of the 
auditor rules and considers the possibility of per se prohibition of 
investment banker conflicts by analogy. 
1. Auditor Duties and Prohibition.—Like lawyers, auditors owe 
specially tailored duties to their clients.  Unlike lawyers and more like 
bankers, they have proved insensitive to their reputations regarding 
conflicted representation.  As a result, they stumbled into a regulatory 
crisis, emerging under specially tailored conflict prohibitions. 
 Auditors are held to a standard of care and, unlike bankers, are subject 
to direct shareholder actions for negligent misrepresentation.398  They also 
follow exhaustively articulated professional standards when conducting 
audits.399  Among other things, the auditor must remain “independent.”400  
Independence in turn derives much of its meaning from a long list of 
prohibited relationships.401 
 Prior to 2000, the prohibited list did not include most non-audit 
consulting services.402  In the 1990s the big accounting firms aggressively 
took advantage of this, developing large consulting arms that provided 
 
395. See generally William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 
DUKE L.J. 439 (2003) (arguing for a legal positivist approach to auditors’ duties and rejecting the 
principal–agent paradigm). 
396. See, e.g., id. at 441–42 (discussing the Enron scandal and the accompanying failure of 
Enron’s auditors). 
397. See Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 
Fed. Reg. 6006, 6007 (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, 274) 
(promulgating regulations following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act aimed at reducing 
auditor conflict). 
398. As with bankers under New York law, the theory is that the shareholders are in “near 
privity” to the contract between the auditor and the corporate entity.  See Credit Alliance Corp. v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 119 (N.Y. 1985) (requiring “the existence of a 
relationship between the parties sufficiently approaching privity”). 
399. The standards are articulated by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
REFERENCES IN AUDITORS’ REPORT TO THE STANDARDS OF THE PUBLIC COMPANY 
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, Auditing Standard No. 1 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 
2003), available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket010/2003-12-17_Release_2003-
025.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4PK-8QBT. 
400. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, R. 3520 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2006), available 
at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Documents/Section_3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
SZK5-6S6Z. 
401. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)–(h) (2012) (listing these relationships). 
402. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (1999).  
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advisory services to audit clients.403  By 2000 audit firm revenues derived 
from non-audit advisory services grew to 50% of total revenues where 
twenty years earlier non-audit fees had constituted only 13% of total 
revenues.404 
 There resulted a softening in auditors’ positions regarding questionable 
accounting treatments employed by their clients.405  Consider the audit of a 
company’s internal control and monitoring systems.  An auditor is unlikely 
to question the effectiveness of a compliance system sold by another 
division of his or her own firm.  Yet, during the 1990s, auditing firms 
routinely sold compliance systems to their clients—for instance, Arthur 
Andersen, the audit firm that signed off on Enron’s fraudulent financials of 
the late 1990s, had sold Enron its compliance system in 1993.406 
 The conflict bound up in auditor consulting closely resembles that 
bound up in a banker staple.  The unconflicted banker is supposed to work 
hard to maximize value for the selling company’s shareholders.  As we 
have seen, a banker that stands to make more money as a lender to the 
acquiring company has an incentive to draw back and take a more 
accommodating posture.407  Compare an unconflicted auditor, who is 
charged to maintain a posture of independence regarding its audit client408 
so as to position itself to impose Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) despite the protests of the client’s managers.  An auditing firm that 
stands to make substantial money through ancillary consulting fees will lose 
this independent edge: better to keep the client’s managers happy by 
passing on dubious accounting treatments than to alienate it by refusing a 
favorable opinion on its financials and thus lose consulting business. 
 Auditor consulting became a policy problem as the 1990s came to a 
close.  The audit firms stoutly defended themselves and lobbied against new 
regulation.409  The SEC, after much gnashing of teeth, in 2000 promulgated 
 
403. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 291 (2004). 
404. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor 
Independence and the Governance of Accounting 27 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. 
Studies, Working Paper No. 191, 2001). 
405. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2003).  For a similar discussion of auditor conflicts, 
see id. 
406. See Thaddeus Herrick & Alexei Barrionuevo, Were Enron, Anderson Too Close to Allow 
Auditor to Do Its Job?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1011565452 
932132000,00.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P3GZ-NEED (explaining that Enron became 
especially close with Arthur Andersen after it took over Enron’s internal audit in 1993). 
407. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
408. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1, § 220.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972). 
409. RICK ANTLE ET AL., AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE FOR A MULTI-CLIENT, MULTI-SERVICE PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTING FIRM 24–25 (1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1466963, archived at 
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a rule that much lengthened the list of prohibited services, adding 
bookkeeping, financial information systems design, appraisal or valuation 
services, actuarial services, fairness opinions, and management functions.410 
 The new prohibitions came too late to forestall disaster.  Enron, with 
its combination of sham transactions and antecedent (and lucrative) auditor 
consultation in the transactions’ structure,411 demonstrated that consulting 
relationships indeed contribute to catastrophic audit failures.  In 2002 
Congress embedded the substance of the SEC’s rule in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.412 
 2. Per Se Possibilities.—The per se approach taken to auditor conflicts 
by the SEC and Sarbanes-Oxley is a regulatory alternative open in any case 
where an advisory conflict holds out the possibility of negatively impacting 
a third-party interest.413  Does a justification for outright prohibition of 
banker conflicts follow by analogy? 
 a. Broad-Brush Prohibition.—Broad-brush prohibition of banker 
conflicts holds out a few attractions.  It would clear the scene of 
“appearance[s] of impropriety,”414 thereby enabling (arguably) more 
reasonable sale processes.  The selling board of directors would altogether 
avoid the cumbersome and risky business of managing conflicts.  All it 
would need to do is engage an unconflicted banker, or, in cases of post-
engagement conflicts, terminate the relationship and substitute an un-
conflicted banker. 
 On reflection, however, absolute prohibition would not work well.  
There are four categories of concern: structural, shareholder-oriented, 
institutional, and policy based. 
 i. Structural.—As we saw in Part II, M&A is not a world of randomly 
selected, one-time buyers and sellers.415  Banks, even boutique banks, are 
repeat players.416  So are buy-side private equity firms and the banks that 
 
http://perma.cc/F9DX-W9MM (arguing that providing consulting services is not a threat to 
auditor independence). 
410. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2014). 
411. Herrick & Barrionuevo, supra note 406. 
412. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (2012)).  The section also requires preapproval by the 
reporting company’s audit committee for any non-audit services not on the prohibited list.  Id. 
§ 201(h). 
413. See generally Bratton, supra note 405 (arguing that, in the context of auditor conflicts, 
formal rules rather than agency-based duties should govern). 
414. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
415. See supra text accompanying notes 109–110. 
416. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
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finance cash deals.417  Thus, even absent a staple, the bank representing a 
seller in a private equity buyout easily can have loans outstanding to 
companies owned by the private equity buyer and can be assumed to be 
making more loans to the buyer’s investees in the future.  Relationships 
develop as these institutions deal with one another repeatedly.  It follows 
that a rule of absolute prohibition could have unintended, disruptive effects.  
A selling firm could have difficulty finding a completely unconflicted 
advisor with the wherewithal for the job.  The Delaware courts recognize 
the problem: prior relationships between banker–advisors and private equity 
firms on the buy-side do not by themselves undermine a sale process.418 
 There is an argument in response: a broad-brush ban would precipitate 
beneficial industry restructuring—numbers of boutique firms limiting 
themselves to advising potential merger partners would grow to meet the 
resulting demand.  The prediction is credible.  We have seen that the sector 
is fluid and that talented bankers follow the bonuses.419  Indeed, boutique 
market share has been growing in recent years.420 
 But industry structure holds out a rebuttal argument for the big banks, 
based on their ability to provide a full range of market information.421  
Some selling companies will make business judgments that they need real 
time input regarding market conditions in addition to the strategic advice on 
offer from a couple of experts who have hung out a shingle.  To get an 
advisor with an infrastructure to provide this input, a large repeat player 
must be engaged.  On this view of the world, recourse to a full service bank 
may be unavoidable given a large, complex transaction.  We should 
accordingly leave boards of directors with a zone of discretion for 
managing conflicts. 
 It also bears noting that the system not only tolerates conflicts but goes 
out of its way to create them.  The standard performance fee creates a 
conflict by incentivizing the banker to favor a less risky low price over a 
more risky higher price,422 and alternative fee structures could ameliorate 
the problem.  Commentators have been criticizing the practice for more 
than two decades.423  Yet the fee arrangements remain unchanged, 
presumably because the clients prefer them. 
 
417. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
418. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 581–82 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating 
that a prior relationship between a banker–advisor and a private equity firm on the acquiring side 
is simply “one of the facts of business life”). 
419. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155. 
420. See supra text accompanying note 152 and Figure 1. 
421. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
422. See Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 185 (noting that contingent fees can prompt advisors 
to push for bad deals). 
423. See supra note 193. 
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 Auditing conflicts can be distinguished at this point: self-interested 
managers have every reason to create auditor conflicts so as to compromise 
independence toward the end of increasing management’s discretion re-
garding accounting treatments.424  There is no comparable perverse 
incentive in sale contexts, at least absent a particular self-interested tie to 
the buyer on the sell-side board. 
 ii. Shareholder Benefits.—Shareholder interests may be best served by 
a full-service bank with built-in conflicts.  Merger-advisory services are 
about information and a bank with which management has a long-term 
relationship knows more about the company.  That edge easily can trump 
dangers stemming from personal relationships from sell-side managers. 
 Even buy-side relationships may fall short of disabling when all costs 
and benefits are tallied.  Hypothesize a strategic merger with a same-
industry buyer.  There happens to be one banker who knows the industry 
better than any other, a banker with unique knowledge and skills who for 
many years has advised many companies in the industry on mergers and 
other strategic choices.  This banker comes to the selling company having 
advised the purchasing company in the past and has a present expectation of 
providing the purchaser with future services—a clear conflict.  Yet the 
selling company may be better off with the conflicted banker on its team, 
both to secure the best informed advice and to prevent the best informed 
advisor from joining the opposing team.  Arguably, the selling board 
reasonably can manage the conflict, engaging a second bank to provide the 
fairness opinion and disclosing the conflict to its shareholders. 
 In sum, expected shareholder benefits can figure importantly and 
reasonably into the calculations of sell-side boards that tolerate banker 
conflicts.  A heavy presumption against per se regulatory intervention 
follows. 
 iii. Institutional.—Even if we were to determine that a broad-brush 
prohibition makes cost–benefit sense, the Delaware Chancery Court is not 
the lawmaker equipped to lay down the mandate.  The exercise is 
legislative: terms need to be defined and lines need to be drawn; formal 
regulations drafted by experts are the best means to that end. 
 Assuming that regulations are desirable, what body should do the 
formulating?  By analogy to other professions, a self-regulatory organi-
zation should generate rules on conflicts along with best practice guidelines 
for advisors and givers of fairness opinions—a banker’s equivalent of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the American Bar 
 
424. See Bratton, supra note 395, at 442 (describing the problem as one of managers 
“cross[ing] the auditors’ palms with silver in exchange for a free hand to manage bottom-line 
numbers”). 
BRATTON(WACHTER).FINAL.RESUBMIT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  12:26 PM 
2014] Bankers and Chancellors 75 
 
Association.  But there is no organization that functions in this way.425  But, 
where lawyers and auditors long ago organized as guilds, chilling 
competition and regulating themselves into the bargain, investment banks 
have refrained from doing so.426  Perhaps selling boards and their 
shareholders would be better off if investment banks had evolved 
differently; perhaps FINRA should lower the boom on the banks and 
mandate professional organization.  Such an intervention implies a 
fundamental change of approach, fundamental enough to make it 
unreasonable to look to Delaware corporate law as the leading edge of 
change. 
 iv. Policy.—Fundamental reform follows from recognition of a 
fundamental structural problem.  It is not at all clear to us that banker 
conflicts have this salience.  One study looks to see if acquisition premiums 
are sensitive to investment banker fee structures.427  It finds no evidence 
that fee structure drives premiums—the drivers instead are target and 
transaction characteristics, with which the fees do vary.428 
 Nor does anyone make a broader claim that sale processes are so 
skewed against seller shareholders as to cause them to be systematic losers.  
Merger premiums are substantial, so substantial as usually to arrogate the 
merger gain to the target shareholders.  Studies of announcement period 
price effects bear out this assertion with a stark allocational picture.429  
 
425. For a proposal of an Investment Banking Authority that would issue guidelines and 
standards, see Davidoff, supra note 35, at 1615–19. 
426. See John C. Coffee, Limited Options, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2003, http://www.le 
galaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2003/review_coffee_novdec03.msp, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/ZNZ6-R6SB (“Accountants . . . and attorneys all belong to self-regulating professions. 
Much like medieval guilds, [these] professions regulate themselves protectively,” but “time will 
tell . . . whether professional independence is even a realistic goal for the ‘sell-side’ analyst”). 
427. Calomiris & Hitscherich, supra note 55, at 9–10. 
428. Id.  There are a number of other studies of bankers and fees.  Results are inconclusive.  
See Helen M. Bowers & Robert E. Miller, Choice of Investment Banker and Shareholders’ Wealth 
of Firms Involved in Acquisitions, 19 J. FIN. MGMT., Winter 1990, at 34, 37, 39 (addressing the 
relationship between acquisition fees and shareholder wealth in an empirical study analyzing 
whether the choice of investment banker affects shareholder wealth); William C. Hunter & Mary 
Beth Walker, An Empirical Examination of Investment Banking Merger Fee Contracts, 56 S. 
ECON. J. 1117, 1118 (1990) (finding a positive relationship between banker fees and social gain in 
merger transactions); Rau, supra note 149, at 322 (studying incentive fee structures and finding 
that the difference in fee structures relates to market share); Anthony Saunders & Anand 
Srinivasan, Investment Banking Relationships and Merger Fees 3 (NYU Stern Sch. Bus. Research 
Series, Working Paper No. S-FI-01-07, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1298849, archived at http://perma.cc/V9F2-Y5GH (determining that buy-side firms 
pay higher advisory fees to advisors they have long-term relationships with without experiencing 
significantly better results). 
429. Studies of fairness opinions add an intriguing fact—while sell-side fairness opinions 
have no effect on premium or announcement period return, in the one-third of cases where the 
buyer gets a fairness opinion, premiums are 4.3% lower but buyer announcement period returns 
are also 2.3% lower.  Kisgen et al., supra note 59, at 180. 
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While target shares go up a consistent 16% during the three days 
surrounding announcement, bidder shares go down—the average was 
−0.3% in the 1970s, −0.4% in the 1980s, and −1.0% in the 1990s.430  Over a 
time window of several months, target shares average an increase of 23.8%, 
while bidder shares on average go down around 4%.431  The figures imply 
consistent losses to bidder shareholders.432 
 The policy implication is straightforward: Revlon has been working 
well for the sell side. 
Summary.—The four grounds of objection cumulate to rebut the proposition 
that broad-brush prohibition of banker conflicts would materi-ally improve 
the platform on which companies are sold. 
 
430. Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 
110 tbl.3 (2001). 
431. Id.  The decline was ‒4.5% in the 1970s, ‒3.1% in the 1980s, and ‒3.9% in the 1990s.  
Id.  There is a literature that sorts for the characteristics of bidder firms with low abnormal returns. 
Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm 
Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 770 (2005), summarizes its results as follows: 
abnormal returns are lower for (1) low leverage firms; (2) low Tobin’s q firms; (3) firms with 
large cash holdings; (4) firms with low managerial ownership of shares; and (5) large capitali-
zation firms.  Lower abnormal returns are also associated with certain transactions: (1) public firm 
targets; (2) target opposition; (3) conglomerate results; (4) competitive bidding; and (5) stock 
consideration.  Id. at 770–71. 
432. A reference to portfolio theory makes the results less disturbing.  Most bidder 
shareholders own their shares in diversified portfolios.  They thus stand on both sides of the deal 
and so are indifferent to the division of gain as between bidder and target.  Robert G. Hansen & 
John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Share-
holders/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 59 (1996).  So long as the 
combined result for the bidder and the target nets out positive, everything is fine.  And such was 
the case until the late 1990s: from 1973 to 1998, the combined three-day-window result averaged 
a positive 1.8%; from 1973 to 1979, the average was 1.5%; from 1980 to 1989, the average was 
2.6%; and from 1990 to 1998 the figure was 1.4%.  Andrade et al., supra note 430. 
 Unfortunately, a cluster of mergers in the late 1990s reversed the 1.8% long-term positive.  
Sarah Moeller, Frederik Schlingemann, and René Stulz marshal some shocking three-day 
announcement returns.  They show that from 1980 to 1990, bidder firms’ shares lost an aggregate 
$4 billion, and from 1990 to 1997 they gained $24 billion.  Moeller et al, supra note 431, at 758–
59.  From 1998 to 2001, however, they lost $240 billion, bringing down the 1990 to 2001 result to 
a $216 billion bidder loss.  Id.  The 1998 to 2001 numbers are so bad that they make for a negative 
combined result of $134 billion for bidders and targets in the period.  Id.  The negative dominoes 
fall from there.  Where in the 1980s combined returns were a positive $12 billion, from 1991 to 
2001 the combined loss was $90 billion.  Id. at 763.  That nets out to a $78 billion loss for 1980 to 
2001. 
 These disastrous results stem from 87 deals out of a total of 4,136 in the authors’ sample.  Id. 
at 765.  The large-loss deals were more likely to be hostile tender offers and more likely to be in 
the same industry, but neither result is statistically significant.  Id. at 771.  The most prominent 
common feature among the bidding firms is prior acquisition behavior.  They are serial acquirers 
with high market valuations that in the past had made value-enhancing acquisitions.  Id. at 777.  
Moeller, Schingemann, and Stulz suggest that the pattern of success causes an increase in the 
managers’ zone of discretion.  Id.  The managers then push the acquisition pattern too far and the 
market withdraws its support.  Id. at 777–78. 
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b. Narrow and Tailored Prohibition.—Let us suppose that Vice-
Chancellor Strine had been tougher in Toys “R” Us—that instead of 
disavowing any intent to make a “bright-line statement”433 in the case he 
had gone ahead and done so, holding that targets seeking to pass Revlon 
inspection must avoid staples. 
 A narrowly framed staple remover would avoid many of the problems 
that beset the broad-brush prohibition hypothesized above.  Definitional 
problems would be minimal and the case for judicial competence would be 
stronger.  Interference with pricing arrangements and other market practices 
also would be minimal.  Such a prohibition still would cut against the grain 
of Revlon jurisprudence.  In its earliest iterations, Revlon was thought to 
have a bright-line aspect, requiring an open auction.434  The Delaware 
courts smoothed that rule-like aspect out over time, calling only for the 
realization of the “highest value reasonably attainable” without specific 
directives as to the means to the end.435  Revlon is very much a standard. 
 A staple-remover also triggers questions concerning the sell-side 
shareholder interest.  We have seen that staples have defenders and that the 
arguments in favor work well as regards the auction of a privately-held 
company.436  But a shareholder-beneficial staple is easily hypothesized even 
outside of that narrow auction framework.  This time Target, Inc.’s 
managers take a look at their industry and decide that the time has come to 
sell.  They engage Unibank, their longtime banker–advisor, and sit down 
with it and work out an upset price.  Unibank shops the company with little 
success on the strategic side.  But a financial bidder meets the upset price 
and, with a little negotiation, exceeds it.  Credit is tight and the buyer has 
trouble putting together a banking syndicate.  It becomes clear during the 
negotiation process that Unibank’s participation will be necessary.  
 
433. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 n.46 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
434. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).  Rejecting this 
bright-line approach, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated in Barkan v. Amsted Industries: 
This Court has found that certain fact patterns demand certain responses from the 
directors.  Notably, in Revlon we held that when several suitors are actively bidding 
for control of a corporation, the directors may not use defensive tactics that destroy 
the auction process.  When it becomes clear that the auction will result in a change of 
corporate control, the board must act in a neutral manner to encourage the highest 
possible price for shareholders.  However, Revlon does not demand that every change 
in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.  
Revlon is merely one of an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of 
interest that arise in the field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors 
act with scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
435. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988); see also 
Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“[T]here is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its 
duties.  A stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is not to be 
expected in the face of the evolving techniques and financing devices employed in today’s 
corporate environment.”). 
436. See supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
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Unibank, as Target’s longtime advisor, knows more about its internal 
operations than any third party.  Its participation in the bank syndicate 
imports outcome-determinative informational credibility.437  A per se rule 
against staples kills a good deal. 
 3. Summary.—We began this section asking why banker conflicts are 
tolerated where auditor conflicts are not.  The answer lies in accumulated 
experience.  Severe auditor conflicts were once tolerated even though the 
context was professionalized and auditors owed clear fiduciary duties to 
their clients.  Discomfort among federal regulators grew as the conflicts 
became more severe.  Ultimately, audit failure combined with financial 
disaster to lead to hardwired prohibitions in Sarbanes-Oxley.  Banker 
conflicts in merger negotiations present much less of a threat to investor 
interests than did the auditor conflicts of the 1990s.  The value of the 
service rendered does not depend on independence.  Any taints or skews are 
transaction specific.  With auditing, in contrast, the stakes go to the 
informational integrity of the entire stock market.  Mergers, moreover, 
particularly activate boards of directors.  The board, which normally sits 
back and monitors, moves to the forefront of day-to-day decision making, 
better enabling it to manage advisor conflicts effectively.  Finally, banker 
conflicts have been subject to scrutiny in the Delaware courts since the day 
Revlon was decided.  This backstop, case-by-case supervision makes it 
unlikely that these relational compromises will lead to a systemic break-
down in governance processes, as happened with auditor conflicts. 
B. Safe Harbor 
 Subpart A took up the claim that Del Monte and El Paso stop too short 
in their policing of banker conflicts, looking into the possibility of a fresh, 
prohibitive approach.  As it happened, none of the per se alternatives posed 
emerged as obviously superior to Revlon scrutiny.  This subpart takes up the 
other side of criticism of Del Monte and El Paso—the claim of regulatory 
boundaries overstepped, looking for a bright-line rule that might qualify 
conflicted representation.  We couple the disclosure rule with the solution 
derived in practice to qualify staples in the wake of Toys “R” Us,438 
positing that full disclosure to the selling board and the shareholders taken 
together with engagement of a second, unconflicted banker circumstantially 
guarantees a clean deal.  The proposition is sensible.  But whether the 
circumstantial guarantee suffices to justify the creation of a safe harbor to 
 
437. Cf. Linda Allen et al., The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions, 36 J. 
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 197, 200 (2004) (empirically confirming a positive “certification 
effect” in cases where a commercial bank served as merger advisor). 
438. See supra notes 255–260 and accompanying text. 
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immunize banker–client relationships from later Revlon disruption still 
presents a difficult question.  We conclude that it does not. 
1. The Case in Favor.—We use the term “safe harbor” loosely, for in 
our standards-based regime of corporate fiduciary law, no conflicted 
transaction can be shielded with 100% certainty.  That said, safe harbors are 
not unknown in corporate fiduciary law—a famous one obtains in respect of 
director and officer self-dealing transactions.  In Delaware, majority 
disinterested-director approval based on full disclosure blocks ex post 
judicial scrutiny for fairness and triggers the protection of the business 
judgment shield.439  By analogy, full disclosure of banker conflicts to sell-
side boards and shareholders could have a similar effect with Revlon 
scrutiny.  To the extent that a conflict could still impair the sale process, 
engagement of a second banker holds out additional comfort, with the two 
together operating as a safe harbor. 
 Full disclosure and second banker engagement already provide 
substantial insulation on the narrow question whether a banker conflict 
undercuts a fairness opinion.440  We only carry this usage to its logical 
conclusion in the following affirmative restatement: full disclosure plus 
independent director approval plus resort to a second banker together block 
a Revlon claim grounded in tainted banker influence. 
 A question arises at the outset.  Why include the third leg of second 
banker engagement, and why not impart safety based on a basic agency law 
approach: full disclosure and informed consent subject to a bad faith 
backstop?  The parties are sophisticated and the bad faith backstop leaves a 
considerable stretch of conflicted territory remaining outside the ring of 
safety.  The Del Monte fact pattern, for example, gets no protection here; 
when the banker deceives the client disclosure is anything but full and bad 
faith is clear. 
 The second banker does address an important problem.  The conflicted 
advisor deals with counterparties outside of the board’s purview and 
recommends actions from a position of informational superiority.  This 
stretches the consenting board’s monitoring capabilities to the limit.  It is 
not hard to posit a situation where the conflict impairs the process despite 
full disclosure and consent.  The buy-side ownership interest in El Paso 
arguably presents such a case.  Second banker engagement addresses the 
problem: the board retains what it values in the conflicted banker’s 
participation while assuring a flow of unconflicted advice, easing the 
monitoring burden.  A second banker requirement makes the safe harbor 
 
439. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2011); see also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, 
Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 173–75 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006) (applying the “safe 
harbor” provision of § 144(a) and noting that one director’s interest in the transaction “would not 
vitiate the presumptions of the business judgment rule”). 
440. See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text. 
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less capacious while providing a stronger assurance that the conflict will be 
mediated successfully.  As such it adds robustness to the proposal. 
 The safe harbor also would impart added certainty to sell-side actors, 
and it would have the advantage of being optional—a board not wishing to 
engage a second banker could take a pass, accepting the risk of subsequent 
Revlon litigation.  A safe harbor would also make it harder for plaintiffs, an 
attractive result in an era when the fact of a sale by itself makes a court 
challenge highly probable.441  The trend toward merger litigation makes Del 
Monte and El Paso look inopportunely timed, dumping grist at a shabby 
litigation mill.  It arguably is time to cut back on the size of the playing 
field. 
2. Contrary Concerns.—The utility of the safe harbor just posited 
suffers from significant practical limitations.  First, any effect on the overall 
burden of Revlon litigation would be nominal, for a safe harbor concerning 
banker conflicts would not shut the Revlon door.  It would only foreclose 
one line of scrutiny within a wider inquiry and then only after a 
determination that full disclosure actually had been made, a conclusion 
likely to be subject to plaintiff challenge.  Second, there would be a 
problem of specification.  Second banker engagement implies mediation: 
the board must decide what tasks go to the new banker and what tasks 
remain with the old one.  El Paso presented a case where a problem 
persisted despite such a division of labor.442  To hold out review of the 
specification denudes the safe harbor of value.  If a plaintiff attacks the 
appropriateness of the deployment of the two bankers as well as the 
disclosure, then the defending board ends up in substantially the same 
position as in a world without a safe harbor.  Of course, the safe harbor’s 
value could be preserved with a blunt approach: so long as a second banker 
comes on board, safety is achieved no matter how the board deploys the 
two bankers.  But this is a large concession, so large as to make one wonder 
whether the substantive cost of a safe harbor outweighs the benefits.  Third, 
there is a question regarding out-of-pocket cost, second banker engagement 
being an expensive expedient.  Maybe the shareholders would be better off 
in the long run under a stricter regime that pushes boards in the direction of 
engagement severance. 
 Finally, there is a question regarding the magnitude of the certainty 
enhancement.  Banker conflicts crop up as troublesome facts in the course 
of a broader inquiry into the sale process.  A safe harbor in effect tells the 
inquirer that the fact no longer should be deemed troublesome.  The 
resulting effect on the inquiry as a whole is hard to project.  Presumably, a 
 
441. In 2005, 39.3% of closed deals in Professors Cain and Davidoff’s dataset experienced 
state law litigation; by 2011, the figure rose to 92.1%.  Cain & Davidoff, supra note 13, at 3. 
442. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
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safe harbor would cut off a claim based exclusively on a banker conflict 
taint and alleging that the banker’s compromised incentives by themselves 
made the sale process unreasonable without alleging any more particular 
negative effects.  A showing of particular effects would present a line-
drawing problem.  Assume for example, a safe-harbored conflict along with 
independent facts showing that the banker skewed a competitive sale 
process toward a favored bidder.  The skew, although a consequence of the 
conflict, presumably would remain a legitimate topic of inquiry, problema-
tizing the banker’s performance and incentives despite safe harbor 
protection. 
 There is also a question concerning the allocation of the burden of 
uncertainty.  Boards of directors already possess a straightforward 
expedient with which to deal with severe banker conflicts—prohibition.  
They look to counsel to determine whether the conflict requires that drastic 
step.443  If, once advised of litigation risk, the board chooses to continue 
with a conflicted banker because it values the relationship net of the 
conflict, the burden falls again on counsel, this time for a persuasive 
articulation of reasons and advice on appropriate contractual adjustments.  
Were a safe harbor to diminish this stress, counsel would be the primary 
beneficiary. 
 It is not at all clear to us that the corporate lawyers who give this 
advice need this solicitude.  This is a variant of the standards versus rules 
debate,444 with Revlon as the judicially administered, open-ended standard 
and the proposed safe harbor as a modifying rule.  Standards assure that the 
regime of scrutiny covers all fact patterns at the cost of a high compliance 
burden on regulated parties.  Rules relieve the burden by holding out 
specific instructions at the cost of regulatory arbitrage in the form of 
compliant conduct that subverts the regulatory objective.445  The case for 
rules strengthens as the volume of regulated traffic increases and proximity 
of scrutiny decreases, as with GAAP and federal securities disclosure 
requirements.446  In these situations, precise instructions save costs, and 
rules as a practical matter may be the only effective mode of regulation.  
Bankers and boards present the opposite situation.  In public company 
governance, sale processes are the exception not the rule;447 multiple parties 
 
443. Cf. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 216, § 11.20 (reflecting that, when an attorney’s own 
conflict is at issue, such conflict may be so severe as to be “non-consentable”). 
444. See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) (describing the standards-versus-rules debate as one emphasizing whether 
law is given substance ex post or ex ante, respectively). 
445. Cf. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United 
States, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 7, 30–33 (2004) (detailing the benefits of rules in the accounting 
context). 
446. Cf. id. at 30 (arguing that “[t]he case for rules strengthens materially in an imperfect 
institutional framework, such as that prevailing respecting the audit function in the US”). 
447. See Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change 
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weigh in carefully on important decisions and given a challenge, scrutiny 
will be close.  There is no analogy to wholesale matters like GAAP and 
federal securities compliance.  In other words, merger sale process is the 
archetypical case for a standard.  In a one-off, big-money context, claims of 
a need for guidance or safety should be deeply discounted. 
3. Conclusion.—We doubt that our hypothesized safe harbor makes 
cost–benefit sense.  To dredge a safe harbor is to value litigation certainty 
over the risk of sale process infirmity.  We would not make that choice, 
absent a showing that indiscriminate filings by the plaintiffs’ bar have 
driven the cost of Revlon scrutiny to unacceptable heights.  We do not read 
recent litigation statistics to signal a law reform as anything approaching 
such an emergency. 
C. Commentary 
 Our double-barreled search for alternative approaches returns us to the 
starting point: judicial scrutiny under the open-ended Revlon standard.  If 
our analysis is persuasive, it implies the conclusion that there is no clearly 
superior alternative to Revlon scrutiny despite the attendant risks and 
uncertainties. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Robert Kindler, a banker at Morgan Stanley, has been quoted as 
saying, “We are all totally conflicted—get used to it.”448  What is he telling 
us?  He could be making a structural point: because the banking sector is 
concentrated, conflicts are inevitable and accordingly must be tolerated and 
their management left to the client’s discretion.  He could be making a 
relational point: because banker–advisors are not really fiduciaries, conflicts 
are permitted and accordingly should be tolerated and managed.  He could 
be making both points.  Whatever Mr. Kindler’s more particular com-
municative motivation, he makes one thing absolutely clear: bankers 
themselves are untroubled by conflicts and have no incentive to ameliorate 
any resulting problems through self-regulation. 
 With Del Monte and El Paso the Delaware Chancery Court “gets used 
to it.”  But, contrary to Mr. Kindler’s implication, familiarity does not result 
in acceptance.  Importantly, the court’s treatment of banker conflicts does 
not follow from a revitalization of the dormant, fiduciary side of the 
 
of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 942–43 (2013) (recognizing that “not every sale 
requires a full-blown auction process” and corporate boards can opt for more limited negotiated 
sales rather than public auctions). 
448. Andrew Ross Sorkin, When a Bank Works Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08business/yourmoney/08deal.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/SA36-QFQ9. 
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banker–client relationship.  The banker fiduciary duty has not awakened, 
reared its head, and started roaring about honor and self-sacrifice.  Revlon is 
about the board’s unquestioned, unwaivable fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders.  Whether or not the banker should or should not have done 
something is irrelevant.  The question is whether the board, in contracting 
mode, should have permitted or contained it.  There is no clash between 
contractual and fiduciary values; this is all on the contractual side. 
 But, even as these cases apply the law without changing its terms, the 
M&A world looked very different before than it does after.  Before, the law 
of banker–client relationships amounted to a field open to contracting out 
subject to minimal ex post scrutiny.  After, there is a cognizable potential 
for reasonableness review.  Before, shareholders had no tractable cause of 
action against a banker.  After, a shareholder action under Revlon can effect 
forfeiture of the banker’s fee and contribute to an attractive return to a class 
action attorney, while a robust aiding and abetting claim can hold out a 
money judgment jackpot. 
 Why, if the possibility for intervention against banker conflicts lay 
inherent in the structure of Revlon inquiry, did it take so long for inter-
vention to occur?  Perhaps the delay was just an accident of history—no 
case happened to come along.  But maybe more has been going on.  
Relational standards may have declined over time, with cognizable conflicts 
finally showing up amidst the stress of a severe recession.  Evidence of 
increasing bank concentration taken together with the reactive rise of the 
boutique sector449 support this reading.  Perhaps the Chancery Court 
became more sensitive to banker incentive problems, influenced by the 
widespread skepticism about practices at big banks triggered by the 
financial crisis.450  If so, the change is a legitimate one: like a banker, the 
Chancery Court has a reputation to protect. 
 In any event, changes which loom large in the Revlon context look less 
than fundamental when we take a step back and look at M&A as a whole.  
The Chancery Court’s interventions are discreet and occur as a phase of the 
deal-making process.  The challenged mergers still closed and actors on 
Wall Street labor under no per se conflicts prohibition.  Primary decision 
making is still remitted to the board of directors of the banker’s client.  The 
cases simply shift the cost–benefit calculus against the bankers.  And, even 
as the cases also enhance the authority of the lawyers in the sell-side team’s 
internal discussions, the decision remains a business rather than legal 
judgment, in this case exercised by independent directors. 
 
449. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
450. We note that the spike in boutique market share in the down market of 2008 has been 
attributed to reputational reverses at commercial banks in the wake of the financial crisis.  Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg, Boutique Banks to Cash In, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 23, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-09-23/boutique-banks-to-cash-inbusinessweek-busine 
ss-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice, archived at http://perma.cc/X396-2WXK. 
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 Perhaps banker–client relationships should be considered de novo with 
a view to articulation of best practices, whether at the instance of bankers 
undertaking formal organization as a profession or the existing self-
regulatory organization, FINRA, imposing client duties on bankers as an 
incident of market regulation.  Such a fundamental relational restructuring 
could not be undertaken effectively by the Delaware courts.  To the extent 
the Chancery Court’s minimalist but high profile interventions forestall 
such fundamental reform initiatives by diminishing the volume and 
magnitude of banker conflicts, the bankers owe the court a word of thanks. 
 
 
